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Abstract 
This dissertation consists of three essays which examine information flows through 
financial markets and across firms, and investigates the factors affecting the process of 
information dissemination.  The first essay examines whether the announcement of a credit 
rating change for a given firm contains information pertinent to the valuations of intra-industry 
peer firms. I identify an information spillover effect on peer firms surrounding credit rating 
downgrades. Further, I find that the post-announcement spillover effects are indicative of an 
overreaction in the market’s response to the downgrade announcement. Peer firms exhibit 
predictability in their post-announcement returns as a function of their relative transparency.  
The second essay explores the relation between instances of credit rating initiations and 
stock market liquidity. Traditional finance literature holds the view that liquidity is impaired as a 
function of information asymmetry. Additionally, that credit ratings have been shown to reduce 
information asymmetry. This study uses instances of new credit ratings to examine the change in 
stock market liquidity surrounding the announcement of the new rating. My results suggest that 
rating initiations improve in the liquidity of the newly rated firm’s equity and that managers 
exploit this price support through seasoned equity offerings. 
The third essay investigates information flows through the social networks of board 
members. I find that the degree to which a CEO and her directors overlap in social communities 
affects the governance of the firm and that these effects are conditional upon the adverse 
reputation costs faced by the board. For firms whose boards face relatively lower (higher) 
potential adverse reputation costs to bad behavior, clustering is associated with poorer (better) 
governance and greater (lesser) expropriation by managers. 
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I. Introduction 
The efficacy of managers and the price setting mechanisms of financial markets are, 
ultimately, reliant upon the transfer and assimilation of information. Information fidelity is 
paramount to the functioning of efficient financial markets and to the effectiveness of firm 
managers. The three essays in this dissertation examine information flows through financial 
markets and across firms and investigate the factors affecting the processes of information 
dissemination.  What impediments affect information flows in financial markets? Under what 
circumstances will restrictions on the flow of information cause price deviations from intrinsic 
values? How can individuals or firms mitigate the problems associated with restrictions in the 
transfer of information?  
In the first essay, I examine the spillover effects of credit ratings changes on the intra-
industry peers of the rated firm. To the extent that credit ratings contain information about the 
industry in which the firm operates, changes in the rating of a given firm should have valuation 
consequences for like firms. I analyze both the contemporaneous and long-term valuation 
impacts on peer firms and identify an information spillover effect on peer firms surrounding 
credit rating downgrades. The equity values of peer firms suffer, on average, at the 
announcement of an intra-industry downgrade. Furthermore, the post-announcement spillover 
effects are indicative of an overreaction in the market’s response to the downgrade 
announcement. Peer firms exhibit predictability in their equity returns post-announcement as a 
function of their relative transparency. Information induced overreaction seems to be present at 
the announcement of an intra-industry credit downgrade. 
The second essay builds on prior literature that examines the correlation between equity 
liquidity and credit ratings. Traditional finance literature holds the view that liquidity is impaired 
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as a function of information asymmetry. Additionally, credit ratings have been shown to reduce 
information asymmetry. Using instances of new, long-term issuer credit rating initiations, I 
examine contemporaneous movements in stock market liquidity surrounding the announcement 
of the new credit rating. Controlling for contemporaneous changes in market/industry-wide 
liquidity by propensity matching firms who obtain a rating with those who do not, my findings 
show that credit rating initiations are associated with statistically significant increases in the 
liquidity of a firm’s equity. Additionally, managers capitalize on this price support through 
increased seasoned equity offering activity. 
While my research primarily focuses on information propagation in financial markets, I 
also investigate information flows through networks of individuals. Using BoardEx, an extensive 
database which covers the social networks of business executives, I investigate the effects that 
networks impart upon firm governance. I identify “social clustering” (roughly defined as close-
knit communities within a network) and study its effects on the information environment of firms 
and on the incentives, behaviors, and outcomes of network participants. The degree to which a 
CEO and her directors overlap in social communities affects the governance of the firm and that 
these effects are conditional upon the adverse reputation costs faced by the board. For firms 
whose boards face relatively lower (higher) potential adverse reputation costs to bad behavior, 
clustering is associated with poorer (better) governance and greater (lesser) expropriation by firm 
managers. 
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II. Essay 1: Spillover Valuation Effects of Credit Rating Changes: ‘Shoot First, Ask 
Questions Later’1 
Wayne Y. Lee and Garrett A. McBrayer 
A. Abstract 
Opacity hinders information efficiency. When information is asymmetric, investors use 
credit downgrades to infer adverse changes in the creditworthiness of similar firms in the same 
industry. Intra-industry cumulative abnormal equity returns (CARs) over the seven-day event 
window around announcements of rating downgrades from investment to speculative grade 
average -1.23%, and -1.30%, controlling for rating, firm characteristics, as well as year and 
industry fixed effects. Overreaction results when price contagion is dominated by noise trading. 
CARs over three, six, and twelve-month windows starting four days after downgrade 
announcements average 1.45%, 5.02%, and 5.47%, respectively. The reversals in price declines 
are predominantly on shares of transparent industry peers. For opaque peers, share price declines 
continue post announcement. Significant average increases in the return on assets, profit margin, 
and earnings per share of industry peers from the preceding to subsequent fiscal year around 
downgrade announcement years corroborate the post announcement rise in share prices. Lastly, 
we show that transparency is priced. Transparent firms have lower systematic risks and lower 
costs of capital. 
JEL Classification: G14, G24 
Keywords: contagion, market efficiency, credit ratings, opacity 
  
                                                     
1 We thank seminar participants at the University of Arkansas and the 2015 Eastern Finance 
Association Annual meetings for their invaluable comments and suggestions. We thank 
especially Tim Yeager and Alexey Malakhov for their comments. All errors remain our own.  
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B. Introduction 
Credit rating agencies play critical roles in alleviating informational asymmetries 
between borrowers and lenders and apportioning risks in financial markets. The value of the risk 
certification process depends on its objectivity, informativeness, and timeliness. Credibility is 
uncertain when issuers pay to be rated and can shop competing rating agencies. High regulatory 
costs of cheap talk and reputation considerations safeguard the trustworthiness of credit signals 
(Ottaviani and Sorensen, 2006). To assess creditworthiness, rating agencies count on their 
specialized access to non-public information about firms. Regulation Fair Disclosure Act (Reg 
FD) enacted in 2000 preserved the selective disclosures of private information by management to 
certified rating agencies.2 The exclusion of equity analysts and other market participants from 
opportunities to obtain confidential information enhanced the informational advantage of ratings 
agencies. Following initial ratings, ratings agencies monitor firms for changes in 
creditworthiness and the threat of adverse rating changes motivates firms to take corrective 
actions (Boot, Milbourn, and Schmeits, 2006). Meetings with management (at least annually) are 
used to review past performance, discuss potential problems, and stay apprised of future plans. 
Explanations regarding ratings changes, as with initial ratings, refer only to public information to 
ensure the confidentiality of sensitive information provided by rated firms.  
Public announcements of unexpected changes in credit ratings can convey latent but 
economically significant revisions in the private information that ratings agencies have about 
firms. Moreover, because ratings agencies recognize that risk management responses to ratings 
changes necessitate costly portfolio adjustments, ratings changes are more likely to anticipate 
longer term permanent rather than volatile market-driven changes in credit risk. 
                                                     
2Section 102(b)(2).  
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Performance based compensation and likelihood of dismissal induce managers to 
advance or voluntarily disclose good news, and delay or avoid the disclosure of bad news (Chen, 
Hong, and Stein, 2001). Market reactions to credit rating downgrades and upgrades are 
asymmetric. Holthausen and Leftwich (1986) find significant negative abnormal equity returns 
on one or more rating class credit downgrades of straight debt averaging -2.66% over a two-day 
window ending one day after announcement.3 On credit upgrades, equity share price changes are 
positive, but are negligible and insignificant. Announcements of credit upgrades appear to be 
largely anticipated.  
Jorion, Liu, and Shi (2005) examine the impact of Reg FD on the information content of 
credit rating changes. Their findings suggest the special exemption granted credit rating agencies 
to management disclosures of confidential information reduced the informativeness of prices. As 
Odders-White and Ready (2006) point out, firms more exposed to shocks initially observed by 
“insiders” will incur higher adverse selection costs that deters informed trading in equity. The 
rise and fall in equity share prices in reaction to credit rating upgrades and downgrades were 
larger and more significant post Reg FD. The exclusion of analysts and other market 
professionals had a greater impact on firms with more analysts as well as larger sized firms that 
were more likely to make use of selective disclosures to institutional investors.4 Heflin, 
Subrahmanyam, and Zhang (2003) find, however, that voluntary disclosures by firms 
                                                     
3For example, a change from A+, A, A- to BBB+, BBB, or BBB-. Holthausen and Leftwich (1986) 
do not find significant abnormal equity returns around announcements of credit downgrades 
within a rating class. Hand, Holthausen, and Leftwich (1992) also find that bond and stock prices 
react to unexpected additions of firms to the S&P Credit Watch List. In the three-day event 
window around the credit watch announcement, bonds decline relative to benchmark Treasuries 
by -1.39%, and CRSP equally-weighted market adjusted stock returns by -1.78%.   
4The authors acknowledge the limitations of their event study. Sample period was confined to the 
26 months prior and subsequent to the enactment of Reg FD on October 23, 2000 that coincided 
with an economic recession in 2001.  
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significantly increased post Reg FD and earnings forecast accuracy (actual from consensus) was 
relatively unchanged. A reduction in the adverse component of the bid-ask spread post Reg FD 
noted by Eleswarapu, Thompson, and Venkataraman (2004) points to improved information 
efficiency. 
Observed drifts in equity share prices post credit downgrade announcements suggest that 
markets are not information efficient. When rated firms have the opportunity to take corrective 
actions, delays in credit downgrade announcements can mislead investors about the gravity of a 
firm’s financial condition. Investors underestimate the longer-term real costs of financial distress 
associated with credit downgrades. Dichev and Piotroski (2001) find statistically significant 
negative abnormal equity returns of -10% to -14% in the first year, and an annualized -4% to -
6% over the two and three years following credit ratings downgrades. The performance deficit is 
especially pronounced for firms with non-investment grade debt and small firms where analyst 
following and investor interest are low. A lack of transparency impedes investors’ inferences. 
 This study focuses on the impact of long-term issuer credit ratings downgrades by 
Standard and Poor’s (S&P) from investment-grade (>=BBB-) to speculative-grade (<=BB+) on 
similar firms in the same industry as credit-downgraded firms. Our motivation for examining 
these events stems, in part, from S&P’s literature on the information employed in determining 
credit ratings:    
"Credit ratings are forward-looking opinions about credit risk. Standard & 
Poor’s credit ratings express the agency’s opinion about the ability and 
willingness of an issuer, such as a corporation or state or city government, to 
meet its financial obligations in full and on time. The reasons for ratings 
adjustments vary, and may be broadly related to overall shifts in the economy 
or business environment or more narrowly focused on circumstances affecting 
a specific industry, entity, or individual debt issue. The likelihood of default is 
the single most important factor in our assessment of creditworthiness." 5 
 
                                                     
5http://www.standardandpoors.com/ratings/definitions-and-faqs/en/us. 
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To the extent credit rating agencies are better informed about business and financial risks, 
investors will use credit downgrade announcements to infer changes in the creditworthiness of 
similar firms within the same industry.6 The unstructured and qualitative nature of the 
disclosures and differences in transparency make it difficult, however, for investors to 
discriminate across firms. We conjecture that when investors are asymmetrically informed, 
opacity exacerbates the variability in beliefs about an asset’s fundamental value. Increased price 
uncertainty requires arbitrageurs to bear greater risk. The limits to informed arbitrage creates 
space for noise trading (Delong, Shleifer, Summers and Waldman, 1989 and 1990). An 
overreaction results when price contagion at credit downgrade announcements is dominated by 
noise trading. The resolution of information uncertainty and resumption of informed trading 
following credit downgrade announcements leads to price reversals. When investors are poorly 
informed, the market reaction at announcement is characterized by 'shoot first, ask questions 
later'. 
Our main findings can be briefly summarized as follows. First, we document significant 
negative intra-industry cumulative abnormal equity returns over the three-day to seven-day event 
windows around announcements of credit rating downgrades from investment to speculative 
grade. Intra-industry equity price declines are notably greater when the credit downgrades are 
unexpected, and only slightly smaller, the more severe is the competitive impairment of the 
credit downgraded firm.   
Second, cumulative average abnormal equity returns on transparent industry peer firms 
                                                     
6Previously unknown future changes in business and financial risk factors may be implied in 
credit downgrade announcements. Business risk factors include country risk, industry condition, 
competitive position, business and geographic diversification, management, regulatory 
environment and strategy. Financial risk factors include capitalization, leverage, earnings, 
funding, liquidity, cash flow, risk management, and accounting. 
http://www.standardandpoors.com/aboutcreditratings/RatingsManualPrintGuide.html.  
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are less negative than on opaque industry peer firms. At best, however, a small percentage of 
transparent peer firms avoid a negative cumulative abnormal equity return at credit downgrade 
announcements. Investors overreact to potential adverse changes in the creditworthiness of 
similar firms in the same industry as credit-downgraded firms. 
Third, we find significant positive intra-industry cumulative abnormal returns in the six-
month and one-year event windows post announcement. Share price declines at credit 
downgrade announcements are reversed for transparent peer firms but continue their decline for 
opaque peer firms post announcement as information uncertainty is resolved and informed 
trading resumes. Taking the Fama-French (1993) and Carhart (1997) momentum asset pricing 
factors into account, more transparent firms have lower systematic risks and lower cost of 
capital. Transparent firms experience higher profitability in the year post-announcement. 
The remaining sections of this paper are organized as follows. Section 2 reviews related 
literature and presents our hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data used for our analysis and our 
empirical design. Section 4 reports and discusses the spillover valuation effects at announcement 
and post-announcement. Robustness tests are presented in section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
C. Background and Hypotheses 
1. Earnings Transparency 
Barth, Konchitchki, and Landsman (2013) argue that earnings transparency reflects the 
extent to which earnings disclosures are credible public signals about the fundamental value of 
firms. Lower uncertainty about intrinsic asset values diminishes the return investors require. The 
reduced cost of capital increases firm value. Investors will seek private information when the 
predictive content of earnings about firm value is poor, however, acquisition costs can be high 
when firms are complex entities. Moreover, gains to informed trading require sufficient market 
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liquidity. Earnings transparency will remain important in mitigating the informational 
asymmetry between inside managers and outside investors.   
The sum of explanatory powers ( 2R ) from a two-step estimation procedure of the 
returns-earnings relation capture the intertemporal industry and industry-neutral cross-sectional 
variations in earnings transparency. A significant negative relation between earnings 
transparency and subsequent excess and portfolio mean returns is documented. Taking Fama-
French (1993) and Carhart (1997) momentum asset pricing factors into account, firms with more 
earnings transparency enjoy a lower cost of capital. 
2. Return Synchronicity 
Earnings as signals of economic value have limitations. Reporting standards and adoption 
can differ across firms as well as change over time. Earnings are historical rather than forward-
looking. Innovation, expansion, acquisitions or divestitures can alter a firm’s business and 
earnings power. The quality and clarity of disclosures can vary by firms as well. Last but not 
least, differences in performance based incentives influence when, what, and how managers 
exercise discretion.  
Roll (1988) notes the extent to which stock returns move together will reflect 
macroeconomic, industry, as well as firm-specific factors. He finds however that firm size, 
industry, and the impact of unique industry or firm-specific news cannot explain the low degree 
of co-movement ( 2R ). Low return synchronicity, he concludes, can be due to “either the 
existence of private information or else occasional frenzy unrelated to concrete information 
(p.56)”. 
Morck, Yeung, and Yu (2000) find that emerging markets exhibit highly synchronous 
stock price movements. Moreover, return synchronicity is not related either to the size of the 
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stock market or economy. Rather, the inadequate protection of property rights makes informed 
risk arbitrage unattractive. And as Delong, Shliefer, Summers, Waldmann (1989 and 1990) 
show, the reduction in informed trading can increase market-wide noise trading. Further, in 
countries that provide poor investor protection from corporate insiders, e.g. from earnings 
expropriation or risk-shifting behaviors, can render firm-specific information less useful. The 
reduction in firm-specific information in stock prices increases stock return synchronicity.  
Durnev, Morck, Yeung, and Zarowin (2003) confirm that high firm-specific return 
variation as a fraction of total variation signals more informative stock prices. Regressions of 
current stock returns against future earnings are estimated to infer how much information stock 
prices contain about future earnings. Aggregated coefficients on future earnings and the marginal 
variation of current stock returns explained by future earnings capture the informativeness of 
stock prices. They find that firms and industries with lower market model 2R exhibit higher 
association between current stock returns and future earnings.  Markets are more information 
efficient. 
Jones, Lee, and Yeager (2012a) argue that opacity exacerbates the variability in beliefs 
about an asset’s fundamental value. Increased price uncertainty requires arbitrageurs to bear 
greater risk. The limits to informed arbitrage creates space for noise trading (Delong, Shleifer, 
Summers and Waldman, 1989 and 1990) that engenders positive feedback loops where the 
misconceptions of noise traders can prolong deviations of price from fundamental value. The 
inability of investors to discriminate across firms leads to return synchronicity (Roll 1998; 
Morck, Yeung, and Yu, 2000; Durnev, Morck, Yeung, and Zarowin, 2003). Investors use the 
information revealed about a specific firm to update their price expectations of similar but 
opaque firms. Using bank merger announcements, Jones, Lee, and Yeager (2012b) find that 
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between 2000 and 2006, revaluations of banks not involved in the mergers were higher for more 
opaque banks. The most opaque non-merger banks with the highest revaluations prior to the 
financial crisis also experienced the largest price declines in the 2007-2008 financial crisis. 
Further, the “separation of brains and capital” (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) weakens the 
effectiveness of market discipline. Jones, Lee, and Yeager (2012b) find that valuation discounts 
associated with investments in opaque assets fell in the period 2000 to 2006. The fall in the 
required returns increased risk-taking in the years preceding the 2007 financial crisis. The 
resulting rise in return synchronicity, which peaked in 2007, created systemic risk. 
3. Hypotheses 
In this study, we conjecture that opacity impairs information efficiency. Investors will use 
public disclosures of credit downgrades to infer future changes in business and financial risks 
that confront similar firms in the same industry. But uncertainty about the causal risk factors that 
contributed to credit downgrades makes accurate assessments difficult and enables noise trading. 
Investors overreact to the potential adverse change in the creditworthiness of firms in the same 
industry as credit-downgraded firms. The contagion in equity share price declines of industry 
peer firms at credit downgrade announcements are reversed post announcement for transparent 
industry peer firms. For opaque industry peer firms, equity share price declines at credit 
downgrade announcements continue post announcement. 
D. Empirical Design 
1. Sample Selection 
Our sample period starts in January 2000 and ends in December 2010. We excluded the 
years prior to the enactment of Reg FD in 2000. As noted earlier, a special exemption on 
selective disclosures of confidential information under Reg FD enhanced the informational 
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advantage of credit ratings agencies. The enactment of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street and 
Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Section 939B), however, removed the special exemption from 
Reg FD accorded statistical rating organizations and credit rating agencies for the purpose of 
determining or monitoring credit ratings.7 Ending in 2010 also allowed us to examine the effects 
of credit rating changes in the year(s) following credit rating changes. A comprehensive list of 
Standard and Poor’s (S&P) credit rating changes was compiled from Bloomberg Data Services. 
From this list, we focused on credit rating downgrades from investment grade (>=BBB-) to 
speculative grade (<=BB+) and conversely for upgrades. The list of event firms were then 
matched to the Center for Research in Securities Price (CRSP) database to obtain equity share 
prices around announcements of credit ratings changes.  
To alleviate problems posed by thinly traded, illiquid securities and to ensure reliable 
estimates of abnormal returns, we required the equity shares of event firms to be traded at least 
90% of the 282 days prior to the event date and 252 days following the event date. Moreover, to 
avoid potential biases with serial credit ratings changes, firms with more than one credit change 
event within a 366-day period were removed. Credit ratings changes by differing firms that 
occurred within the same industry over a period less than 15 days were also eliminated. Further, 
to avoid the potential for confounding effects of other corporate events in our abnormal returns 
calculations, we excluded any event firm which also had a merger announcement in the one 
month preceding or following the credit rating change. Event firms with share prices below $5 
were also excluded. Lastly, financial firms with two-digit SIC codes in the interval 60-69 
inclusive were discarded. The final sample contains 133 credit-downgrade events and 84 credit-
                                                     
7Dimitrov, Palia, and Tang (2013) find that the increase in legal and regulatory penalties under 
Dodd-Frank made optimistic ratings costlier. As a result, credit ratings agencies issued lower 
ratings and gave more false warnings. Downgrades that were less informative because investors 
rationally discounted the private information of credit rating agency analysts.   
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upgrade events.8 
 As in prior studies, firms in the Compustat Annual database operating in the same 
three-digit Standard Industrial Classification code (SIC-3) as the event firm in the fiscal year 
immediately preceding the year of the ratings change announcement are considered peer firms.9 
Equity share prices for the 4,799 and 2,951 peer firms associated with credit downgrade and 
upgrade events respectively were obtained from the CRSP database. As with event firms, we 
required the equity shares of peer firms to be traded at least 90% of the 282 days prior to the 
event date and 252 days following the event date, and also that share prices of peer firms were 
greater than $5. 
[Insert Table 1 here.] 
 The top panel of Table 1 reports, by year, the distribution of credit downgrade 
(upgrade) events, the mean number of peers, the mean CAR[-3,3] for the event firm, and the 
mean number of notches crossed in rating changes. As expected, macroeconomic conditions 
affect the frequency of credit downgrades. Credit downgrades occurred with greater frequency 
following the tech bubble collapse in 2000 as well as during the economic recession in 2001 and 
recovery in 2002 and 2003 that ensued. Credit upgrades are fewer in number and more likely in 
years of strong economic growth. The mean CAR for credit-downgraded event firms is negative 
regardless of the year and ranges from -23.16% in 2002 to -1.07% in 2007. The bottom panel of 
Table 1 shows considerable heterogeneity in the distribution of credit rating changes and peer 
firms across industries. Credit downgrades cluster in retail, machinery, and utility industries. 
Credit upgrades cluster in machinery and utilities industries. The mean number of peer firms per 
                                                     
8Our sample selection procedure is detailed in Appendix B. 
9In unreported, random sample checks, we find the SIC codes given by Compustat better reflect 
the parent firm’s SIC designation. However, our results are robust whether we use Compustat 
Annual or CRSP to identify peer firms. 
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industry are highest in the oil, machinery, cars, and utility industries and are lowest in 
transportation, construction, and clothing industries. On average, the number of peer firms in 
credit downgrades are roughly one-third less than in credit upgrades.  
[Insert Table 2 here.] 
 Table 2 presents the pattern of credit upgrades and downgrades in our sample. 
The rows and columns of the matrix are the credit ratings of the event firms before and after the 
change, respectively. The numbers of ratings changes meeting the pre and post rating level are 
reported in the cells. For both upgrades and downgrades, the majority of credit change events 
involve a one-notch change across rating categories; e.g. from BBB- (BB+) to BB+ (BBB-). Note, 
however, that approximately 48.8% of the credit downgrades span more than one than one notch, 
and 31.5%, for credit upgrades. Altogether the pattern of credit upgrades and downgrades as well 
as the distribution across industries and over time show considerable variation in credit ratings 
changes. 
2. Abnormal Equity Returns 
To compute daily abnormal equity returns, a Fama-French (1993) three-factor plus 
Carhart (1997) momentum factor returns model is estimated over the period 282 days to 30 days 
prior to announcement date.10  
 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖,𝑅𝑀(𝑅𝑀,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡) + 𝛽𝑖,𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑅𝑆𝑀𝐵,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖,𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑅𝐻𝑀𝐿,𝑡 
                                            +𝛽𝑖,𝑀𝑂𝑀𝑅𝑀𝑂𝑀,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  (1) 
Daily abnormal equity returns summed over three-day, five-day, and seven-day event windows 
around announcement yield cumulative abnormal equity returns, CAR[-1,1], CAR[-3,1] and 
                                                     
10Our results are robust to various methods of calculating abnormal returns including a simple 
market adjustment, a one-factor market model, as well as a Fama-French (1993) three-factor 
returns model. 
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CAR[-3,3].11 We use two proxies for the news content of credit rating changes. Event Firm 
CAR[-3,3] is the seven-day cumulative abnormal return of the credit ratings change firm at 
announcement. As in Holthausen and Leftwich (1986), Notches is a categorical variable that 
reflects the severity of the credit downgrade by the numerical drop in rating steps. For example, a 
ratings change from BBB-  BB+  BB generates a Notches value of -2. Summary descriptive 
statistics are reported in Table 3. 
[Insert Table 3 here.] 
CARs at announcement for credit downgraded and upgraded firms reported in the top 
panel of Table 3 are consistent with Holthausen and Leftwich (1986) and Dichev and Piotroski 
(2001). Credit-downgraded firms experience significantly negative abnormal equity returns. The 
mean CAR[-1,1], CAR[-3,1] and CAR[-3,3] are -5.26%, 6.89%, and -7.59% respectively; and, 
median CARs, are -2.13%, -2.82%, and -2.54% respectively. For upgrades, mean CAR[-1,1], 
CAR[-3,1] and CAR[-3,3] are positive, but are only significant in the three-day and five-day 
event windows and are much smaller in magnitude than for downgrades. Median CARs are not 
statistically significant.  
Announcement CARs for peer firms exhibit a similar pattern. For credit ratings 
downgrades, mean (median) CAR[-1,1], CAR[-3,1], and CAR[-3,3] of -0.70% (-0.27%), -1.01% 
(-0.45%), and -1.09% (-0.44%), respectively are negative and statistically different from zero at 
better than the 1% level. For credit upgrades, mean and median CARs are considerably smaller in 
magnitude than for downgrades and largely indistinguishable from zero. 
Credit ratings upgrades are largely anticipated. Regressions of peer firm CARs on event 
firm CARs and Notches with fixed effects for year and industry corroborate that spillover 
                                                     
11We also allowed our event window to range from as much as 10 days prior to 5 days after the 
event and found that our results remain qualitatively unchanged. 
® ®
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valuation effects are more significant for credit downgrades than credit upgrades. The 
information contagion is greater the more adverse is investor reaction to the credit downgrade. 
Peer firms benefit more when the competitive impairment of credit-downgraded firms is severe. 
From here on, we focus our analysis on credit ratings downgrades from investment to speculative 
grade.12 
The remainder of Table 3 examines announcement returns around credit rating 
downgrades within investment grade and within speculative grade. Two key findings should be 
noted. First, our results support the findings of Jorion and Zhang (2010). Intra-industry 
revaluations at credit downgrades within investment grade reflect information contagion, and 
competitive effects for credit downgrades within speculative grade. Secondly, peer firms exhibit 
statistically significant, negative CARs at credit downgrades within investment grade. But as the 
regression results show, average CARs though negative are statistically insignificant when event 
firm CARs and Notches with fixed effects for year and industry are taken into account. 
3. Peer Firm Characteristics 
To examine how opacity impacts information efficiency, we construct proxies for the 
transparency of peer firms.  As Roll (1998), Morck, Yeung, and Yu (2000), and Durnev, 
Morck, Yeung, and Zarowin (2003) argue, higher firm-specific return variation as a fraction of 
total variation implies a more informative equity share price. We use R2 from a Fama-French 
(1993) three-factor plus Carhart (1997) momentum factor returns model estimated over the 
period 282 days to 30 days prior to the event date to capture the return synchronicity of peer 
firms. We compute Return Synchronicity, as the difference between the peer firm’s R2 and the 
                                                     
12In unreported analysis, we repeat all our subsequent tests on the sample of credit-upgraded 
firms and find no consistent announcement or post-announcement spillover valuation effects on 
peer firms. 
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median across all peers in the same event, to proxy for the informativeness of price. Peer firms 
are relatively more opaque (transparent) when their Return Synchronicity is positive (negative). 
As a second measure of transparency, we also compute earnings transparency following 
Barth, Konchitchki, and Landsman (2013) as the summation of two R2. The first R2 is obtained 
from an earnings-returns relation regression shown in (2) estimated for each year (t = 2000, …, 
2010) and for each Fama-French 17 industry.  
 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛼0
𝐼 + 𝛽1
𝐼𝐸𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 𝑃𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1⁄ + 𝛽2
𝐼∆𝐸𝑖,𝑗,𝑡/𝑃𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 (2)  
Subscripts i, j, and t denote firm, industry, and year, respectively. 𝑅𝐸𝑇 is the annual equity return 
of a firm measured beginning three months after the firm’s fiscal year end, 𝐸𝑡/𝑃𝑡−1 is the 
earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued operations scaled by the beginning of year 
price, and ∆𝐸 is the change in earnings from year t-1 to t. Coefficients in (1), 𝛼0
𝐼 , 𝛽1
𝐼, and 𝛽2
𝐼 , are 
the same for firms within industry j in year t. R2 in (2) captures the industry variation in returns 
in response to permanent and transitory components in earnings. 
The magnitude of the residuals in the industry-year regressions (2) are then used each 
year to sort firms in each industry into quartiles to form portfolios p (p = 1, …, 4). Portfolios 1 
and 4 have the largest negative and largest positive residuals respectively. A second earnings-
return regression shown in (3) is estimated for each year and each portfolio.  
 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑝,𝑡 = 𝛼0
𝐼𝑁 + 𝛽1
𝐼𝑁𝐸𝑖,𝑝,𝑡 𝑃𝑖,𝑝,𝑡−1⁄ + 𝛽2
𝐼𝑁∆𝐸𝑖,𝑝,𝑡/𝑃𝑖,𝑝,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑝,𝑡 (3) 
R2 in (3) captures the temporal variation in the industry neutral component of earnings 
transparency. 
For each peer firm, Earnings Transparency, is the sum of their R2 from (2) and (3). 
Higher values of Earnings Transparency are associated with greater firm transparency. As with 
return synchronicity, we subtract the median earnings transparency of all peers in the same event. 
18 
 
Positive (negative) values are associated with more transparent (opaque) peer firms. 
Investor assessments of changes in creditworthiness from credit downgrades can differ 
between rated and unrated peer firms. Alissa, Bonsall, Koharki, and Penn (2013) use the log of 
total assets (Ln(TA)), sales and general administrative expenses scaled by revenue (SGA), asset 
tangibility (PPE), market-to-book (MTB), return on assets (ROA), solvency (Altman-Z), as well 
as research and development expenses scaled by total revenue (R&D), as surrogates for expected 
credit ratings.13 Table 4A reports descriptive statistics for our sample of peer firms. 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
Median values for firm transparency, Return Synchronicity and Earnings Transparency, 
are zero by construction but show considerable heterogeneity. Return Synchronicity ranges from 
-0.3947 to 0.5670, and Earnings transparency, from -0.4064 to 0.7614. Approximately 27.6% of 
our sample of peer firms are rated by S&P. 
Table 4B presents summary statistics by Fama-French 17 industries. The clothing 
industry is the most transparent industry with the lowest Return Synchronicity and highest 
Earnings Transparency. The most opaque industries are durables and steel with the highest 
Return Synchronicity, and oil, with the lowest Earnings Transparency. The percentage of peer 
firms with S&P rating is highest and lowest in the utilities and machinery industries.  
Table 4C presents the Pearson (below diagonal) and Spearman rank correlations (above 
diagonal). Return Synchronicity and Earnings Transparency are negatively but not significantly 
rank correlated. The transparency measures capture distinct factors that contribute to information 
asymmetry.14 Earnings Transparency reflects the quality of public disclosures by firms to 
                                                     
13Variable definitions are provided in appendix A. 
14For Pearson correlation, t-statistic = 𝜌/𝑠𝑞𝑟𝑡[(1 − 𝜌2)/(𝑁 − 2)] is distributed Students t  with  
𝑑𝑓 = 𝑁 − 2. For Spearman rank correlation, standard error  𝜎 = 0.6325/(𝑁 − 1). 
19 
 
investors. Return Synchronicity reflects the private information that investors have about the 
intrinsic values of firms. 
Significant negative and positive correlations with Return Synchronicity and Earnings 
Transparency suggest that peer firms with high SGA tend to be more transparent. Peer firms that 
are larger, with higher asset tangibility and profitability, are more likely to be S&P rated. 
Conversely, peer firms with higher SGA, growth opportunities, solvency, and R&D expenditures 
are less likely to be S&P rated. 
E. Empirical Results 
1. Announcement Event CARs 
Table 5 reports the results of cross-sectional OLS regressions of peer firm CAR[-3,3] with 
fixed effects for year and industry and robust standard errors clustered by industry. In these 
regressions, Return Synchronicity and Earnings Transparency examine the effects of opacity. 
The impact of S&P rating, Event Firm CAR[-3,3] and Notches, as well as the characteristics of 
the peer firms are taken into account. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
Across model specifications, there is a significant negative intra-industry average CAR[-
3,3] of about 1.24% at credit downgrade announcements. The share price decline corroborates an 
earlier finding in Table 3. Investors infer meaningful adverse changes in the creditworthiness of 
similar firms in the same industry.  
The significant negative coefficient on Return Synchronicity and significant positive 
coefficient on Earnings Transparency show that share price declines are notably lower (higher) 
for transparent (opaque) firms. However, at best a small percentage of peer firms avoid a 
negative CAR[-3,3] at credit downgrade announcements. A one standard deviation change in 
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Return Synchronicity and Earnings Transparency implies about a -0.56% and 0.14% change in 
CAR[-3,3]. Given an average negative CAR[-3,3] of 1.24%, even peer firms whose Return 
Synchronicity are two standard deviations lower than median will experience a share price 
decline.  
Credit downgrade announcements exacerbate investor beliefs about the creditworthiness 
and intrinsic value of similar firms in the same industry. Increased uncertainty and limits to 
arbitrage enables noise trading. On balance, investors overreact to potential adverse changes in 
creditworthiness of peer firms at credit downgrade announcements. 
Further, at credit downgrade announcements, investors do not discriminate between S&P 
rated and unrated peer firms. Coefficients on S&P Rated and Investment Rated are positive but 
mainly insignificant. The positive significant Event CAR[-3,3] coefficient suggests information 
contagion is greater the more adverse is investor reaction to the credit downgrade. A one 
standard deviation change in Event CAR[-3,3] results in about a 1.66% change in CAR[-3,3]. 
Moreover, the negative significant Notches coefficient implies that peer firms benefit more when 
the competitive impairment of credit-downgraded firms is severe. The competitive effect is, 
however, small in magnitude. A one standard deviation change in Notches results in about a -
0.28% change in CAR[-3,3]. 
Lastly, share price declines are significantly smaller for peer firms that are more 
profitable (ROA) and have lower SGA. A one standard deviation change in profitability and SGA 
results in about a 0.76% and -0.17% change in CAR[-3,3]. 
2. Post-Announcement Event CARs 
To examine intra-industry post-announcement cumulative abnormal returns, we compute 
CARs over three-month, six-month, and one-year event window: CAR[4,68], CAR[4,130], and 
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CAR[4,256]. Table 6 reports the results of cross-sectional OLS regressions of peer firm post-
announcement CARs with fixed effects for year and industry and robust standard errors clustered 
by industry. In these regressions, Return Synchronicity and Earnings Transparency examine the 
effects of opacity. The impact of S&P rating, Event Firm CAR[-3,3] and Notches, as well as the 
characteristics of the peer firms are taken into account.  
[Insert Table 6 here] 
Significant negative Event Firm CAR[-3,3] at credit downgrade announcements are 
reversed post announcement. Across model specifications, three-month CAR[4,66] is a positive 
though insignificant 1.4% average. Six-month CAR[4,130] rises to a significant positive 4.7% 
average. Twelve-month CAR[4,130] evens out at a significant positive 4.9% average. Informed 
trading post announcement corrects investor overreaction at announcement.  
The negative significant Return Synchronicity and positive significant Earnings 
Transparency coefficients indicate the reversal primarily benefit transparent peer firms. Share 
price declines continue for opaque peer firms with higher than median Return Synchronicity and 
lower than median Earnings Transparency. A one standard deviation change in Return 
Synchronicity and Earnings Transparency implies about a -2.76% and 2.72% change in 
CAR[4,130] and about a -5.37% and 4.68% change in CAR[4,256]. Given an average negative 
CAR[4,256] of 4.9%, opaque peer firms whose Return Synchronicity or Earnings Transparency 
are one standard deviation higher or lower than median will experience a share price decline 
post-announcement. 
The information contagion associated with credit downgrades are fully reflected in Event 
Firm CAR[-3,3]. The benefits to peer firms from the competitive impairment of credit-
downgraded firms are transient and reverse in the six months following announcement. From the 
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correlation table in Table 4C, coefficient signs on significant firm characteristics suggest that 
post-announcement returns are higher for unrated and more creditworthy peer firms.  The former 
are smaller in size (Ln(TA)), high SGA, high solvency (Altman-Z), and invest in R&D. The latter 
are lower growth (MTB) and higher profitability (ROA). 
3. Uncertainty Resolution 
Post-announcement abnormal equity returns are computed on the assumption that 
systematic risk (beta) exposures estimated in the pre-announcement period remain unchanged 
following credit downgrades. But heightened uncertainty about the creditworthiness and intrinsic 
value of similar firms in the same industry as credit-downgraded firms may raise investors’ 
perceptions of systematic risks. Positive post-announcement CARs may simply reflect a latent 
change in systematic risk (beta) exposures. 
We conjecture, however, that information uncertainties are gradually resolved post-
announcement. The release of quarterly earnings reduces the informational asymmetry between 
firms and outside investors. When Earnings Transparency is high (low), disclosures are 
informative about the creditworthiness and intrinsic values of peer firms. Further, credit 
downgrade announcements that intensity investor uncertainties also enhance the incentives to 
acquire private information. Share price changes post announcement are more likely to signal 
informed trading. 
We examine our conjecture in an asset pricing framework. At each event, peer firms are 
assigned into quartiles sorted by their values of Return Synchronicity, Earnings Transparency, 
and summed ranks on Return Synchronicity and Earnings Transparency. Return Synchronicity 
and Earnings Transparency are both estimated in the pre-announcement period. By each 
measure of transparency, peer firms sorted into portfolios 1 to 4 represent the least transparent 
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and most transparent respectively across all events.  
Using a Fama-French (1993) three factor and Carhart (1997) momentum factor returns 
model, we estimate seemingly unrelated regressions (Zellner, 1962). 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑅𝑀𝑅𝐹,𝑝(𝑅𝑀𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡) + 𝛽𝑆𝑀𝐵,𝑝𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝐻𝑀𝐿,𝑝𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽𝑈𝑀𝐷,𝑝𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡 
                                           + 𝛽𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑,𝑝𝑆&𝑃 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖 + 𝛽𝐼𝐺,𝑝𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡  𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽𝑍𝑍𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡
 (4) 
𝑖 denotes peer firms in portfolio 𝑝. Beta coefficients for peer firms differ only across portfolios. 
We include proxies for rating – 𝑆&𝑃 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖 and 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡  𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑖, as well as 𝑍𝑖, a vector of 
event and peer firm characteristics – Event CAR[-3,3], Notches, Ln(TA), SGA, PPE, MTB, ROA, 
Altman-Z, and R&D. Regressions control for year and industry fixed effects and compute robust 
standard errors clustered by industry. In (4), 𝛽𝑅𝑀𝑅𝐹,𝑝, 𝛽𝑆𝑀𝐵,𝑝, 𝛽𝐻𝑀𝐿,𝑝, and 𝛽𝑈𝑀𝐷,𝑝 characterize 
the systematic risk exposures on the least to most transparent quartile portfolios across events 
over the one-year post-announcement event window [4,256]. 𝛼𝑝 denotes the excess risk-adjusted 
returns on the least to most transparent quartile portfolios of peer firms across events over the 
one-year post-announcement event window [4,256]. Results are presented in Table 7. 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
The left-hand panel of Table 7 utilize portfolios formed by Return Synchronicity. The 2 
basis point abnormal daily return (alpha) on portfolio (1) with the least transparent peer firms is 
not significantly different from zero. As expected, daily abnormal returns increase monotonically 
in magnitude and statistical significance with transparency. The 8 basis point abnormal daily 
return on portfolio (4) is significant. Moreover, the positive difference in abnormal daily return 
between portfolio (4) and (1) of 6 basis points is significant at better than the 1% level (F-
statistic = 17.9). 
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Further, note that systematic risks are significantly higher for opaque peer firms. 𝛽𝑅𝑀𝑅𝐹 is 
1.09 for portfolio (1) and decreases monotonically to 0.51 for portfolio (4). Similarly, 𝛽𝑆𝑀𝐵 is 
0.66 for portfolio (1) and declines to 0.42 for portfolio (4). A negative significant 𝛽𝑈𝑀𝐷 for 
portfolio (1) suggests that returns on opaque peer firms exhibit reversals rather than momentum.   
Lastly, positive significant 𝛽𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 and negative significant 𝛽𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 coefficients 
suggest that S&P speculative grade peer firms are more risky than S&P investment grade peer 
firms. S&P speculative grade peer firms tend to be opaque. S&P investment grade peer firms 
tend to be transparent. 
The results in the middle panel of Table 7 based on portfolios formed by Earnings 
Transparency are qualitatively similar. The 3 basis point abnormal daily return (alpha) on 
portfolio (1) with the least transparent peer firms is not significantly different from zero. As in 
Barth, Konchitchki, and Landsman (2013), daily abnormal returns increase (non-monotonically) 
in magnitude and statistical significance with transparency. The 9 basis point abnormal daily 
return on portfolio (4) is significant. Moreover, the positive difference in abnormal daily return 
between portfolio (4) and (1) of 6 basis points is significant at better than the 1% level (F-
statistic = 15.4). 
Again, note that systematic risks are higher for opaque peer firms. 𝛽𝑅𝑀𝑅𝐹 is 0.90 for 
portfolio (1) and decreases monotonically to 0.86 for portfolio (4). Similarly, 𝛽𝑆𝑀𝐵 is 0.66 for 
portfolio (1) and declines to 0.60 for portfolio (4). A negative significant 𝛽𝑈𝑀𝐷 for portfolio (1) 
corroborates that returns on opaque peer firms exhibit reversals rather than momentum. Lastly, 
positive significant 𝛽𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 and negative significant 𝛽𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 coefficients substantiate 
that S&P speculative grade peer firms are more risky than S&P investment grade peer firms. 
Lastly, the negative significant Event CAR[-3,3] coefficient in the bottom left-hand and 
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middle panels of Table 7 shows a post-announcement reversal of the information contagion 
associated with investors’ reaction to credit downgrades consistent with a resolution of 
information uncertainty. From the correlation table in Table 4C, coefficient signs on significant 
firm characteristics indicate that post-announcement returns are higher for unrated and more 
creditworthy peer firms.  The former are smaller in size (Ln(TA)), high SGA, high solvency 
(Altman-Z), and invest in R&D. The latter are lower growth (MTB) and higher profitability 
(ROA). 
The results in the right-hand panel of Table 7 confirm the left-hand and middle panels of 
Table 7. Overall, the findings support the thesis that post-announcement abnormal returns reflect 
a resolution of information uncertainty and informed trading. At credit downgrade 
announcements, investors overreact to the potential adverse changes in the creditworthiness and 
intrinsic values of similar firms in the same industry. The overreactions are corrected post-
announcement for transparent peer firms. 
4. Changes in Profitability 
Credit rating changes signal revisions in the beliefs of rating agencies about the latent 
intrinsic values of rated firms. Ederington and Goh (1998) find that analysts forecast declines 
(growth) in quarterly earnings per share prior and subsequent to credit rating downgrades 
(upgrades). Further, there are significant decreases in actual earnings per share prior and 
subsequent to credit downgrades, but insignificant increases, for credit upgrades. Similarly, 
Dichev and Piotroski (2001) find strongly (weakly) significant decreases (increases) in annual 
earnings following credit downgrades (upgrades).   
In this section we examine three proxies for post-announcement changes in the 
profitability of firms in the same industry as credit-downgraded firms –  ∆ROA[-1,1], ∆Profit[-
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1,1], and ∆EPS[-1,1]. Each proxy is constructed as the difference in profitability between the 
fiscal year following and fiscal year prior to the fiscal year of the ratings change. For example, 
for a ratings change that occurred in fiscal year 2003, the difference is the profitability in fiscal 
year end 2004 and fiscal year end 2002. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. 
Table 8 reports the results of cross-sectional OLS regressions of peer firm post-
announcement profitability with fixed effects for year and industry and robust standard errors 
clustered by industry. In these regressions, Return Synchronicity and Earnings Transparency 
examine the effects of opacity. The impact of S&P rating, Event Firm CAR[-3,3] and Notches, as 
well as the characteristics of the peer firms are taken into account. 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
Across model specifications, ∆ROA[-1,1], ∆Profit[-1,1], and ∆EPS[-1,1], average 1.2%, 
7.2%, and 0.55 respectively. ∆Profit[-1,1] and ∆EPS[-1,1] are significant at better than the 1% 
level; ∆ROA[-1,1] is marginally significant at the 15% level. The changes in profitability are 
consistent with uncertainty resolution and informed trading post announcement which corrects 
investor overreaction at announcement.  
The negative significant Return Synchronicity and positive significant Earnings 
Transparency coefficients indicate improved profitability post-announcement are primarily 
focused on transparent peer firms. Profitability declines continue for opaque peer firms with 
higher than median Return Synchronicity and lower than median Earnings Transparency. A one 
standard deviation change in Return Synchronicity and Earnings Transparency imply about a -
0.86%, -1.56%, and -7.73% and about a 0.40%, 0.85%, and 8.07% change in ∆ROA[-1,1], 
∆Profit[-1,1], and ∆EPS[-1,1], respectively.    
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Lastly, negative and significant Event CAR[-3,3] and Notches coefficients show that the 
impaired competitiveness of credit-downgraded firms improve the profitability of peer firms. 
Post-announcement profitability is higher for high growth (MTB), and lower for more solvent 
(Altman-Z), peer firms. 
F. Conclusion 
This paper examines the spillover effects of long-term issuer credit-downgrades on 
similar firms in the same industry. We show the opacity of firms hinders information efficiency. 
Investors infer adverse changes in the creditworthiness and intrinsic values of peer firms at credit 
downgrade announcements. Increased uncertainty among investors about economic 
fundamentals, however, limits arbitrage and enables noise trading. The inflated share price 
declines at credit downgrade announcements are reversed post announcement as information 
uncertainties about peer firms are resolved. Transparent firms benefit the most from the 
reduction in information asymmetry and increased informed trading post announcement. 
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Table 1: Distribution of Credit Events 
Sample events are long-term credit rating downgrades (upgrades) from investment (speculative) 
to speculative (investment) grade over the period January 1, 2000 through December 31, 2010. 
Peers are firms in Compustat that operate in the same three-digit SIC code as the credit rating 
change firm in the announcement year. Top and bottom panels report the distribution of events, 
average number of peer firms, average 7-day cumulative abnormal return on credit rating change 
firms, and average number of notches involved in credit rating changes by year and industry, 
respectively. Daily abnormal returns for credit change firms are computed using the Fama-
French (1993) three-factor plus Carhart (1997) momentum factor returns model estimated over 
the period 282 to 30 days prior to announcement.  
 
 
  
31 
 
Table 1: Distribution of Credit Events (Cont.) 
 
 
 
  
 
Credit Rating Downgrades 
Investment to Speculative Grade 
Credit Rating Upgrades 
Speculative to Investment Grade 
Year 
No. of 
Events 
Average 
Number of 
Peers 
Average 
Event Firm 
CAR[-3,3] 
Average
No. of 
Notches 
No. of 
Events 
Average 
Number of 
Peers 
Average 
Event Firm 
CAR[-3,3] 
Average
No. of 
Notches 
         
2000 9 21.3 -0.0746 -1.78 7 35.1 0.0278 1.57 
2001 23 56.8 -0.1040 -2.43 4 49.5 0.0194 1.75 
2002 16 25.9 -0.2316 -1.88 4 18.8 0.0136 1.00 
2003 22 21.6 -0.0503 -1.50 4 35.0 0.0270 1.50 
2004 9 77.0 -0.0215 -1.56 8 25.4 0.0276 1.13 
2005 12 15.9 -0.0470 -1.25 13 77.8 0.0016 1.31 
2006 11 54.8 -0.0269 -1.64 6 73.5 -0.0048 1.17 
2007 11 19.1 -0.0107 -1.82 13 43.2 -0.0085 1.31 
2008 13 54.2 -0.0317 -1.31 9 23.0 0.0222 1.11 
2009 5 4.4 -0.1202 -1.40 7 69.9 0.0004 1.29 
2010 2 14.0 -0.0183 -1.50 9 12.8 0.0005 1.00 
Total 133 36.4 -0.0759 -1.72 84 43.9 0.0089 1.26 
         
Fama-French 
Industries 
No. of 
Events 
Average 
Number of 
Peers 
Average 
Event Firm 
CAR[-3,3] 
Average
No. of 
Notches 
No. of 
Events 
Average 
Number of 
Peers 
Average 
Event Firm 
CAR[-3,3] 
Average
No. of 
Notches 
         
         
FOOD - - - - - - - - 
MINING 2 10.0 -0.0340 -2.00 2 12.5 0.0656 2.00 
OIL 4 72.0 -0.2640 -1.25 4 85.3 0.0151 1.00 
CLTHS 4 6.5 -0.0112 -1.50 2 17.5 -0.0142 1.00 
DURBL 7 14.3 -0.0289 -1.43 2 14.5 0.0234 1.00 
CHEM 6 10.8 -0.0405 -1.00 2 12.0 0.0491 1.00 
CNSUM - - - - 3 8.7 -0.0377 1.00 
CNSTR 7 4.1 -0.1225 -1.71 4 4.3 0.0342 1.25 
STEEL 5 16.6 -0.1536 -2.00 1 23.0 0.0779 1.00 
FABPR - - - - - - - - 
MACHN 13 59.2 -0.0350 -1.54 16 74.3 0.0062 1.19 
CARS 7 33.4 -0.0309 -1.71 4 32.3 0.0148 1.25 
TRANS 5 8.4 -0.1059 -1.20 1 13.0 -0.0534 1.00 
UTILS 13 32.3 -0.2134 -3.38 10 29.2 -0.0086 1.50 
RTAIL 19 15.2 -0.0248 -1.47 7 18.9 0.0141 1.14 
OTHER 41 60.4 -0.0588 -1.61 26 54.4 0.0084 1.35 
TOTAL 133 36.4 -0.0759 -1.72 84 43.9 0.0089 1.26 
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Table 2: Credit Rating Change Matrix 
This table reports the distribution of S&P long-term credit rating downgrades (upgrades) from 
investment (speculative) to speculative (investment) grade over the period January 1, 2000 
through December 31, 2010. The rows and columns are the long-term credit ratings before and 
after the rating change events. 
 
 
  
Panel A:  Credit Rating Downgrades 
 New Rating 
Old Rating BB+ BB BB- B+ B B- CC C 
A+  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
A  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
A-  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
BBB+  4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
BBB  14 5 3 1 0 0 0 0 
BBB-  76 25 3 0 0 0 2 0 
 
Panel B:  Credit Rating Upgrades 
 New Rating 
Old Rating AAA AA- A+ A A- BBB+ BBB BBB- 
BB+  0 0 0 0 0 0 11 63 
BB  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 
BB-  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
B+  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
B  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
CCC  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Table 3: Announcement Returns 
Table reports descriptive statistics on cumulative abnormal equity returns around credit 
downgrades and upgrades over the sample period January 1, 2000 through December 31, 2010. 
Daily abnormal returns for event (credit ratings change) firms and associated peers are computed 
using the Fama-French (1993) three-factor plus Carhart (1997) momentum factor returns model 
estimated over the period 282 to 30 days prior to announcement. Peers are firms in Compustat 
that operate in the same three-digit SIC code as the event (credit rating change) firm in the 
announcement year. Cross-sectional OLS regressions of cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of 
peers control for fixed effects by year and industry using Fama-French (1997) 17-industry 
classification and robust standard errors clustered by industries. Event Firm CAR[-3,3] and 
Notches are demeaned by cross-sectional average. t-statistics are presented in parentheses. p-
values on joint coefficient restriction tests are reported in brackets. *, **, ***, denote 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 3: Announcement Returns (Cont.) 
 
 
 
  
 
Credit Rating Downgrades 
Investment to Speculative Grade 
Credit Rating Upgrades 
Speculative to Investment Grade 
 N CAR[-1,1] CAR[-3,1] CAR[-3,3] N CAR[-1,1] CAR[-3,1] CAR[-3,3] 
         Event Firms         
Mean 133 -0.0526 *** -0.0689 *** -0.0759 *** 84 0.0066 ** 0.0088 ** 0.0089 
Medan 133 -0.0213 *** -0.0282 *** -0.0254 *** 84 0.0052 0.0018 0.0012 
Standard Deviation 133 0.1264 0.1598 0.1774 84 0.0281 0.0352 0.0442 
25th Percentile 133 -0.0664 -0.0957 -0.1010 84 -0.0143 -0.0142 -0.0246 
75th Percentile 133 0.0092 0.0087 0.0117 84 0.0302 0.0385 0.0464 
         
Peer Firms         
Mean 4,799 -0.0070 *** -0.0101 *** -0.0109 *** 3,648 0.0002 -0.0001 0.0031 * 
Medan 4,799 -0.0027 *** -0.0045 *** -0.0044 *** 3,648 -0.0016 -0.0017 ** 0.0000 
Standard Deviation 4,799 0.0604 0.0788 0.0895 3,648 0.0574 0.0769 0.0920 
25th Percentile 4,799 -0.0329 -0.0421 -0.0489 3,648 -0.0271 -0.0352 -0.0390 
75th Percentile 4,799 0.0242 0.0305 0.0375 3,648 0.0224 0.0289 0.0388 
         
Peer Firm CAR 
Regressions  CAR[-1,1] CAR[-3,1] CAR[-3,3]  CAR[-1,1] CAR[-3,1] CAR[-3,3] 
        
Constant -0.0080 *** -0.0144 *** -0.0116 ***  -0.0054 -0.0102 * -0.0263 
  (-4.839) (-4.323) (-3.302)  (-1.506) (-1.779) (-1.444) 
Event Firm 𝑪𝑨𝑹[−𝟑,𝟑] 0.0378 *** 0.0580 *** 0.0542 ***  0.0664 ** 0.0797 ** 0.1041 * 
  (12.151) (8.624) (10.629)  (2.122) (2.025) (1.737) 
 Demeaned Notches -0.0022 *** -0.0016 *** -0.0029 ***  -0.0020 -0.0006 -0.0068 
  (-5.272) (-3.161) (-6.806)  (-0.462) (-0.136) (-1.604) 
Adjusted R2 0.051 0.070 0.045  0.036 0.026 0.026 
        
Constant -0.0074 *** -0.0133 *** -0.0091 **  -0.0039 ** -0.0028 0.0062 
 (-5.235) (-3.885) (-2.529)  (-2.285) (-0.775) (1.315) 
Event Firm 𝑪𝑨𝑹[−𝟑,𝟑] 0.0379 *** 0.0580 *** 0.0543 ***  0.0649 ** 0.0813 ** 0.1040 ** 
 (7.929) (7.346) (8.962)  (1.988) (2.028) (1.743) 
Demeaned Notches -0.0010 0.0014 0.0034  -0.0026 0.0037 -0.0047 
 (-0.594) (0.443) (1.050)  (-0.548) (0.727) (-0.872) 
Rival -0.0011 -0.0023 -0.0051  0.0027 0.0045 * 0.0044 
 (-0.358) (-1.013) (-1.383)  (1.145) (1.700) (1.313) 
Rival × Demeaned 
Notches 
-0.0015 -0.0035 -0.0073 **  0.0014 -0.0074 -0.0034 
 (-0.724) (-1.061) (-2.350)  (0.264) (-1.064) (-0.456) 
Adjusted R2 0.051 0.070 0.047  0.037 0.026 0.027 
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Table 3: Announcement Returns (Cont.) 
 
 
  
 
Credit Rating Downgrades 
Within Investment Grade 
Credit Rating Downgrades 
Within Speculative Grade 
 N CAR[-1,1] CAR[-3,1] CAR[-3,3] N CAR[-1,1] CAR[-3,1] CAR[-3,3] 
         Event Firms         
Mean 992 -0.006 *** -0.0087 *** -0.0099*** 1,094 -0.013 *** -0.0136 *** -0.0155 *** 
Medan 992 -0.002 ** -0.0053 *** -0.0058 *** 1,094 -0.006 *** -0.0055 *** -0.0063 *** 
Standard Deviation 992 0.043 0.0532 0.0602 1,094 0.067 0.0813 0.0930 
25th Percentile 992 -0.025 -0.0327 -0.0380 1,094 -0.038 -0.0502 -0.0604 
75th Percentile 992 0.017 0.0237 0.0257 1,094 0.023 0.0320 0.0373 
         
Peer Firms         
Mean 39,348 -0.0018 *** -0.0010 *** -0.0009 ** 42,428 -0.0002 0.0005 0.0009 * 
Medan 39,348 -0.0018 *** -0.0013 *** -0.0011 *** 42,428 -0.0011 *** -0.0005 * -0.0005 
Standard Deviation 39,348 0.0479 0.0620 0.0727 42,428 0.0498 0.0655 0.0775 
25th Percentile 39,348 -0.0280 -0.0350 -0.0416 42,428 -0.0287 -0.0370 -0.0444 
75th Percentile 39,348 0.0235 0.0321 0.0388 42,428 0.0269 0.0366 0.0441 
         
Peer Firm CAR 
Regressions 
 CAR[-1,1] CAR[-3,1] CAR[-3,3]  CAR[-1,1] CAR[-3,1] CAR[-3,3] 
Constant -0.0007 -0.0039 -0.0056  0.0014 0.0015 -0.0004 
  (-0.344) (-1.066) (-1.372)  (0.397) (0.327) (-0.056) 
Event Firm 𝑪𝑨𝑹[−𝟑,𝟑] 0.0365 *** 0.0559 *** 0.0799 ***  0.0377 *** 0.0563 *** 0.0896 *** 
  (2.950) (3.975) (4.468)  (4.004) (3.843) (3.989) 
Notches -0.0002 -0.0006 -0.0002  0.0003 0.0004 -0.0001 
  (-0.303) (-0.759) (-0.220)  (0.339) (0.348) (-0.074) 
Adjusted R2 0.006 0.007 0.008  0.007 0.010 0.016 
        
Constant -0.0035 ** -0.0017 -0.0017  -0.0023 *** -0.0013 -0.0015 
 (-2.054) (-0.810) (-0.733)  (-4.184) (-1.600) (-1.608) 
Event Firm 𝑪𝑨𝑹[−𝟑,𝟑] 0.0368 *** 0.0563 *** 0.0801 ***  0.0374 *** 0.0560 *** 0.0891 *** 
 (2.925) (3.924) (4.432)  (3.993) (3.832) (3.989) 
Demeaned Notches -0.0009 -0.0015 ** -0.0009  0.0012 0.0013 0.0014 
 (-1.164) (-2.057) (-1.327)  (1.010) (0.819) (0.953) 
Rival -0.0006 -0.0014 -0.0004  0.0007 0.0016 *** 0.0019 *** 
 (-0.760) (-1.049) (-0.223)  (0.759) (2.734) (2.598) 
Rival × Demeaned 
Notches 
0.0014 * 0.0020 *** 0.0013  -0.0015 * -0.0016 -0.0026 *** 
 (1.720) (3.260) (1.505)  (-1.876) (-1.468) (-3.507) 
Adjusted R2 0.007 0.007 0.008  0.007 0.010 0.016 
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Table 4: Transparency and Peer Firm Characteristics 
Table reports descriptive statistics on return synchronicity and earnings transparency measures as well as 
financial characteristics of peer firms in our sample. Peers are firms in Compustat that operate in the same 
three-digit SIC code as the event (credit rating change) firm in the announcement year. Variable 
definitions are provided in Appendix A. Panels A and B present summary statistics for the overall sample 
and by Fama-French (1997) industry, respectively.  Correlations are shown in Panel C. *, **, and *** 
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
 
Panel A: Pooled Sample 
 
       
 NOBS = 4,799 
 
Mean Median 
Standard  
Deviation 
5th 
Percentile 
25th 
Percentile 
75th 
Percentile 
95th 
Percentile 
Return Synchronicity  0.0138 0.0000 0.1254 -0.1682 -0.0700 0.0896 0.2521 
Earnings Transparency  0.0064 0.0000 0.0847 -0.0767 -0.0098 0.0061 0.1454 
S&P Rated  0.2761 0.0000 0.4471 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Ln(TA)  6.0776 5.8749 2.0230 2.8996 4.5154 7.5391 9.9731 
SGA  0.3692 0.2809 0.3311 0.0000 0.1094 0.5480 1.2040 
PPE  0.2587 0.1550 0.2444 0.0215 0.0621 0.4090 0.8074 
MTB  1.6903 1.3627 0.9414 0.6390 1.0318 2.0906 4.1176 
ROA  0.0066 0.0505 0.1309 -0.2775 -0.0421 0.0975 0.1508 
Altman-Z  3.3560 2.6352 4.0997 -4.1977 1.1862 4.8555 13.6695 
R&D  0.5803 1.0000 0.4936 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
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Table 4: Transparency and Peer Firm Characteristics (Cont.) 
 
 
 
Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std.
MINING -0.012 0.156 -0.003 0.017 0.47 0.51 7.45 2.04 0.12 0.28 0.56 0.19 1.50 0.91 0.04 0.13 4.98 4.41 0.26 0.45
OIL 0.025 0.112 -0.020 0.150 0.44 0.50 6.59 2.06 0.19 0.27 0.72 0.15 1.54 0.79 0.06 0.10 2.75 3.09 0.07 0.25
CLTHS -0.021 0.176 0.060 0.235 0.19 0.40 6.07 1.28 0.35 0.16 0.17 0.12 1.81 0.90 0.08 0.11 5.66 4.25 0.08 0.27
DURBL 0.031 0.123 0.003 0.022 0.22 0.42 5.55 1.54 0.27 0.19 0.27 0.16 1.39 0.73 0.03 0.12 3.88 3.21 0.57 0.50
CHEM 0.000 0.176 0.059 0.177 0.55 0.50 6.81 2.01 0.14 0.08 0.36 0.17 1.49 0.63 0.04 0.09 2.87 2.72 0.75 0.44
CNSTR 0.020 0.120 0.002 0.029 0.36 0.49 6.51 1.50 0.19 0.22 0.34 0.22 1.15 0.46 0.04 0.10 2.96 1.64 0.36 0.49
STEEL 0.031 0.139 0.040 0.129 0.58 0.50 6.88 1.63 0.11 0.08 0.41 0.13 1.20 0.59 0.04 0.07 2.60 1.76 0.54 0.50
MACHN 0.015 0.142 0.015 0.098 0.15 0.36 5.41 1.83 0.45 0.31 0.15 0.12 1.78 0.97 -0.03 0.15 4.36 4.66 0.93 0.26
CARS 0.003 0.134 -0.001 0.103 0.45 0.50 7.03 1.91 0.13 0.08 0.28 0.13 1.32 0.72 0.06 0.08 3.58 2.99 0.79 0.41
TRANS 0.008 0.123 0.011 0.038 0.46 0.50 7.08 1.67 0.07 0.06 0.65 0.19 1.31 0.70 0.07 0.07 2.65 2.89 0.05 0.22
UTILS -0.014 0.113 0.004 0.115 0.86 0.35 8.56 1.35 0.00 0.02 0.61 0.14 1.12 0.22 0.06 0.03 1.26 0.56 0.00 0.00
RTAIL 0.001 0.119 0.003 0.085 0.37 0.48 6.90 1.66 0.24 0.11 0.40 0.19 1.67 0.92 0.08 0.07 4.75 2.58 0.03 0.16
OTHER 0.019 0.119 0.006 0.046 0.15 0.36 5.56 1.83 0.49 0.33 0.14 0.17 1.86 1.01 -0.02 0.14 3.29 4.55 0.69 0.46
MTB ROA Altman-Z
Panel B: By Industry
Ln(TA)R - Sync RD-Ind.PPERatedE - Trans SGA
P - Sync -0.016 0.220 *** 0.463 *** -0.034 ** 0.027 * 0.207 *** 0.207 *** 0.201 *** 0.081 ***
E - Trans -0.029 ** -0.004 -0.001 0.024 * -0.021 -0.002 0.016 0.021 0.015
S&P Rated 0.211 *** -0.022 0.670 *** -0.475 *** 0.433 *** -0.216 *** 0.261 *** -0.195 *** -0.295 ***
Ln (TA) 0.408 *** -0.022 0.689 *** -0.535 *** 0.444 *** -0.221 *** 0.446 *** 0.007 -0.276 ***
SGA -0.026 * 0.026 * -0.419 *** -0.526 *** -0.585 *** 0.298 *** -0.462 *** 0.008 0.515 ***
PPE -0.014 -0.041 *** 0.436 *** 0.438 *** -0.505 *** -0.277 *** 0.241 *** -0.178 *** -0.503 ***
MTB 0.171 *** 0.016 -0.222 *** -0.241 *** 0.270 *** -0.259 *** 0.128 *** 0.320 *** 0.245 ***
ROA 0.162 *** -0.003 0.289 *** 0.488 *** -0.641 *** 0.266 *** -0.015 0.464 *** -0.251 ***
Altman-Z 0.177 *** 0.023 -0.157 *** 0.005 -0.115 *** -0.163 *** 0.353 *** 0.420 *** 0.102 ***
RD-Ind. 0.105 *** 0.036 ** -0.295 *** -0.274 *** 0.470 *** -0.551 *** 0.239 *** -0.277 *** 0.085 ***
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
Panel C: Pearson (Spearman) Correlations Below (Above) Diagonal
P - Sync E - Trans S&P Rated Ln (TA) SGA PPE MTB ROA RD-Ind.Altman-Z
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Table 5: Announcement Return Regressions 
Table reports results of cross-sectional OLS regressions of cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) 
of peer firms with fixed effects for year and robust standard errors clustered by industries. Daily 
abnormal equity returns in the event windows are computed using a Fama-French (1993) three-
factor plus Carhart (1997) momentum factor returns model estimated over the period 282 to 30 
days prior to announcement. Peers are firms in Compustat that operate in the same three-digit 
SIC code as the event firm in the announcement year. Event Firm CAR[-3,3], Notches, Ln(TA), 
SGA, PPE, MTB, ROA, and Altman-Z are demeaned by the cross-sectional average. t-statistics 
are presented in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1%, respectively. Economic significance represents the impact on CARs associated with one 
standard deviation change. 
 
 Dependent Variable:  Peer Firm 𝑪𝑨𝑹[−𝟑,𝟑] 
Constant                        
Constant 
-0.0129 *** -0.0123 *** -0.0130 *** -0.0124 *** 
 (-9.625) (-8.811) (-9.516) (-8.665) 
Return Synchronicity   -0.0443 ***   -0.0439 *** 
   (-2.789)  (-2.741) 
Earnings Transparency    0.0180 * 0.0162 
    (1.763) (1.538) 
S&P Rated (Yes=1) 0.0025 0.0026 0.0025 0.0026 
 (0.661) (0.720) (0.669) (0.727) 
Investment Rated 0.0047 0.0043 0.0048 * 0.0045 
 (1.586) (1.381) (1.653) (1.423) 
Event CAR[-3,3] 0.0634 *** 0.0635 *** 0.0632 *** 0.0633 *** 
 (6.600) (6.636) (6.429) (6.475) 
Notches -0.0022 *** -0.0024 *** -0.0023 *** -0.0024 *** 
 (-3.442) (-3.763) (-3.574) (-3.891) 
Ln(TA) -0.0022 ** -0.0001 -0.0022 ** -0.0002 
 (-2.228) (-0.113) (-2.229) (-0.134) 
SGA -0.0076 *** -0.0060 ** -0.0077 *** -0.0062 ** 
 (-2.622) (-2.381) (-2.721) (-2.482) 
PPE 0.0005 0.0017 0.0002 0.0015 
 (0.063) (0.229) (0.033) (0.201) 
MTB -0.0009 0.0002 -0.0009 0.0002 
 (-0.953) (0.219) (-0.961) (0.194) 
ROA 0.0681 *** 0.0660 *** 0.0677 *** 0.0657 *** 
 (7.181) (6.700) (7.316) (6.820) 
Altman-Z 0.0007 0.0008 0.0007 0.0008 
 (1.225) (1.633) (1.226) (1.630) 
R&D -0.0005 -0.0001 -0.0006 -0.0001 
 (-0.330) (-0.042) (-0.347) (-0.060) 
Adjusted R2 0.052 0.055 0.053 0.055 
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Table 6: Post-Announcement Return Regressions 
Table reports results of cross-sectional OLS regressions of cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of peer firms with fixed effects for 
year and industry using Fama and French 17 industry classifications and robust standard errors clustered by industries. Daily 
abnormal equity returns in the event windows are computed using a Fama-French (1993) three-factor plus Carhart (1997) 
momentum factor returns model estimated over the period 282 to 30 days prior to announcement. Peers are firms in Compustat that 
operate in the same three-digit SIC code as the event firm in the announcement year. Event Firm CAR[-3,3], Notches, Ln(TA), SGA, 
PPE, MTB, ROA, and Altman-Z are demeaned by their respective cross-sectional averages. t-statistics are presented in parentheses. 
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 6: Post-Announcement Return Regressions (Cont.) 
 
 
  
β1: P - Synchronicity -0.0829 * -0.2250 *** -0.4363 *** -0.0809 * -0.2161 *** -0.4210 ***
(-1.867) (-4.244) (-5.347) (-1.768) (-4.243) (-4.859)
β2: E - Transparency 0.0744 0.3257 *** 0.5610 *** 0.0712 0.3172 *** 0.5444 ***
(1.216) (5.221) (8.337) (1.160) (5.070) (7.944)
S&P Rated (1 if yes) 0.0089 0.0161 0.0255 0.0091 0.0166 0.0265 0.0089 0.0161 0.0255 0.0091 0.0166 0.0265
(0.789) (0.876) (1.285) (0.807) (0.950) (1.462) (0.779) (0.899) (1.350) (0.796) (0.969) (1.522)
Investment Rated -0.0079 0.0121 0.0027 -0.0087 0.0100 -0.0014 -0.0073 0.0149 0.0075 -0.0081 0.0128 0.0033
(-0.483) (0.737) (0.092) (-0.547) (0.660) (-0.058) (-0.454) (0.949) (0.265) (-0.519) (0.868) (0.147)
Event CAR[-3,3] -0.0157 0.0059 -0.0832 -0.0150 0.0078 -0.0796 -0.0181 -0.0045 -0.1011 -0.0173 -0.0024 -0.0971
(-0.491) (0.105) (-1.213) (-0.476) (0.142) (-1.183) (-0.518) (-0.070) (-1.309) (-0.503) (-0.039) (-1.288)
Notches 0.0056 ** 0.0122 *** 0.0052 0.0053 ** 0.0116 *** 0.0040 0.0053 * 0.0113 *** 0.0036 0.0051 * 0.0107 *** 0.0024
(2.159) (3.977) (0.883) (2.085) (3.807) (0.660) (1.938) (3.743) (0.610) (1.881) (3.572) (0.408)
Ln (TA) -0.0019 -0.0142 *** -0.0334 *** 0.0020 -0.0035 -0.0127 ** -0.0019 -0.0142 *** -0.0335 *** 0.0019 -0.0040 -0.0134 **
(-0.566) (-3.616) (-5.034) (0.832) (-0.755) (-2.164) (-0.568) (-3.649) (-5.072) (0.816) (-0.891) (-2.371)
SGA 0.0234 ** 0.0358 * 0.0633 *** 0.0263 ** 0.0435 ** 0.0783 *** 0.0229 ** 0.0337 ** 0.0597 *** 0.0257 ** 0.0411 ** 0.0742 ***
(2.096) (1.943) (3.096) (2.261) (2.250) (3.386) (2.130) (1.991) (2.784) (2.285) (2.312) (3.036)
PPE 0.0029 -0.0702 -0.0284 0.0052 -0.0640 -0.0164 0.0020 -0.0743 -0.0355 0.0043 -0.0683 -0.0237
(0.064) (-1.145) (-0.537) (0.112) (-1.049) (-0.315) (0.043) (-1.249) (-0.692) (0.091) (-1.152) (-0.469)
MTB -0.0604 *** -0.0957 *** -0.1319 *** -0.0583 *** -0.0899 *** -0.1206 *** -0.0605 *** -0.0960 *** -0.1324 *** -0.0584 *** -0.0904 *** -0.1214 ***
(-14.103) (-11.319) (-9.195) (-17.378) (-11.078) (-10.123) (-14.194) (-11.405) (-9.303) (-17.792) (-11.363) (-10.468)
ROA 0.2467 *** 0.3604 *** 0.6268 *** 0.2427 *** 0.3497 *** 0.6060 *** 0.2453 *** 0.3544 *** 0.6166 *** 0.2415 *** 0.3443 *** 0.5968 ***
(5.846) (4.988) (8.721) (5.598) (4.663) (7.414) (5.781) (5.153) (8.284) (5.555) (4.801) (7.183)
Altman-Z 0.0108 *** 0.0170 *** 0.0145 *** 0.0110 *** 0.0175 *** 0.0156 *** 0.0108 *** 0.0169 *** 0.0145 *** 0.0110 *** 0.0175 *** 0.0155 ***
(14.788) (6.650) (5.278) (14.748) (8.088) (7.084) (14.650) (6.744) (5.430) (14.774) (8.114) (7.186)
RD-Ind. 0.0167 *** 0.0175 ** 0.0179 * 0.0177 *** 0.0200 *** 0.0229 ** 0.0166 *** 0.0167 ** 0.0166 0.0175 *** 0.0192 ** 0.0214 **
(2.694) (2.420) (1.808) (2.806) (2.759) (2.245) (2.661) (2.227) (1.608) (2.774) (2.553) (2.025)
β0: Constant 0.0128 0.0449 * 0.0447 0.0142 0.0485 * 0.0518 * 0.0133 0.0467 * 0.0480 * 0.0145 0.0502 * 0.0547 *
(0.790) (1.716) (1.615) (0.847) (1.840) (1.817) (0.822) (1.755) (1.659) (0.874) (1.864) (1.832)
Adjusted - R
2
0.114 0.129 0.102 0.115 0.133 0.110 0.115 0.134 0.111 0.116 0.138 0.118
CAR[4,68] CAR[4,130]CAR[4,68] CAR[4,130] CAR[4,256]
Price Synchronicity Earnings - Transparency Full ModelS&P Rated
CAR[4,256] CAR[4,68] CAR[4,130] CAR[4,256]CAR[4,68] CAR[4,130] CAR[4,256]
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Table 7: Portfolio Return Regressions 
Table reports results of seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) of daily excess returns on contemporaneous Fama-French and 
momentum factors with fixed effects for year and industry using Fama and French 17 industry classifications and robust standard 
errors clustered by industries.  
𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝛽𝑅𝑀𝑅𝐹,𝑝(𝑅𝑀𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡) + 𝛽𝑆𝑀𝐵,𝑝𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝐻𝑀𝐿,𝑝𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽𝑈𝑀𝐷,𝑝𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡 + 𝛽𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑,𝑝𝑆&𝑃 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖
+ 𝛽𝐼𝐺,𝑝𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡  𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽𝑍𝑍𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
where 𝑖 are the firms in portfolio 𝑝 and 𝑍𝑖 denote firm characteristics Ln(TA), SGA, PPE, MTB,  ROA, Altman-Z, and R&D. Our 
return series starts 4-days after the announcement date and continues for 252 trading days. Peers are stratified into quartile portfolio 
sorted on return synchronicity (Panel A), earnings transparency (Panel B), and summed ranks on return synchronicity and earnings 
transparency in Panel C. Peers are firms in Compustat that operate in the same three-digit SIC code as the event firm in the 
announcement year. t-statistics are presented in parentheses. F-statistics from joint coefficient tests are present in brackets. *, **, and 
*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 7: Portfolio Return Regressions (Cont.) 
 
 
(4) - (1)
-0.0000 0.0001 0.0002 ** 0.0004 *** 0.0004 0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0002 * 0.0005 *** 0.0004
t-statistic (-0.426) (1.209) (2.565) (3.224) (0.613) (-0.003) (-1.778) (9.991)
F-test [11.27] *** [5.99] **
1.0599 *** 0.9964 *** 0.7860 *** 0.4908 *** -0.5691 0.8795 *** 0.8709 *** 0.8280 *** 0.8355 *** -0.044
t-statistic (36.175) (29.771) (16.323) (12.282) (43.614) (41.415) (14.863) (33.092)
F-test [91.3] *** [1.71]
0.6568 *** 0.7698 *** 0.6187 *** 0.3892 *** -0.2676 0.6456 *** 0.6336 *** 0.6288 *** 0.5837 *** -0.0619
t-statistic (7.340) (9.308) (9.933) (12.637) (20.715) (7.213) (9.450) (7.729)
F-test [15.92] *** [1.54]
-0.1343 0.1030 0.2186 * 0.1293 * 0.2636 -0.0174 0.1472 -0.1076 0.1962 0.2136
t-statistic (-0.501) (0.632) (1.840) (1.669) (-0.169) (0.995) (-0.506) (1.466)
F-test [1.86] [21.16] ***
-0.2254 * -0.0806 -0.0337 -0.0362 0.1892 -0.1248 ** -0.0254 -0.1616 -0.0789 0.0459
t-statistic (-1.917) (-0.995) (-0.622) (-0.686) (-2.453) (-0.280) (-1.504) (-1.231)
F-test [7.97] ** [2.48]
0.0003 ** 0.0001 0.0006 *** 0.0009 ** 0.0006 0.0000 0.0006 *** 0.0008 *** 0.0001 0.0001
t-statistic (1.996) (1.219) (4.973) (2.416) (0.101) (3.083) (3.425) (0.711)
F-test [3.51] * [0.04]
0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0007 *** -0.0012 *** -0.0012 -0.0000 -0.0006 *** 0.0000 -0.0004 * -0.0004
t-statistic (0.172) (-1.035) (-6.908) (-3.848) (-0.084) (-2.636) (0.156) (-1.863)
F-test [16.96] *** [2.27]
0.123 0.115Adjusted - R
2
αp
βRMRF
βSMB
βHML
βUMD
βRated
βInvestment
Panel A: Price Synchronicity Panel B: Earnings Transparency
(2)(1) (2) (3) (4) (4) - (1) (1) (3) (4)
  , −   , = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑅𝑀𝑅𝐹 ,𝑖 𝑅𝑀,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑆𝑀𝐵,𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 +𝛽𝐻𝑀𝐿,𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 +𝛽𝑈𝑀𝐷,𝑖𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡 +𝛽𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑,𝑖𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡
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Table 7: Portfolio Return Regressions (Cont.) 
 
 
-0.0001 ** 0.0000 0.0001 0.0007 *** 0.0008
t-statistic (-2.405) (0.456) (1.035) (12.006)
F-test [152.36] ***
1.0534 *** 0.8856 *** 0.7967 *** 0.6073 *** -0.4461
t-statistic (33.884) (33.278) (28.337) (14.152)
F-test [78.33] ***
0.7245 *** 0.6543 *** 0.5867 *** 0.4699 *** -0.2546
t-statistic (8.000) (9.473) (10.100) (11.795)
F-test [17.91] ***
-0.0474 0.0906 0.1335 0.1432 0.1906
t-statistic (-0.195) (0.557) (1.022) (1.604)
F-test [1.45]
-0.1887 * -0.0943 -0.0645 -0.0302 0.1585
t-statistic (-1.743) (-1.271) (-0.957) (-0.539)
F-test [8.36] **
0.0003 *** 0.0005 *** 0.0005 ** 0.0005 0.0002
t-statistic (2.775) (3.241) (2.463) (1.230)
F-test [0.22]
-0.0000 -0.0002 -0.0005 *** -0.0010 *** -0.001
t-statistic (-0.131) (-0.990) (-2.844) (-2.607)
F-test [5.38] **
Adjusted - R
2
0.119
βRated
αp
βRMRF
βSMB
βHML
βUMD
Panel C: Combined
(1) (2) (3) (4) (4) - (1)
βInvestment
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Table 7: Portfolio Return Regressions (Cont.) 
 
 
  
 Return Synchronicity Earnings Transparency 
Return Synchronicity and Earnings 
Transparency 
               
Event CAR[-3,3] -0.0011 **   -0.0011 **    -0.0010 **    
 (-2.562)   (-2.276)    (-2.450)    
Notches -0.0000   0.0000    -0.0000    
 (-0.751)   (0.131)    (-0.674)    
Ln(TA) -0.0001 ***   -0.0002 ***    -0.0001  ***    
 (-3.122)   (-5.617)    (-4.045)    
SGA 0.0004 ***   0.0003 ***    0.0003 ***    
 (4.086)   (3.665)    (4.641)    
PPE -0.0001   -0.0002    -0.0001    
 (-0.526)   (-1.558)    (-0.629)    
MTB -0.0006 ***   -0.0006 ***    -0.0006  ***    
 (-11.159)   (-13.625)    (-13.578)    
ROA 0.0022 ***   0.0021 ***    0.0021 ***    
 (10.509)   (7.623)    (9.538)    
Altman-Z 0.0001 ***   0.0000 ***    0.0001 ***    
 (5.742)   (3.495)    (4.733)    
R&D 0.0001   0.0001    0.0001    
 (0.544)   (0.421)    (0.536)    
Adjusted R2     0.096     0.090     0.093 
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Table 8: Future Changes in Profitability 
Table reports results of OLS cross-sectional regressions of the changes in profitability of peer firms with fixed effects for year and 
industry using Fama and French 17 industry classifications and robust standard errors clustered by industries. Peers are firms in 
Compustat that operate in the same three-digit SIC code as the event firm in the announcement year. ROA is calculated as EBIT 
scaled by Total Revenue. Profit is net income scaled by Total Revenue. Changes in ROA, Profit, and EPS are computed from fiscal 
year preceding and following the announcement year. Event Firm CAR[-3,3], Notches, Ln(TA), SGA, PPE, MTB, ROA, and Altman-
Z are demeaned by the cross-sectional average. t-statistics are presented in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 7: Portfolio Return Regressions (Cont.) 
 
 
  
β1: P - Synchronicity -0.0693 *** -0.1262 *** -0.6314 ** -0.0679 *** -0.1232 *** -0.6024 **
(-3.060) (-5.413) (-2.249) (-3.055) (-5.608) (-2.299)
β2: E - Transparency 0.0491 *** 0.1032 ** 0.9668 *** 0.0462 ** 0.0980 ** 0.9411 ***
(2.684) (2.356) (2.693) (2.442) (2.271) (2.664)
S&P Rated (1 if yes) 0.0019 0.0007 -0.0338 0.0017 0.0005 -0.0345 0.0019 0.0008 -0.0333
(0.307) (0.079) (-0.486) (0.278) (0.055) (-0.480) (0.321) (0.088) (-0.485)
Investment Rated -0.0017 0.0071 0.0479 -0.0007 0.0090 0.0611 -0.0013 0.0079 0.0560
(-0.302) (0.611) (0.426) (-0.126) (0.740) (0.545) (-0.234) (0.708) (0.493)
Event CAR[-3,3] -0.0239 * -0.0728 * -0.3578 *** -0.0264 ** -0.0780 ** -0.4002 *** -0.0256 * -0.0763 ** -0.3923 ***
(-1.749) (-1.894) (-3.980) (-2.026) (-2.131) (-3.899) (-1.920) (-2.050) (-3.949)
Notches -0.0024 * 0.0005 0.0178 -0.0024 * 0.0005 0.0167 -0.0025 ** 0.0002 0.0153
(-1.890) (0.177) (0.935) (-1.888) (0.189) (0.896) (-1.974) (0.083) (0.819)
Ln (TA) 0.0018 -0.0040 * 0.0310 *** -0.0015 * -0.0100 *** 0.0010 0.0017 -0.0041 * 0.0295 ***
(0.953) (-1.686) (2.752) (-1.705) (-3.817) (0.054) (0.929) (-1.791) (2.613)
SGA -0.0113 -0.0445 0.1304 -0.0145 ** -0.0505 0.0966 -0.0117 * -0.0456 0.1204
(-1.627) (-1.000) (0.986) (-2.254) (-1.148) (0.798) (-1.752) (-1.035) (0.953)
PPE -0.0073 0.0750 * 0.0056 -0.0100 0.0698 * -0.0247 -0.0079 0.0737 * -0.0063
(-0.580) (1.894) (0.045) (-0.821) (1.732) (-0.191) (-0.621) (1.864) (-0.052)
MTB 0.0045 *** 0.0334 *** 0.0788 *** 0.0027 ** 0.0302 *** 0.0624 *** 0.0044 *** 0.0332 *** 0.0774 ***
(3.376) (3.326) (2.917) (2.362) (2.970) (2.656) (3.303) (3.307) (2.908)
ROA 0.0717 *** -0.0565 0.4356 0.0734 ** -0.0536 0.4397 0.0706 *** -0.0587 0.4142
(2.612) (-0.779) (1.207) (2.536) (-0.722) (1.233) (2.612) (-0.820) (1.187)
Altman-Z -0.0028 *** -0.0108 *** -0.0347 *** -0.0030 *** -0.0111 *** -0.0365 *** -0.0028 *** -0.0108 *** -0.0349 ***
(-12.441) (-15.649) (-8.639) (-19.482) (-18.873) (-6.791) (-12.319) (-15.675) (-8.944)
RD-Ind. 0.0029 0.0073 0.0032 0.0021 0.0058 -0.0047 0.0028 0.0071 0.0017
(1.015) (0.774) (0.044) (0.692) (0.607) (-0.065) (0.994) (0.763) (0.024)
β0: Constant 0.0129 0.0730 *** 0.5525 *** 0.0119 0.0712 *** 0.5459 *** 0.0131 0.0734 *** 0.5568 ***
(1.545) (5.042) (4.105) (1.469) (4.909) (4.097) (1.569) (4.986) (4.152)
Adjusted - R
2
0.058 0.051 0.054 0.056 0.050 0.056 0.060 0.051 0.058
∆EPS [-1,1]
Full ModelEarnings - TransparencyPrice - Synchronicity
∆ROA [-1,1] ∆Profit [-1,1]∆ROA [-1,1] ∆Profit [-1,1] ∆ROA [-1,1] ∆Profit [-1,1]∆EPS [-1,1] ∆EPS [-1,1]
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Appendix A: Variable Definitions 
 
 
  
Variable Definition
P-Trans Price synchronicity transparency: P-Trans is calculated as the difference in the R
2
from a
Carhart (1997) four-factor model estimated over the period 282 to 30 days prior to
announcement from the median R
2
 of all peers at the event. 
E-Trans Earnings transparency is calculated following Barth et al. (2013).
S&P Rated Indicator variable which takes a value of 1 if the peer firm is rated at the fiscal year end
preceding the event year and 0 otherwise.
Investment Grade Indicator variable which takes a value of 1 if the peer firm is rated investment grade at
the fiscal year end preceding the event year and 0 otherwise.
Non-Rival Firms in Compustat which operate in the same three-digit SIC code as the event firm
in the year of the announcement excluding rivals.
Event CAR[-3,3] The cumulative abnormal return to the event firm in the period 3-days before the
event to 3-days after. Abnormal returns are calculated using a Carhart (1997) four-factor 
model estimated over the period 282 to 30 days prior to announcement.
Notches The number of rating levels the event firm moves, e.g., Notches would take a value of
2 for a move from BBB- to BB.
Ln (TA) The natural log of book total assets.
SGA Selling, general, and administrative expense scaled by total revenue.
PPE Net property, plant, and equipment scaled by total book assets.
MTB Book total assets minus total equity plus market capitalization all divided by book
total assets.
ROA EBIT divided by book total assets.
Altman-Z =1.2*(Current Assets-Current Liabilities)/Book Total Assets+1.4*Retained
Earnings/Book Total Assets+3.3*EBIT/Book Total Assets+0.6*(Shares
Outstanding*Price per Share)/Total Liabilities+0.999*Total Revenue/Book Total
Assets
RD-Ind. An indicator which takes a value of 1 if the firm has R&D expenses greater than zero
and 0 otherwise.
∆ROA [-1,1] The change in ROA from the fiscal year end preceeding the announcement year to the
fiscal year end following the announcement year, e.g., for an event which occurs in
2003, ∆ROA would measure the change from fiscal year end 2002 to fiscal year end
2004.
∆Profit [-1,1] The change in profit margin from the fiscal year end preceeding the announcement year
to the fiscal year end following the announcement year, e.g., for an event which occurs
in 2003, ∆Profit would measure the change from fiscal year end 2002 to fiscal year end
2004.
∆EPS [-1,1] The change in earnings per shares outstanding from the fiscal year end preceeding the
announcement year to the fiscal year end following the announcement year, e.g., for an
event which occurs in 2003, ∆EPS would measure the change from fiscal year end 2002
to fiscal year end 2004.
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Appendix B: Event Sample Selection 
This table outlines the sample selection procedure. The full sample consists of all S&P credit 
rating downgrades from investment to speculative grade in the sample period January 1, 2000 
through December 31, 2010 compiled from Bloomberg Data Services. 
 
  
Full Sample 257
Less
Same Industry within 15-days 12
Same Firm within 1-year 3
Merger Announcement ±22 trading days 28
Insufficient CRSP Data 36
Infrequently Traded Equity Pre-Event (<90% of trading days) 4
Less Than 1-year of Trading Data Post-Event 25
Insufficient Compustat Data 10
Events with Stock Price Below $5 6
Final Sample 133
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III. Essay 2: Credit Rating Initiations, Liquidity, and Seasoned Equity Offerings15 
Wayne Y. Lee and Garrett A. McBrayer 
A. Abstract 
Prior literature documents economically significant costs in equity trading that result 
from informational asymmetry. Asymmetries lead to adverse selection costs being reflected in 
the price patterns and trading behavior of market participants in the secondary markets for 
equity. Mechanisms which reduce asymmetries then reduce the costs of transacting by 
ameliorating the costs to doing so. In this study, we use a sample of credit rating initiations, the 
first-time a firm obtains a long-term issuer rating from Standard and Poor’s, to examine the 
effects that becoming rated has on secondary market equity liquidity. We find that the firms who 
decide to become rated see an improvement in secondary market liquidity regardless of the 
specific measure we use to measure liquidity. Measures of changes in Amihud (2002) liquidity 
and volume show an improvement over a match set of control firms of 10.82% and 7.4% in the 
period 90-days before the rating to 90-days after. Ask-bid spread, the costs to transacting, falls 
by 3.56% more for newly-rated firms than for control firms. Finally, we show how managers 
take advantage of the increased liquidity through the issuance of seasoned equity offerings. 
Relative to the control group, newly-rated firms are more likely to issue and suffer less in terms 
of valuation for doing so. 
JEL Classification: G12, G14, G24 
Keywords: credit ratings, information asymmetry, adverse selection, liquidity, seasoned equity 
offerings 
  
                                                     
15 We wish to thank seminar participants at the University of Arkansas for their valuable 
comments and suggestions. All errors remain our own. 
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B. Introduction 
Informational asymmetries in financial markets regarding to the valuation of a firm’s 
assets have direct effects on the risk inherent in the firm’s debt and equity. Prior literature 
documents a positive and significant relation between measures of adverse selection in equity-
markets and the trade behavior exhibited by market participants when information is uncertain.16 
In the presence of informational asymmetries, Copeland and Galai (1983) model this process as 
it pertains to the bid-ask spreads of market makers when dealing with two different types of 
traders who trade with distinct motives, i.e., those possessing special information and those 
trading for liquidity purposes. Using a framework wherein the cost of supplying quotes is viewed 
as writing a put and call option to an informed trader, they show that the bid-ask spread is a 
positive function of asset volatility and a negative function of market depth, or liquidity. In other 
words, the bid-ask spread accounts for the fact that the marker maker loses when trading to an 
information-motivated trader. The challenge for the market maker then becomes identifying one 
type from another, or, protecting herself from losses arising from trading with informed traders. 
The challenge for broader market efficiency is to alleviate (at least to the extent possible) the 
informational asymmetries that exist. 
Credit rating agencies play a crucial role to this end by alleviating the informational 
asymmetries that exist between firms and market participants. To assess the creditworthiness of a 
firm, credit rating agencies rely on their access to material, non-public information about the 
firm’s prospects. In fact, this access to information was deemed essential enough to the efficient 
functioning of markets that it was protected by government legislation in 2000. Regulation Fair 
Disclosure Act (Reg FD) preserved the selective disclosure of material, non-public information 
                                                     
16 See, for example, Flannery, Kwan, and Nimalendran (2013 and 2004), Clarke, Fee, and 
Thomas (2004), Krinsky and Lee (1996), and Singh, Zaman, and Krishnamutri (1994). 
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to nationally recognized statistical rating organizations and credit ratings agencies.17 The benefits 
of a credit rating extend beyond the identification, or validation, that occurs at the initial rating. 
Credit rating agencies act as monitors bearing the threat of adverse rating changes as a 
mechanism to ensure firm compliance with bond indentures (Boot, Milbourn, and Schmeits, 
2006). However, despite the certification and monitoring effects of rating agencies, the literature 
on measures of adverse selection in equity markets and credit ratings have developed largely 
independently. 
Odders-White and Ready (2006) and He, Wang, and Wei (2010) are among the few 
studies to examine these two bodies in conjunction. In their study, Odders-White and Ready 
model the relation between firm credit ratings and adverse selection in equity market trading. 
Their model suggests that that firms that have a higher probability of large changes in firm value 
should have both poorer credit ratings and higher adverse selection costs to trading in their 
equity. They test this result empirically using Trade and Quote (TAQ) data and find that credit 
ratings changes and measures of adverse selection costs are negatively related. That is, as credit 
ratings degrade the adverse selection costs of trading the firm’s equity increase. The findings of 
Odders-White and Ready suggest that credit ratings and asymmetric information are inversely 
related, i.e., as ratings improve (degrade) the problem of asymmetric information is reduced 
(made greater). More directly, He et al. (2010) show that rating changes and information 
asymmetry are inversely related. As ratings go up (down), measures of information asymmetry 
fall (rise). 
However, Odders-White and Ready never make a claim regarding the causality of the 
relationship because their dataset limits their ability to test the direction of the relationship. 
                                                     
17 Regulation Fair Disclosure [Rule 100(b)(2)]. 
 53 
 
Recognizing this limitation, they examine the extent to which one predicts the other. They find 
support that credit ratings changes are predictive, to some extent, of changes in adverse selection. 
This results suggests that the rating change is a casual factor affecting the degree of asymmetric 
information. 
In this study, we contribute to the findings of Odders-White and Ready by examining the 
effects on the information environment and trading behavior of a firm’s equity when the firm 
becomes rated for the first time. More specifically, we use a dataset which uniquely identifies 
1,182 first-time Standard and Poor’s long-term issuer credit ratings to examine the effects that 
becoming rated has on the liquidity with which the firm’s equity trades. Our study focuses on 
long-term issuer credit ratings due to fact that they reflect, according to S&P’s documentation,  
the “...overall obligor’s capacity and willingness to meet its financial commitments as they come 
due” and the rating “…does not take into account the specific nature or provisions of any 
particular obligation.” 18 S&P’s long-term issuer credit ratings reflect the overall 
creditworthiness and financial condition of the firm and, as such, ameliorate, to a certain extent, 
the informational asymmetries that exist pertinent to the asset values of the rated firm. Long-term 
issuer ratings offer greater reductions in adverse selection costs to transacting in a firm’s equity 
than ratings pertinent to a given issue. 
We use three previously developed measures of equity liquidity (i.e., Amihud Liquidity 
(2002), Volume, and Ask-Bid Spread) to examine the extent to which the initiation of a new 
credit rating induces changes in equity market liquidity. For each of our three measures, we 
calculate a rolling average for a period of time pre- and post-new credit rating, excluding the 21-
day window centered on the credit rating issue date, and measure the percentage change in the 
                                                     
18 See Standard and Poor’s Corporate Rating Criteria (2008). 
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respective measure.19 To control for contemporaneous market movements and for 
contemporaneous changes in liquidity measures for similar firms, we propensity score match our 
event firms to an unrated, control group. 
Our main findings can be briefly summarized as follows. First, we document a 
statistically significant increase in secondary market equity liquidity following the initiation of a 
new credit rating. For our event firms, measures of Amihud Liquidity and Volume increase by an 
average 47.749% and 29.54% in the 200 trading days surrounding the credit rating initiation, 
respectively. Ask-Bid Spread falls by an average -4.80% over the same time period. Second, 
when our event firm changes are compared to our control group, all measures show improved 
liquidity for the firms who obtained a credit rating relative to the unrated control group. These 
differences are significant across all comparisons in liquidity. In a multivariate framework, these 
differences are significant at better than the 5% regardless of the liquidity measure used for all 
specifications. Our results suggest that the credit rating itself reduces information asymmetry 
thus leading to an improvement in secondary market liquidity surrounding the new rating event. 
The question then becomes what, if any, are the long-term implications? And, what effect, if any, 
does this have on the financing behavior of the firm? 
We examine the long-term, non-transitory effects of being credit rated on equity liquidity 
by looking at the seasoned equity offering (SEO) activity of our two sets of firms, event and 
control. If the effects of becoming credit rated are transitory, then we should not expect any 
differences in the SEO activity of our two groups. In our sample, however, firms which obtain a 
credit rating are 178.84% more likely to issue a SEO following the credit rating event than our 
control firms, 36.89% of our event firms issue a SEO while only 13.23% of our control firms 
                                                     
19 Our results are robust to alternate definitions of the event window, i.e., 11-day and 5-day. 
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issue. To ensure this result is not driven by mechanical adjustments to an optimal capital 
structure post-rating initiation, we control for the change in firm leverage from initiation date to 
SEO date (Faulkender and Peterson, 2006). After controlling for the change in firm leverage and 
other firm characteristics, we find that credit rating initiation firms are 21.75% more likely to 
issue than the firms in our control group. 
Finally, the risk-adjusted, cumulative abnormal returns to our event firms are less 
negative surrounding the SEO issue date. This result supports the findings of Butler, Grullon, 
and Weston (2005) who show that market liquidity is a significant determinant of the costs of 
raising external capital. Overall, the effects of becoming credit rated on equity liquidity are non-
transitory and increase the likelihood that a firm issues seasoned equity while reducing the costs 
for doing so. 
Collectively, our results provide support to prior literature documenting the economic 
importance of credit ratings.20 The identification, certification, and validation that occur with a 
new credit rating affect the information environment with which the newly rated firm’s equity 
trades. Our findings suggests that credit ratings serve to resolve information asymmetry and 
improve market liquidity. 
The remaining sections of this paper are organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the 
related literature and summarizes our hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data used for our 
analysis and our empirical methodology. Section 4 discusses the results of tests examining the 
change in equity liquidity surrounding credit rating initiations. Empirical results on the long-term 
effects of credit ratings on SEOs are presented in Section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
C. Concept Development and Related Literature 
                                                     
20 See, for example, Holthausen and Leftwich (1986), Dichev and Piotroski (2001), and Lee, and 
McBrayer (2015). 
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The purpose of our study is to examine the impacts that credit rating initiations have on the 
environment in which the firm’s equity trades. More precisely, we seek to test for the relation between 
new credit ratings and measures of equity market liquidity and to examine the extent to which this 
relation affects the financing behavior of the firm. As such, this paper relates two strands of literature. The 
first examines the informativeness of credit ratings and their relation to equity market liquidity. And the 
second, the external financing implications of equity market liquidity. 
1. Credit Ratings and Liquidity 
Prior literature documents significant, long-term valuation consequences of the credit 
rating changes. Holthausen and Leftwich (1986) find significant negative abnormal equity 
returns surrounding inter-class downgrades, i.e., downgrades across rating classes, on the 
magnitude of -2.66% over a two-day window ending one-day after the event date but little effect 
of intra-class downgrades.21 The effects appear to be non-transitory. Dichev and Piotroski (2001) 
find abnormal returns to downgraded firms over the first-year following the downgrade on the 
order of -10% to -14%. They show that the effects are strongest for firms with speculative grade 
debt and small firms where investor interest is relatively low. The findings of Holthausen and 
Leftwich (1996) and Dichev and Piotroski (2001) suggest that credit rating changes provide new 
information to markets. Ederington and Goh (1998) examine the earnings of firms who undergo 
a credit rating change, upgrade or downgrade, to examine the impact on accounting profits for 
evidence of real changes in economic performance. Their results show that downgrades are 
preceded by declines in earnings thus forecast falling earnings post downgrade. This results 
suggests that changes in credit ratings are indicative of changes in the long-term financial 
prospects and credit worthiness of downgraded firms. In markets characterized by information 
                                                     
21 For example, an inter-class downgrade is a change from AA to BBB+ while an intra-class 
downgrades is a change from AA to AA-. 
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asymmetries, credit rating agencies play a crucial role in apportioning the risks between market 
participants. 
Equity market adverse selection risk engenders uncertainty in asset valuation. To the 
extent that information is asymmetric, measures of adverse selection risk based on trade behavior 
capture the adverse selection costs in financial markets and the liquidity with which assets 
trade.22 The liquidity with which a given asset trades reflects the adverse selection costs 
associated with that asset. Mechanisms which ameliorate the information asymmetry problem 
should then serve to mitigate the adverse selection costs to trading. Credit ratings, levels and 
changes, act as just such a mechanism. 
The unique access to material, non-public information granted to credit rating agencies in 
Reg FD combined with the fact that rating agencies act as monitors post-rating (Boot, Milbourn, 
and Schmeits, 2006) suggests that credit rating changes contain, in part, information which 
affects the information asymmetry of the asset in question. Odders-White and Ready (2006) 
explore the correlation between credit rating changes and measures of equity market liquidity. 
Using trade level data, they find that measures of adverse selection are larger when credit ratings 
are poorer. He et al. (2010) extend the result of Odders-White and Ready (2006) by examining 
the relation between changes in credit ratings and contemporaneous changes in information 
asymmetry. He et al. (2010) provide evidence that credit rating changes are inversely related to 
measures of information asymmetry. Specifically, they show that when firms experience an 
upgrade (downgrade), its stock information asymmetry and its analyst forecast dispersion are 
significantly reduced (increased). 
                                                     
22 Glosten and Milgrom (1985), Amihud and Mendelson (1986 and 1989), Brennan and 
Subrahmanyam (1996), Eleswarapu (1997), Brennan, Chordia, and Subrahmanyam (1998), and 
Amihud (2002), among others, provide evidence that liquidity is priced in the cross-section of 
stock returns. 
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The results of Odders-White and Ready (2006) and He et al. (2010) indicate that credit 
ratings and credit rating changes are associated with changes in information asymmetry. One 
limitation of the prior studies in this area, however, is that they say little about the causality of 
the relationship. In fact, Odders-White and Ready (2006) find that changes in measures of 
adverse selection are predictive of future changes in credit ratings. Regardless, the rationale for 
why credit rating initiations (instances of new credit ratings) might affect information asymmetry 
and thus liquidity is straight forward. The findings of prior literature in this are point to 
significant market reactions to credit ratings changes and a robust relation between credit ratings, 
credit rating changes, and equity liquidity. Further, credit ratings agencies are privy to material, 
non-public information about the firms they rate. The distinct access to information afforded 
credit ratings agencies uniquely positions them to be able to signal to markets about the firm’s 
quality through the credit rating.  In a market characterized by informational asymmetries, credit 
rating initiations should serve to reduce uncertainty either through the revelation of new 
information or through the certification or validation of existing beliefs. 
2. Liquidity and Seasoned Equity Offerings 
The long-term implications that being rated has on equity liquidity less clear. To our 
knowledge, no study has examined the non-transitory effects that credit ratings or credit rating 
changes have on equity liquidity. However, literature on the relation between liquidity and SEO 
activity provides a natural setting for which to explore the permanent effects that becoming rated 
may have on equity liquidity. 
  Butler, Grullon, and Weston (2005) provide evidence that stock market liquidity is an 
important determinant of the cost of SEOs. By examining the connection between floatation 
costs on SEOs and the secondary market liquidity of the firm’s existing shares, they find that the 
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cost reduction in banker’s fees is about 101 basis points or 21% of the average investment 
banking fees for firms in their sample with the most liquid equity relative to firms with the least 
liquid equity. Their result is significant in that it contributes to the debate on whether a firm has 
any interest in the liquidity with which its equity trades in the secondary market. Firm value is 
affected by secondary market liquidity in that managers, seeking to maximize firm value, should 
issue SEOs when liquidity costs are lowest. Lin and Wu (2013) examine this claim by 
investigating the extent to which the market timing of SEOs can be explained by the dynamics of 
liquidity risk. Using asset-pricing portfolio regressions, their study identifies a robust 
relationship between liquidity declines and SEO filing activity. Firms file for SEOs when their 
liquidity risk for doing so falls to its lowest point in the period preceding the filing date and then 
rises ex-post. 
Managers time SEO filings, in part, when the costs to doing so are favorable. Among the 
cost concerns of the manager, are the liquidity costs which result from asymmetric information. 
To the extent that credit rating initiations reduce asymmetries and thus affect equity market 
liquidity and liquidity costs, the results of Butler et al. (2005) and Lin and Wu (2013) suggest 
that SEO activity should be different for firms following their initial credit rating than for similar 
firms who choose not to become rated. 
D. Data Description, Summary Statistics, and Methodology 
In this section, we discuss our sample selection procedure and explain the matching 
strategy we employ to control for contemporaneous changes in secondary market liquidity driven 
by market movements or for like firms. 
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1. Data Description 
Our initial sample consists of a universe of long-term, S&P issuer credit rating initiations 
consisting, 2,270 observations, obtained from Bloomberg Data Services over the period January 
1st, 1991 through December 31st, 2010. We start our sample in 1991 due to data availability from 
Bloomberg and end our sample in 2010 to avoid truncation in our SEO testing. To be included in 
our final sample, each observation must meet the following criteria: the firm must be followed by 
both CRSP and Compustat databases; the firm must have been tracked in CRSP for at least 252 
trading days prior to the rating initiation and at least 100 trading days post; and, the firm must 
have non-missing values for total book assets and total revenue in Compustat. These criteria 
generate a final sample of 1,182 credit rating initiations. 
In addition to the credit rating initiations data, we collect data on the universe of 11,561 
SEOs from Thomson Reuters’ Securities Data Company (SDC) Global New Issues database over 
the period January 1st, 1991, through December 31st, 2010. Following Butler et al. (2005) and 
Lin and Wu (2013) we require that our sample of SEOs meet the following requirements: the 
size of the SEOs is at least 5% of the existing, outstanding equity of the SEO firm; the offering is 
a firm commitment; and, the offering is not a shelf registration.23 
To measure the changes in equity liquidity surrounding a credit rating initiation we 
construct the following three measures of market liquidity from CRSP data: Amihud Liquidity, 
Volume, and Ask-Bid Spread. We construct Amihud Liquidity following Amihud (2002), i.e., it is 
the absolute value of the daily return over the daily dollar volume, except that we use the 
reciprocal of this value for the purposes of interpretation so that positive changes reflect a 
liquidity increase. Amihud (2002) argues that this measure can be interpreted as the daily price 
                                                     
23 All of our results are qualitatively unchanged to changes in the size requirement, e.g., moving 
from 5% to 10%. 
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response associated with one dollar of trading volume, thus serving as a rough measure of price 
impact. Following Brennan et al. (1998), we compute Volume as the daily trading volume as 
reported by CRSP. Positive values of Volume reflect increases in equity liquidity. Finally, we, 
and consistent with Odders-White and Ready (2006), we construct Ask-Bid Spread as the 
difference between the daily closing ask price and bid price. With Ask-Bid Spread negative 
changes reflect a reduction in the costs to transact in the firm’s equity, or, increased liquidity. 
For all three measures we take an average for a given period of time before and after the 
initiation, excluding a 21-day window centered on the initiation date, and calculate the 
percentage change. All measures are averaged for 30, 45, 60, and 90 days before the initiation 
ending at our initiation window, i.e., 10-days before the initiation date, and again for the same 
amount of time following the window, i.e., starting 10-days after the initiation date.24 The 
percentage change is then calculated for each measure for each time window giving a total of 
twelve measures, three distinct variables measured over four time-horizons each, of changes in 
equity liquidity. 
2. Summary Statistics 
Table 1 reports summary statistics on the distribution of credit rating initiations in our 
sample by year, by Fama-French (1997) industry, and by the credit rating obtained. As one 
would expect, credit rating initiations are pro-cyclical. The number of new ratings increase 
leading into the tech bubble and into the financial crisis and then fall thereafter. The middle 
columns of Table 1 shows clustering in the distribution of credit rating initiations by industry; 
initiations cluster in oil, machinery, and finance occur with the greatest frequency. 
                                                     
24 We construct an initiation window to avoid the potential problem of including information 
leakage in our pre-event measures. Our results are robust to windows over ±20 days, ±5 days, 
and to ±3 days. 
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[Insert Table 1 here] 
The right-hand columns of Table 1 detail the distribution of initiations by the credit rating 
obtained. Most new ratings are speculative grade, 66.7%. Additionally, ratings seem to cluster at 
rating-class breaks. For instance, the number of ratings increases monotonically moving down 
from BBB+ to BBB-, moving from 54 to 91, and then falls to 54 at BB+. 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics on the changes in equity liquidity surrounding the 
credit rating initiation date. Panel A details changes in our liquidity measures. The top third of 
Table 2 panel A presents the changes in Amihud Liquidity for 30, 45, 60, and 90-days 
surrounding the initiation date. The mean percentage change in Amihud Liquidity ranges from 
32.71% to 35.09% and is significant at better than the 1% level. The data show positive 
skewness in that mean is greater than the median, however the median change in Amihud 
Liquidity is positive and significant at better than the 1% for three of the four medians and at 
better than the 5% level for the remainder. Volume exhibits a similar pattern to Amihud Liquidity 
in that all four measures are positive and significant at the mean and median and that the means 
are much more positive than the medians. For Volume, all measures are different from zero at 
better than the 1% level and range from a 21.20% to a 23.16% increase on average. The results 
of our Ask-Bid Spread measure are similar in significance to those previously presented except 
that the signs are negative reflecting a reduction in the costs to transacting. For all four measures 
of Ask-Bid Spread the means and medians are statistically different from zero at better than the 
1% level and range, at the means, from -2.70% to -5.88%. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
Panel B of Table 2 examines the association between liquidity and the rating obtained by 
the newly rated firm. Odders-White and Ready (2006) find that credit ratings are poorer when 
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adverse selection costs are higher. As such, their results suggests that firms who receive higher 
credit ratings, i.e., ratings indicating greater creditworthiness, should experience greater equity 
liquidity increases surrounding the rating date. We test this conjecture using a univariate OLS 
framework wherein we regress Amihud Liquidity, Volume, and Ask-Bid Spread on an ordinal 
variable, Rating, which takes values from 1 (D rated) to 22 (AAA rated). Higher ratings are 
associated with larger increases in equity liquidity for all three measures. Coefficient estimates 
on Rating are positive for the specifications using Amihud Liquidity and Volume and are negative 
for the specifications using Ask-Bid Spread. The coefficient estimates on Rating are significant at 
better than the 1% level for all specifications. The results on Ask-Bid Spread are consistent with 
the findings of Odders-White and Ready (2006). Credit rating initiations are associated with 
greater reductions in the costs to transacting in the firm’s equity for higher rated firms. 
3. Methodology 
One potential issue not captured by an analysis of liquidity changes for firms surrounding 
credit rating initiations, particularly when examining non-transitory, long-term changes, is the 
fact that most measures of equity liquidity are subject to contamination from contemporaneous 
changes in market-wide liquidity. For instance, the daily volume on the NYSE has increased 
from roughly 162 million shares per day on January 2nd, 1991 (the start of our sample period) to 
roughly 807 million shares per day on December 31st, 2010 (the end of our sample period).25 
Any attempt to capture the intermediate to long-term changes in equity liquidity for a given firm 
also capture broader, market-wide changes. Further confounding the effect is the fact that prior 
literature finds that changes in liquidity are clustered by industry and by similar firms. Lin and 
Wu (2013) find that liquidity risk moves in the same direction for both the SEO firms in their 
                                                     
25 https://www.nyse.com/data/transactions-statistics-data-library 
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sample as well as the non-issuer control firms. To address the problem of contemporaneous 
movements in market and/or industry liquidity, we construct a matched sample wherein every 
credit initiation firm is paired to a propensity score matched control firm. 
To propensity score match our initiation firms to their non-initiation peers, we follow the 
methodology of Faulkender and Peterson (2006) who model the relation between public debt 
market access and capital structure. Identifying a causal relationship requires that they control for 
the potential endogeneity problem between being credit rated and a firm’s capital structure. In 
their study, they address this problem through an instrumental variable approach wherein they 
first model the decision to become credit rated as a function of firm characteristics. Following 
their methodology, we estimate a probit model over the universe of Compustat firms from 1991 
through 2010 modeling the decision to become rated. The dependent variable in our probit 
estimation takes a value of one if the firm is credit rated in a given year and zero otherwise. The 
independent variables we use are characteristics identified in prior literature to be correlated with 
capital structure, and, as Faulkender and Peterson show, the presence of a credit rating. Ln(Total 
Assets), Ln(1+Age), Leverage, Market-to-Book, ROS, PPE/Assets, R&D/Sales, 
Advertising/Sales, Tax Rate, as well as year fixed effects.26 
We then use our coefficient estimates to calculate a propensity score for each firm-year 
observation in Compustat. Our propensity score matching is then accomplished as follows: for 
each event firm, we select an unrated, bank-dependent control firm from the fiscal year end 
preceding the event year whose absolute difference in propensity score from that of the event 
firm is lowest. We define as “bank-dependent” if the sum of their long-term debt and the current 
portion of their long-term debt is non-zero.  We restrict our universe of control firms to bank-
                                                     
26 Variable definitions are presented in Appendix A. Results of this probit estimation are 
presented in Appendix B. 
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dependent firms to avoid the problem of modeling a firms decision to use debt, i.e., both our 
event and control firms have non-zero values for debt reflecting their willingness to use debt 
financing.27 In unreported results, we also impose a restriction that the control firms do not 
become rated for at least three years following the credit rating initiations to prevent 
contamination of our SEO testing. We dropped this restriction, however, to avoid questions 
regarding whether or not three years, or any number of years for that matter, were an appropriate 
length of time. Regardless, assuming that credit ratings affect liquidity and thus SEO activity, 
removing this restriction biases our results away from finding anything. 
The outcome of our matching procedure yields one control firm for every event firm in 
our credit rating initiation sample. Table 3 present descriptive statistics on the financial 
characteristics of our subsamples of event and control firms. 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
At the means, the event firms and control firms are statistically similar in Ln(Total Assets), 
Ln(1+Age), Leverage, Advertising/Sales, and σ(Equity Return). The only differences are for 
Ln(Sales), Market-to-Book, ROS, PPE/Assets, and R&D/Sales, initiation firms have higher sales, 
higher growth opportunities, higher profitability, have fewer tangible assets as a percent of total 
assets, and spend more on R&D as a percent of sales. At the medians, the groups show additional 
differences in σ(Equtiy Return). Initiation firms have greater prior-year equity volatility, but the 
difference in R&D/Sales is no longer present. 
Two results emerge when you compare our results to those of Faulkender and Peterson 
(2006) which suggest that our procedure yields similar subsamples. First, when comparing firms 
with public debt market access compared to those without, Faulkender and Peterson find 
                                                     
27 Our results are robust to this restriction. In fact, the effects are slightly stronger when non-bank 
dependent firms are included in our control firm subsample. 
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statistically significant differences at better than the 1% level for every variable presented in 
Table 3. The fact that we do not provides supporting evidence of the validity of our matching 
procedure. Secondly, the differences we do identify are in the opposite direction of Faulkender 
and Peterson. Given that we are simply attempting to identify appropriate control firms and are 
not interested in the effects of public debt market access on leverage, we take this as additional 
evidence that our procedure avoids any systematic bias. 
E. Empirical Results – Credit Ratings and Liquidity Changes 
In this section, we discuss the results from our examination of the effects of credit rating 
initiations on secondary market equity liquidity. 
1. Univariate Results 
Table 4 presents descriptive statistics on the changes in equity liquidity surrounding the 
credit rating initiation date for both our event and control firms and well as statistics on the 
differences in the two subsamples. The mean and median values for event firms are the same as 
those presented in Table 2 Panel A and have been discussed previously. 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
For the control firm subsample, the change in liquidity measures surrounding a credit 
rating initiation show a statistically significant improvement in equity liquidity for all but the 
Ask-Bid spread measures. Mean and median values are statistically different from zero at better 
than the 1% level for all eight measures of Amihud Liquidity as well as Volume. The change in 
Ask-Bid is much weaker being significant for half of the eight measures. The fact that our control 
firm group exhibits liquidity improvement is consistent with both the findings of Lin and Wu 
(2013) who find that liquidity risk clusters as well as with an overall improvement of market 
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liquidity over our sample period.28 We interpret the fact that the liquidity for our control firms 
improves, albeit to a lesser extent, along with the liquidity to our event firms as further evidence 
that our propensity score matching routine produces desirable matching results. To control for 
the clustering and market effects of liquidity changes, we evaluate the differences in the changes 
in equity liquidity for our two subsamples. 
The right-hand column of Table 4 shows the differences in the mean and median value 
for each liquidity measure across our two groups. The signs of all 24 measures are in the 
direction we would expect, i.e., the differences are positive for Amihud Liquidity and Volume and 
are negative for Ask-Bid Spread. We test these differences statistically using t-tests on the means 
and Wilcoxon rank-sum tests on the medians. Statistical tests show that the differences are 
significant at better than the 5% level for 23 of the 24 comparisons and at better than the 10% for 
the remainder. The difference is economically meaningful as well. The improvement in equity 
liquidity for event firms is, when evaluated at the means, 19.34 percentage points greater for 
Amihud Liquidity measures, 11.35 percentage points greater for Volume measures, and the cost 
reduction in Ask-Bid Spread is 4.82% more for event firms. 
2. Multivariate Results 
To account for differences in our subsamples identified in Table 3, we examine the 
changes in liquidity resulting from credit rating initiations in a multivariate framework. For all 
measures of equity liquidity changes, we regress the liquidity change on some of the firm and 
return characteristics identified in prior literature as factors correlated with equity market 
liquidity. Odder-White and Ready (2006) show that credit rating changes and equity liquidity are 
related to firm size, leverage, market-to-book, profitability, and prior year asset volatility. We 
                                                     
28 As previously noted, the volume on the NYSE has increased nearly 400% over the period 
1990-2010. https://www.nyse.com/data/transactions-statistics-data-library 
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include these measures in our liquidity change regressions. In addition, to control for the 
heterogeneity identified in Table 3 and following Faulkender and Peterson (2006), we also 
include a measure of asset tangibility, R&D and advertising expenditures, and the natural log of 
total firm revenue and of one plus firm age. We also include the pre-initiation level of the 
dependent variable averaged over the same time frame as the dependent variable in the pre-event 
window. Our primary variable of interest in these equity change regressions if the variable Event 
Firm which is an indicator variable taking a value of one if the firm obtained a credit rating and 
zero otherwise. All specifications include year and Fama-French 17-industry controls. Robust 
standard errors are clustered by industry. The results of these tests are presented in Table 5. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
The left-hand column of Table 5 presents the results using Amihud Liquidity as the 
dependent variable. For all specifications, the coefficient estimate on Event Firm is positive and 
statistically significant at better than the 5% level. The credit rating is associated, on average, 
with between an 18.4% and 22.8% increase in equity liquidity for the newly rated firm. 
Additionally, the intercept, non-rated firms, is only significant in the first two specifications and 
is insignificant for the remainder suggesting the variation is captured by the included firm 
characteristics. The results are qualitatively similar for the specifications using Volume as the 
dependent variable. Estimates on Event Firm are positive and significant for all four 
specifications. Credit rating initiations are associated with between an 18.7% and 22.0% increase 
in equity volume in the 30 to 90-days pre/post initiation for the event firms in our sample. The 
intercept in our volume change specifications is now significant in the four specifications 
highlighting the industry clustering and market effects of volume changes. 
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The right-hand column of Table 5 presents the changes in Ask-Bid Spread. Coefficient 
estimates on Event Firm are negative and significant at better than the 5% level for all four 
specifications. The instance of a new credit rating is associated with between a 4.0% and 5.1% 
decrease in the cost of transacting in the firm’s equity. With the exception of the short-window 
Ask-Bid Spread changes, the intercepts in these specifications are all statistically insignificant. 
Given that this measure of equity market liquidity change is least susceptible to market 
movements and changes in industry clusters, we argue that these results are the least 
contaminated by market and industry clustering effects and best highlight the true cost reduction 
in transacting associated with credit rating initiations. 
Taken together, the initiation of a new, long-term issuer credit rating is associated with 
statistically and economically significant improvements in equity market liquidity. The event 
firm benefits in the form of reduced adverse selection risks in transacting in the firm’s equity. 
The question then becomes, to what extent, if any, are managers able to exploit the 
improvements in liquidity following the credit rating initiation. 
F. Empirical Results – Seasoned Equity Offerings 
1. Univariate Results 
Butler et al. (2005) provide evidence that stock market liquidity is an important 
determinant of the cost SEOs. Firms with greater (lesser) secondary market liquidity pre-SEO 
face lower (higher) SEO costs in terms of investment bank fees at SEO. The implication, then, is 
that managers, seeking to maximize firm value, issue seasoned equity when aftermarket liquidity 
is high. Lin and Wu (2013) examine this conclusion and find that liquidity risk declines in the 
36-months preceding the filing of a new SEO. Liquidity risk seems to be a concern in the 
decision by firm managers to issue seasoned equity. We extend this literature by investigating 
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various characteristics of SEO activity post-credit rating initiation: the size of SEO issues, the 
likelihood of a SEO issue, the time to a SEO issue, and the abnormal returns to a SEO issue. 
We construct four variables to examine SEO activity/characteristics: 1) SEO Flag which 
takes a value of one if the firm issues a SEO and zero otherwise; 2) Time to SEO which counts 
the number of days from the credit rating initiation date to the SEO issue date; 3) Issue Size 
which scales the issue proceeds by the firm’s market capitalization; and, 4) CAR which captures 
the cumulative abnormal return to the issuing firm at the issue date (we measure CAR over three 
time horizons). To construct our abnormal return measures, we use the Carhart (1997) four-
factor asset pricing model estimated in the period 282 trading days before the issue date to 30 
days before the issue date. Risk-adjusted daily abnormal returns are then the difference between 
the predicted return for that day and the realized return. We sum the daily abnormal returns 
around the issue date for three time intervals centered on the date of the issue: ±3 days, ±7 days, 
and ±10 days. Table 6 presents summary statistics on these measures for our full SEO sample in 
Panel A, and, by subsample in Panel B. 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
Of the 2,364 firms in our sample, 580 issue SEOs over our sample period, or, roughly 
25.38% of firms. Time to SEO is 1205 days at the mean and 630.5 days at the median. The 
average issue size represents 32.96% of the market capitalization of the issuing firm at the mean, 
and 18.43% at the median. Consistent with the findings of prior literature, CARs to SEO issues 
are negative.29 CARs for two of the three issue windows are negative and statistically significant, 
i.e., the 7-day and 11-day windows. Over the longer, 21-day window, CARs are negative, but not 
                                                     
29 Most studies on SEO return patterns focus on the post-issue period to examine the extent, to 
which, managers issue equity when equity is overvalued. However, Asquith and Mullins (1986), 
Ritter (1993), Lee (1997), Carlson, Fisher, and Giammarino (2006), and Li and Zhao (2006). 
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significant. The -1.62% CAR over the 7-day window is quantitatively similar in magnitude to 
Asquith and Mullins (1986), Ritter (1993), and Lee (1997) who find CARs around SEO filing 
dates near -2%, on average. SEOs, on average, negatively affect firm valuations. 
Panel B of Table 6 splits our sample into the event and control subsamples and examines 
the differences in our SEO measures. The results suggest that credit rating initiation firms are 
178.4% more likely to undergo a SEO post-new rating, 36.89% of event firms issue while only 
13.23% of control firms issue. This difference is significant at better than the 1% level. Time to 
SEO is also different across the two groups. For event firms, the mean (median) time to issue is 
1259.28 (697) days. In contrast, for control firms the mean (median) time to issue is 1046.51 
(473.50) days. The differences are significant at better than the 10% level for the median. Issue 
Size is slightly larger for control firms than for event firms. 
One potential issue regarding our investigation into the SEO behavior of the firms in our 
sample is that SEO behavior may be driven, in part, by the firm’s lifecycle. The likelihood of 
SEO issuance and Time to SEO both reflect managerial preferences following the credit rating 
initiation and could be a function of firm’s life-cycle, e.g., firms, after becoming credit-rated, 
issue more debt (Faulkender and Peterson, 2006) and thus the SEO is simply an attempt to 
rebalance their capital structure. To account for this possibility, and in addition to controlling for 
leverage changes in multivariate testing, we also examine the differential market response to the 
issue. Abnormal returns to our two groups are independent, to a greater extent, of confounding 
lifecycle effects that may be present. CARs are negative for both groups on average, however, 
the returns to event firms are more positive for all three measures at both the mean and median 
and the differences are statistically significant for all six comparisons. The valuation of initiation 
firms suffer less at SEO issue than their unrated peers. 
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2. Multivariate Results 
To investigate the extent to which liquidity affects SEO activity, we first investigate the 
likelihood of SEO issuance. If credit rating initiations improve equity market liquidity and, as 
Butler et al. (2005) and Lin and Wu (2013) argue, managers time SEO issues to take advantage 
of favorable liquidity costs, then we would expect to see a higher likelihood of SEO issuance for 
our initiation firms. We test this hypothesis in a limited dependent variable framework where we 
model the decision to issue as a function of a vector of firm characteristics and an indicator, 
Event Firm, which takes a value of one if a given observation is from our credit rating initiation 
subsample. The results from six model specifications examining the likelihood to issue are 
presented in Table 7. All specifications use probit regressions with robust standard errors 
clustered by Fama-French 17-industry. 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
The left-hand side of Table 7 imposes no restriction on the time differential from credit 
rating initiation to SEO issue date. The first column is a simple univariate estimation, the second 
adds firm characteristics and a control for the change in leverage from initiation date to SEO date 
(∆Leverage), and the third includes year and industry fixed effects. For all three specifications, 
the coefficient estimates on Event Firm are positive and statistically significant at better than the 
1% level. After becoming credit rated, firms are more likely to issue seasoned equity. The 
estimates are economic significance as well. The marginal effect of Event Firm on SEO issue, 
when evaluated at the means, is 24.13%, 24.10%, and 24.66% for the first three specifications, 
respectively. 
Consistent with Faulkender and Peterson (2006), the positive and significant coefficient 
estimate on the change in leverage reflects managerial preference to maintain a certain capital 
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structure. Firms whose leverage increases post-credit rating initiation are more likely to issue 
SEOs. The coefficient on Leverage, in levels, is consistent with this result. Firms with higher 
leverage are more likely to issue SEOs. The interpretations of the remaining variables are 
consistent with economic intuition. Older firms with higher sales, a greater percentage of their 
assets in tangible assets, and who are NYSE listed are less likely to issue reflecting their ability 
to better access debt markets. 
To ensure that our results are not driven by outliers and that our sample does not suffer 
from a right-censoring bias. We reevaluate our full specification but impose a requirement that 
the SEO issuance occurs in one, three, and five year following the credit rating initiation date. 
The results of this exercise are presented in columns (4) through (6). The inferences from our full 
sample estimation are consistent regardless of the additional restriction. For all three 
specifications, estimates on Event Firm are positive and significant suggesting credit rating 
initiations are associated with an increased likelihood of SEO issuance. Economically, the 
marginal effect of Event Firm when evaluated at the mean values of the remaining covariates 
increases the likelihood of SEO issuance of 6.55% over one-year, 13.15% over three-years, and 
16.57% over the five-years following the credit rating initiation after controlling for the 
heterogeneity in firm characteristics. 
We then examine the time to SEO issuance using a Cox proportional hazards model to 
estimate a firm’s duration of time until it issues seasoned equity. The direction of the relation 
between becoming credit rated and the time to SEO is less clear than the likelihood to issue and 
the valuation effects for doing so. It could be the case that firm’s with enhanced equity liquidity 
resulting from the credit rating initiations choose to issue a SEO earlier than its less-liquid peers. 
However, this assumes that the firm’s are unable or unwilling to access public debt markets to 
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meet their financing needs. Faulkender and Peterson (2006) argue that credit rated firms are to 
increase their leverage by accessing public debt markets. If that is the case, then it is less likely 
that these firms would need to issue a SEO to raise capital. We test these competing hypotheses 
with a proportional hazards model. 
The proportional hazards model is ideal in this setting as it deals with both censored 
observations and the non-normal distribution of the dependent variable. Our framework models 
Time to SEO as a function of Event Firm, our primary variable of interest, and a vector of firm 
characteristics. Recall, proportional hazard models seek to explain the time to failure, or action 
(e.g., to examine the relationship between an oil additive and the time to engine failure a 
researcher would use a proportional hazards model). As such a positive coefficient estimate 
indicates that the time to failure, SEO issuance in our case, is shorter given higher values of the 
covariate. The results of this testing are presented in Table 8. 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
Model 1 includes Event Firm as the only covariate. The negative and marginally 
significant coefficient estimate of -0.168 indicates that the time to SEO issuance is longer for 
credit rating initiation firms. The hazard ratio provides an intuitive interpretation of this result. 
Firms in the initiation subsample are 0.845 times less likely to issue on a given day given that 
they had not already done so. Model 2 repeats this testing controlling for firm characteristics. 
Again the negative and marginally significant coefficient estimate indicates that the time to issue 
is longer for credit rating initiation firms than for our control firms (hazard ratio of 0.848). Model 
3 adds year and industry fixed effects. In this specification, the significance of the coefficient 
estimate on Event Firm subsides.  There is no difference in the time to SEO for firms in the 
initiation subsample relative to firms in the control subsample. We interpret this result in our full 
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model specification as evidence that credit initiation firms have increased options in their choice 
of financing. 
Finally, we examine the abnormal returns to the issuing firms in our sample controlling 
for confounding effects. Market reactions are less dependent on firm lifecycle effects thus offer a 
cleaner setting to examine the rating’s effect on liquidity. Table 9 presents the results of OLS 
regressions where CARs over our three time horizons are the dependent variables in three model 
specifications. Again, we include, as our primary variable of interest, Event Firm which is an 
indicator taking a value of one if the observation is for a credit rating initiation firm and zero 
otherwise. Standard errors in all specifications are clustered by year. The first three columns 
present the results from univariate regressions, columns (4) through (6) include the financial 
characteristics of the issuing firm and the change in firm leverage, and the remaining columns 
include year and Fama-French 17-industry controls. The results are consistent regardless of the 
specification used. 
[Insert Table 9 here] 
Coefficient estimates are positive for all nine specifications and are statistically 
significant at better than the 10% for all nine model specifications suggesting the credit rating 
firm’s CARs are more positive (less negative) than the CARs for non-rated firms. The results are 
economically meaningful as well. In the first three columns, the CARs to our control firm 
subsample, the constant, are negative and statistically significant. In unreported results, we test 
whether the sum of the constant and the coefficient estimate on Event Firm is equal to zero. We 
cannot reject this null, the sum of the two is equal to zero, for any of the first three specifications. 
The positive effects of becoming credit rated and the liquidity that results mitigates the negative 
effects of SEO issuance for our initiation firms. 
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Columns (4) through (9) support the differential result even after controlling for firm, 
industry, and year effects. The estimates on Event Firm are all positive and significant. The 
estimates on the intercepts are still negative, but the significance drops. This is largely the result 
of the inclusion of ∆Leverage and Prior Return. Firms whose leverage increases post credit 
initiation date suffer less at SEO because the market interprets the issue as a rebalance of the 
firm’s capital structure. Prior Return has the opposite effect. Firms who have seen a larger stock 
price rise in the past year suffer more at SEO due to the market interpreting the issue as 
manager’s issuing when equity is overvalued. 
G. Conclusion 
Credit rating agencies play a crucial role is alleviating the informational asymmetries that 
exist in financial markets. Rating changes are predictive of changes in measures of adverse 
selection in equity trading patterns (Odders-White and Ready, 2006). The rating itself both 
reflects the asymmetric information present and serves to reduce its adverse selection costs in 
equity trading. In contrast to prior literature, this paper examines the effects that a credit rating 
initiation (becoming rated for the first time) has for the trading behavior of the firm’s equity. 
Specifically, the extent to which the credit ratings reduces information asymmetry and improves 
secondary market equity liquidity. 
The revisions in investor beliefs about the adverse selection costs to transacting in the 
firm’s equity that ensue from the credit rating initiation bring about significant changes in firm’s 
secondary market equity. Be it through the introduction of new information or the validation of 
prior beliefs, the credit rating initiation produces economically meaningful changes in the trading 
patterns of the firm’s equity. Our analysis shows that measures of secondary market liquidity, 
i.e., Amihud Liquidity and trading volume, increase surrounding the credit rating initiation while 
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measures of adverse selection costs, i.e., Ask-Bid Spread, fall. We then investigate the extent to 
which managers, seeking to maximize firm value, are able to exploit the favorable changes in 
secondary market liquidity. 
The long-term, permanent effects of being credit rated on equity liquidity produces 
differential effects on SEO issuance activity. Credit rating initiation firms are 178.84% more 
likely to issue a SEO following the credit rating initiation than their propensity-score matched 
controls. Managers are more likely to issue following the initiation. 
To account for the possibility that SEO activity following credit rating is simply a 
function of the life-cycle of the firm, we examine the abnormal equity returns to the firms in our 
subsamples. We show that the risk-adjusted, cumulative abnormal returns to our event firms are 
more positive (less negative) surrounding the SEO issue. The fact that credit rating initiation 
firms are more likely to issue and suffer less in terms of valuation suggest that the effects on 
liquidity are non-transitory. The adverse selection costs of transacting in the firm’s equity fall 
post-rating and the price support in terms of secondary market liquidity rises. 
In summary, information asymmetry and the adverse selection costs it engenders impose real 
economic costs for financial transactions. Credit rating agencies serve to mitigate the cost of 
transacting by decreasing asymmetries and fostering market liquidity. The effects of being rated 
reduce the costs to firms in raising external capital and thus are of primary concern to managers 
seeking maximize firm value. 
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Table 1: Distribution of Rating Initiations 
This table provides summary statistics on the distribution of new credit ratings by year, industry, 
and rating class. The sample consists of new long-term issuer credit rating initiations by Standard 
and Poor's over the time period January 1st, 1991 through December 31st, 2010. Firms are 
identified as having obtained a new issuer rating if their prior rating, as identified by Bloomberg 
Data Services, is either missing, blank, or contains a value of "NR" which identifies a firm as 
being not-rated. Firms are classified in to 17 industries following the classification methodology 
of Fama and French (1997). 
 
  
Year Frequency Year Frequency Year Frequency
1991 24 FOOD 30 AAA 2
1992 35 MINING 18 AA+ 1
1993 42 OIL 82 AA 7
1994 47 CLTHS 25 AA- 8
1995 57 DURBL 25 A+ 22
1996 93 CHEM 19 A 49
1997 126 CNSUM 38 A- 53
1998 133 CNSTR 42 BBB+ 61
1999 91 STEEL 28 BBB 103
2000 79 FABPR 5 BBB- 111
2001 43 MACHN 134 BB+ 61
2002 54 CARS 22 BB 111
2003 51 TRANS 48 BB- 210
2004 49 UTILS 55 B+ 203
2005 53 RTAIL 64 B 116
2006 46 FINAN 181 B- 42
2007 37 OTHER 366 CCC+ 12
2008 25 CCC 1
2009 35 D 1
2010 62
Total 1182
S&P Long-Term Credit RatingYear Fama-French 17 Industry
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Table 2: Changes in Equity Liquidity 
This table presents descriptive statistics on the changes in various measures of a firm's equity 
liquidity surrounding the initiation of a new long-term issuer credit rating. The sample covers the 
time period January 1st, 1991 through December 31st, 2010. Amihud Liquidity is calculated as 
the reciprocal of the absolute return of a issue on a given day divided by that day's dollar volume 
all multiplied by 1x106 for scaling purposes (Amihud, 2002). Ln(Volume) is the natural log of 
the issue's daily trading volume. Ask-Bid Spread is the difference between an issue's ask and bid 
prices at closing. All three liquidity measures are the percentage changes in averages taken for a 
given time period pre- and post-rating and exclude the time period from 10 trading days before 
the rating to 10 trading days after. Panels A details the percentage in Amihud Liquidity, Volume, 
and Ask-Bid Spread. Panel B presents the results of OLS tests looking at the association between 
the rating obtained and the changes in liquidity measures. a, b, and c indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
 
 
N Std. Dev. p5 p25 p75 p95
  Amihud 30-day 1182 0.4369
c
0.0567
c
1.4538 -0.6675 -0.3086 0.6354 2.8122
  Amihud 45-day 1182 0.4189
c
0.0709
c
1.2834 -0.6614 -0.2769 0.6029 2.4072
  Amihud 60-day 1182 0.4567
c
0.0781
c
1.4657 -0.6650 -0.2600 0.6384 2.5134
  Amihud 90-day 1182 0.4774
c
0.1223
c
1.4256 -0.6589 -0.2292 0.6343 2.5246
  Volume 30-day 1182 0.2941 c 0.0557 c 0.9388 -0.5301 -0.2383 0.4546 2.0137
  Volume 45-day 1182 0.2662 c 0.0684 c 0.8106 -0.5076 -0.2092 0.4709 1.8249
  Volume 60-day 1182 0.2615 c 0.0743 c 0.7653 -0.4964 -0.1997 0.4472 1.7641
  Volume 90-day 1182 0.2954 c 0.0842 c 0.8369 -0.4702 -0.1748 0.4629 1.7179
  Ask-Bid 30-day 1182 -0.0183
a
-0.0313
c
0.3178 -0.4909 -0.1936 0.1071 0.4599
  Ask-Bid 45-day 1182 -0.0213
b
-0.0370
c
0.3190 -0.4749 -0.1892 0.1000 0.5000
  Ask-Bid 60-day 1182 -0.0242
b
-0.0426
c
0.3229 -0.4591 -0.1978 0.0929 0.4838
  Ask-Bid 90-day 1182 -0.0480
c
-0.0631
c
0.3275 -0.5157 -0.2172 0.0701 0.5253
Volume Changes
Ask-Bid Spread Changes
Mean Median
Amihud Liquidity Changes
Panel A: Changes in Equity Liquidity
  
 
8
4
 
Table 2: Changes in Equity Liquidity (Cont.) 
 
 
 
 
Rating 0.0313
c
0.0270
b
0.0388
c
0.0392
c
0.0192
b
0.0117
a
0.0136
b
0.0187
c
-0.0067
b
-0.0074
c
-0.0079
c
-0.0085
c
(2.602) (2.543) (3.210) (3.334) (2.467) (1.735) (2.150) (2.711) (-2.431) (-2.693) (-2.862) (-3.052)
Constant 0.0567 0.0910 -0.0141 0.0019 0.0615 0.1247 0.0964 0.0682 0.0633
a
0.0694
b
0.0729
b
0.0565
(0.373) (0.677) (-0.092) (0.013) (0.626) (1.469) (1.206) (0.781) (1.814) (1.983) (2.067) (1.587)
Observations
Adj-R
2
1182 1182 1182 1182
0.005 0.006 0.007 0.008
1182 1182 1182 1182
0.005 0.003 0.004 0.006
1182 1182 1182 1182
0.006 0.005 0.009 0.009
90-day30-day 45-day 60-day 90-day 30-day 45-day 60-day 90-day 30-day 45-day 60-day
Panel B: Rating Obtained and Liquidity Changes
Ask-Bid SpreadAmihud Liquidity Volume
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Table 3: Validation of Control Sample 
This table reports summary statistics on the financial characteristics of event and control firms in 
the sample for the fiscal year end prior to the event date. Control firms are unrated firms matched 
based on the closest absolute-difference in their propensity score to that of an event firm 
following the methodology of Faulkender and Peterson (2006). Propensity scores are calculated 
as the output from a probit estimation using Ln(Total Assets), Ln(Sales), Ln(1+Age), Leverage, 
Market-to-Book, ROS, PPE/TA, R&D/Sales, Advertising/Sales, and σ(asset return) as 
explanatory variables. Variable definitions are provided in appendix A. Variable medians are 
presented in brackets. Statistical significance is provided from results testing for differences in 
means using t-tests and medians using Wilcoxon sign rank tests. a, b, and c indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
 
 
  
Variable N Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Ln (Total Assets) 1182 7.069 [6.972] 7.003 [6.825] 0.0654 [0.1466]
Ln (Sales) 1182 6.485 [6.544] 6.359 [6.432] 0.1262 b [0.1121] a
Ln (1+Firm Age) 1182 2.537 [2.485] 2.549 [2.485] -0.0123 [0.0000]
Leverage 1182 0.373 [0.359] 0.380 [0.345] -0.0070 [0.0139]
Market-to-Book 1182 1.720 [1.218] 1.435 [0.995] 0.2852
c
[0.2235]
c
ROS 1182 0.095 [0.106] 0.074 [0.096] 0.0204
b
[0.0092]
b
PPE/Assets 1182 0.288 [0.203] 0.327 [0.271] -0.0390
c
[-0.0682]
c
R&D/Sales 1182 0.028 [0.000] 0.022 [0.000] 0.0069
b
[0.0000]
Advertising/Sales 1182 0.006 [0.000] 0.006 [0.000] 0.0003 [0.0000]
σ(Equity Return) 1182 0.030 [0.027] 0.030 [0.025] 0.0002 [0.0017] b
Event Firms Control Firms Difference
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Table 4: Changes in Liquidity by Group 
This table presents descriptive statistics on the changes in various measures of a firm's equity 
liquidity surrounding the initiation of a new long-term issuer credit rating for both event and 
control firms. Control firms are unrated firms matched based on the closest absolute-difference 
in their propensity score to that of an event firm following the methodology of Faulkender and 
Peterson (2006). All three liquidity measures are averaged for a given time period pre- and post-
rating and exclude the time period from 10 trading days before the rating to 10 trading days after. 
Panels A, B and C detail changes in Amihud Liquidity, Volume, and Ask-Bid Spread, 
respectively. a, b, and c indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
N
  Amihud 30-day 1182 0.4369
c
0.0567
c
0.2633
c
0.0032
c
0.1735
c
0.0535
b
  Amihud 45-day 1182 0.4189
c
0.0709
c
0.2549
c
0.0045
c
0.1640
c
0.0664
c
  Amihud 60-day 1182 0.4567
c
0.0781
c
0.2399
c
-0.0109
c
0.2168
c
0.0890
c
  Amihud 90-day 1182 0.4774
c
0.1223
c
0.2580
c
0.0072
c
0.2194
c
0.1151
c
  Volume 30-day 1182 0.2941 c 0.0557 c 0.1862 c 0.0199 c 0.1078 c 0.0358 b
  Volume 45-day 1182 0.2662 c 0.0684 c 0.1680 c 0.0469 c 0.0981 c 0.0214 a
  Volume 60-day 1182 0.2615 c 0.0743 c 0.1520 c 0.0249 c 0.1095 c 0.0495 c
  Volume 90-day 1182 0.2954 c 0.0842 c 0.1571 c 0.0302 c 0.1383 c 0.0541 c
  Ask-Bid 30-day 1182 -0.0183
a
-0.0313
c
0.0337
c
-0.0089 -0.0520
c
-0.0223
c
  Ask-Bid 45-day 1182 -0.0213
b
-0.0370
c
0.0249
b
-0.0126 -0.0462
c
-0.0244
c
  Ask-Bid 60-day 1182 -0.0242
b
-0.0426
c
0.0192
a
-0.0169
b
-0.0434
c
-0.0257
b
  Ask-Bid 90-day 1182 -0.0480
c
-0.0631
c
0.0032 -0.0342
c
-0.0512
c
-0.0289
c
Panel C: Volume Changes
Panel B: Ask-Bid Spread Changes
Panel A: Amihud Liquidity Changes
Mean Median Mean MedianMedianMean
Event Firms DifferenceControl Firms
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Table 5: Multivariate Tests of Liquidity Changes 
This table reports the results of multivariate ordinary-least-squares testing on the changes in various measures of a firm's equity 
liquidity surrounding the initiation of a new long-term issuer credit rating with fixed effects for year and industry using Fama and 
French 17 industry classifications and robust standard errors clustered by industries. Control firms are unrated firms matched based 
on the closest absolute-difference in their propensity score to that of an event firm following the methodology of Faulkender and 
Peterson (2006). All three liquidity measures are averaged for a given time period pre- and post-rating and exclude the time period 
from 10 trading days before the rating to 10 trading days after. Event Firm is an indicator which takes a value of one if the 
observation if for a firm which obtained a credit rating and zero otherwise. Pre-Level is the average level of the dependent variable 
measured over the same time frame as the dependent in the period before the rating initiation. Remaining variable definitions are 
provided in appendix A. a, b, and c indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
  
  
 
8
8
 
Table 5: Multivariate Tests of Liquidity Changes (Cont.) 
  
Dependent Variable
Event Firm 0.195
c
0.184
c
0.228
c
0.219
c
0.215
c
0.187
c
0.188
c
0.220
c
-0.051
c
-0.044
b
-0.040
b
-0.048
c
(3.670) (3.738) (4.580) (5.158) (6.478) (5.982) (6.424) (6.514) (-2.588) (-2.314) (-2.163) (-2.885)
Pre-Level -0.000
c
-0.001
c
-0.000
c
-0.000
c
-0.140
c
-0.120
c
-0.110
c
-0.118
c
-0.127
a
-0.121 -0.102 -0.098
a
(-4.988) (-5.339) (-2.801) (-3.757) (-8.222) (-9.302) (-7.632) (-7.413) (-1.771) (-1.595) (-1.401) (-1.704)
Ln (Total Assets) -0.070 -0.010 0.001 -0.016 0.035 0.044 0.052
b
0.039 -0.006 -0.006 0.001 -0.001
(-1.323) (-0.242) (0.022) (-0.321) (0.998) (1.439) (1.993) (1.597) (-0.450) (-0.451) (0.040) (-0.064)
Ln (Sales) 0.029 0.010 -0.001 0.020 0.003 0.005 -0.003 0.013 -0.006 -0.001 -0.001 -0.006
(0.618) (0.272) (-0.017) (0.432) (0.107) (0.196) (-0.144) (0.502) (-0.481) (-0.088) (-0.126) (-0.588)
Ln (1+Firm Age) -0.038 -0.017 0.011 0.007 0.002 0.013 0.011 -0.010 0.016
a
0.015
a
0.017
a
0.014
b
(-1.058) (-0.633) (0.342) (0.225) (0.073) (0.470) (0.423) (-0.379) (1.700) (1.887) (1.783) (2.057)
Leverage 0.215 0.194 0.199 0.193 -0.017 -0.013 -0.035 -0.022 -0.002 0.005 -0.015 -0.016
(1.231) (1.426) (1.111) (1.067) (-0.172) (-0.152) (-0.388) (-0.223) (-0.081) (0.123) (-0.391) (-0.428)
Market-toBook 0.016 0.025 0.043
b
0.058
c
0.030
b
0.040
c
0.046
c
0.051
c
0.004 0.006 0.007
a
0.007
(0.611) (1.247) (2.107) (2.669) (2.365) (3.496) (3.522) (3.911) (1.105) (1.482) (1.850) (1.345)
ROS 0.167 0.193 0.199 0.221 0.040 -0.040 -0.043 -0.081 -0.016 -0.044 -0.032 -0.004
(1.027) (1.322) (1.143) (1.154) (0.459) (-0.506) (-0.477) (-0.898) (-0.339) (-0.999) (-0.694) (-0.078)
PPE/Assets -0.074 -0.167 -0.136 -0.207 -0.195
a
-0.197
b
-0.196
a
-0.243
b
0.028 0.018 0.042 0.043
(-0.447) (-1.131) (-0.796) (-1.185) (-1.957) (-2.042) (-1.925) (-2.345) (0.663) (0.416) (1.034) (1.090)
R&D/Sales -0.202 -0.448 -0.744
a
-0.778
b
0.077 0.021 0.009 0.072 -0.102 -0.154
a
-0.165 -0.201
(-0.457) (-1.338) (-1.887) (-2.071) (0.334) (0.084) (0.032) (0.265) (-1.162) (-1.703) (-1.280) (-1.339)
Advertising/Sales 1.062 1.215 0.569 1.433 1.542 1.149 1.032 2.401
a
0.546 0.275 0.137 0.154
(0.348) (0.443) (0.194) (0.538) (0.891) (0.768) (0.762) (1.670) (0.732) (0.445) (0.240) (0.267)
σ(Equity Return) 3.021 2.673 5.330 6.133 5.641
c
3.469
c
3.088
b
1.903
a
-1.232 -1.721
b
-1.559
b
-1.991
c
(1.127) (0.929) (1.282) (1.528) (3.443) (2.580) (2.146) (1.666) (-1.518) (-2.549) (-2.309) (-2.903)
NYSE 0.030 -0.018 -0.021 0.002 0.066 0.066 0.072
a
0.060
a
0.042
b
0.043
b
0.037
b
0.037
b
(0.345) (-0.236) (-0.244) (0.028) (1.567) (1.607) (1.826) (1.658) (2.040) (2.378) (2.284) (2.280)
Constant 0.536
a
0.362
a
0.075 0.100 1.243
c
0.973
c
0.848
c
1.025
c
0.144
a
0.114 0.027 0.066
(1.797) (1.725) (0.240) (0.309) (5.529) (4.840) (4.133) (4.275) (1.780) (1.560) (0.329) (0.748)
Observations
Adj. R
2
45-day 60-day 90-day30-day 45-day 60-day 90-day 30-day
Ask-Bid SpreadVolume
30-day 90-day
2364
0.0840.050
2364 2364 2364
0.0550.0430.087 0.083 0.079 0.0880.058 0.067 0.072 0.093
2364 236423642364
Amihud Liquidity
23642364 2364 2364
45-day 60-day
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Table 6: Seasoned Equity Offerings 
This table presents descriptive statistics on seasoned equity offerings for event and control firms 
following the initiation of a new long-term issuer credit rating. The sample covers the time 
period January 1st, 1991 through December 31st, 2010. SEO Flag is an indicator which takes a 
value of one if the firm issues a seasoned equity offer following the new rating and zero 
otherwise. Time to SEO is the natural log of the issue's daily trading volume. Abnormal returns 
surrounding the issue are calculated using the Carhart (1997) four-factor model estimated over 
the period 282 to 30 days prior to issue date and then summed for various horizons surrounding 
the issue date. Panels A and B provide summary statistics for the full sample and by group, 
respectively. t-tests for differences in means and Wilcoxon sign rank tests are performed on the 
mean and median values for each measure as well as for differences in group results. a, b, and c 
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
  
N p95
SEO Flag 2364 0.2538 0.0 1.0
Time to SEO 580 1204.98 630.5 4287.5
Issue Size 580 0.3296 0.1843 1.1406
CAR[-3,3] 580 -0.0162
c
-0.0180
c
0.1008
CAR[-5,5] 580 -0.0136
c
-0.0172
c
0.1345
CAR[-10,10] 580 -0.0015 -0.0104 0.1797
N N
SEO Flag 1182 0.3689 - 1182 0.1323 - 0.2366
c
-
Time to SEO 432 1259.28 697.00 148 1046.51 473.50 212.77 223.50
a
Issue Size 432 0.3234 0.1774 148 0.3477 0.2094 -0.0243 -0.0320
b
CAR[-3,3] 432 -0.0108
c
-0.0149
c
148 -0.0326
c
-0.0264
c
0.0218
c
0.0115
b
CAR[-5,5] 432 -0.0071 -0.0156
b
148 -0.0328
c
-0.0243
c
0.0257
c
0.0087
b
CAR[-10,10] 432 0.0066 -0.0067 148 -0.0257
c
-0.0224
c
0.0322
c
0.0157
b
     Median
Mean Median
Panel A: Full Sample
Panel B: Comparison by Groups
Mean Median Mean Median Mean
-0.1902
DifferenceEvent Firms
Std. Dev.
Control Firms
p5
0.0
19.5
-0.1455
-0.1776
0.4353
1385.39
0.0773
0.0930
0.1139
0.4763 0.0631
0.0641
p25
0.0
210.5
-0.0627
-0.0675
-0.0703
p75
1.0
1702.5
0.0308
0.0438
0.1080 0.3389
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Table 7: Propensity to Issue 
This tables reports the results from probit analyses where the likelihood that a firm issues a 
seasoned equity offering (SEO) following a credit rating initiation is modeled as a function of the 
financial characteristics of the firm and an indicator, Event Firm, which takes a value of one if 
the observation is for an event firm and zero otherwise. Control firms are unrated firms matched 
based on the closest absolute-difference in their propensity score to that of an event firm 
following the methodology of Faulkender and Peterson (2006). All three liquidity measures are 
averaged for a given time period pre- and post-rating and exclude the time period from 10 
trading days before the rating to 10 trading days after. Variable definitions are provided in 
appendix A. a, b, and c indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 7: Propensity to Issue (Cont.) 
 
  
Event Firm 0.781
c
0.817
c
0.861
c
0.552
c
0.643
c
0.707
c
(5.658) (10.661) (10.643) (5.995) (5.379) (6.719)
∆Leverage 3.113 c 3.182 c -0.372 1.368 c 2.590 c
(6.230) (6.794) (-0.970) (2.886) (5.199)
Prior Return 0.026 0.034 0.109
c
0.052 0.023
(1.160) (1.445) (3.040) (1.474) (0.662)
σ(Equity Return) -3.471 a -5.083 b -4.005 -3.750 -3.627
(-1.903) (-2.292) (-1.060) (-1.454) (-1.372)
Ln (Total Assets) 0.109 b 0.000 0.030 -0.034 -0.044
(2.546) (0.001) (0.304) (-0.539) (-0.622)
Ln (Sales) -0.251 c -0.172 c -0.199 c -0.144 c -0.138 b
(-4.744) (-2.924) (-2.954) (-2.984) (-2.470)
Ln (1+Firm Age) -0.085 -0.114 c -0.261 c -0.184 c -0.197 c
(-1.503) (-2.631) (-4.838) (-4.592) (-4.224)
Leverage 0.643
c
0.753
c
0.178 0.515
c
0.463
c
(8.151) (6.802) (1.209) (2.722) (4.069)
Market-to-Book -0.005 0.016 0.034 0.020 0.012
(-0.250) (0.749) (1.309) (0.681) (0.612)
ROS 0.169 -0.038 -0.153 0.020 0.026
(1.216) (-0.205) (-0.931) (0.099) (0.103)
PPE/Assets -0.082 -0.212 -0.276
a
-0.456
b
-0.425
a
(-0.399) (-1.023) (-1.737) (-2.296) (-1.904)
R&D/Sales -0.087 0.236 -0.791 -0.586 -0.034
(-0.375) (0.799) (-0.929) (-1.000) (-0.049)
Advertising/Sales -9.193
c
-6.175
c
-10.422
c
-3.825 -4.746
b
(-5.451) (-4.396) (-6.274) (-1.552) (-2.149)
NYSE 0.575
c
0.493
c
0.452
c
0.408
c
0.427
c
(7.695) (5.839) (3.830) (4.258) (3.473)
Constant -0.603
b
-0.133 -0.757
b
-0.067 0.047
(-2.302) (-0.393) (-2.048) (-0.148) (0.101)
Year Controls N   N   Y   Y   Y   Y   
Industry Controls N   N   Y   Y   Y   Y   
Observations 2364 2364 2364 2364 2364 2364
Pseudo R
2
0.0676 0.186 0.217 0.149 0.148 0.176
(6)(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Full Sample Horizon One-Year Three-Year Five-Year
Dependent Variable = SEO Issue (1 if yes)
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Table 8: Credit Ratings and Time to Seasoned Equity Offering 
We employ a Cox proportional hazard model to estimate the effect of a credit rating initiation on 
the decision to issue a seasoned equity offering (SEO). Specifically, we model the duration of 
time until a firm issues a SEO offering against a set of control variables and an indicator, Event 
Firm, which takes a value of one if the observation is for an event firm and zero otherwise. 
Positive coefficients imply that a given firm is more likely to issue a SEO given an increase in 
the independent variable. We restrict our SEO sample to only those SEOs which occur within 5-
years following the credit rating event. Control firms are unrated firms matched based on the 
closest absolute-difference in their propensity score to that of an event firm following the 
methodology of Faulkender and Peterson (2006). Variable definitions are provided in appendix 
A. a, b, and c indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
Event Firm -0.168
b
0.845
b
-0.164
a
0.848
a
-0.144 0.866
(-1.996) (-1.681) (-1.275)
∆Leverage -0.084 0.919 -0.211 0.809
(-0.398) (-0.822)
Prior Return 0.032
b
1.033
b
0.045
c
1.046
c
(2.104) (2.800)
σ(Equity Return) 4.223 68.220 -0.169 0.844
(1.003) (-0.042)
Ln(Total Assets) 0.011 1.011 -0.052 0.949
(0.195) (-0.684)
Ln(Sales) 0.028 1.028 0.016 1.017
(0.715) (0.247)
Ln(1+Firm Age) -0.089 0.915 -0.178
b
0.837
b
(-1.384) (-2.554)
Leverage -0.366
b
0.693
b
-0.256 0.774
(-2.355) (-1.334)
Market-to-Book 0.034
a
1.034
a
-0.001 0.999
(1.657) (-0.052)
ROS -0.178 0.837 -0.115 0.891
(-0.913) (-0.507)
PPE/Assets -0.430
b
0.650
b
-0.671
b
0.511
b
(-2.511) (-2.391)
R&D/Sales -0.447 0.640 -0.556 0.573
(-0.796) (-0.696)
Advertising/Sales -5.914 0.003 -4.843 0.008
(-1.095) (-0.822)
NYSE -0.097 0.908 0.119 1.127
(-0.852) (0.846)
Year Controls N N Y
Industry Controls N N Y
Observations 580 580 580
Wald Chi
2
3.985
b
446.9
c
373.0
c
Coefficient Hazard Ratio Coefficient Hazard Ratio Coefficient Hazard Ratio
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
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Table 9: Abnormal Returns and Seasoned Equity Offerings 
This table reports the results of multivariate ordinary-least-squares testing on the abnormal 
returns to firms at the issuance of a seasoned equity offering (SEO). Cumulative abnormal 
returns are calculated using the Carhart (1997) four-factor model estimated over the period 282 
to 30 days prior to announcement prior to issue date and then summed for various horizons 
surrounding the issue date. Control firms are unrated firms matched based on the closest 
absolute-difference in their propensity score to that of an event firm following the methodology 
of Faulkender and Peterson (2006). Event Firm is an indicator which takes a value of one if the 
observation if for a firm which obtained a credit rating preceding the SEO offering and zero 
otherwise. Remaining variable definitions are provided in appendix A. a, b, and c indicate 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
  
Dependent Variable
Event Firm 0.0218
b
0.0257
b
0.0322
b
0.0183
a
0.0252
b
0.0264
a
0.0206
b
0.0256
b
0.0263
a
(2.443) (2.240) (2.397) (1.937) (2.098) (1.802) (2.134) (2.055) (1.748)
SEO Issue Size 0.0006 0.0063 0.0197 -0.0020 0.0042 0.0138
(0.068) (0.584) (1.231) (-0.221) (0.344) (0.860)
∆Leverage 0.0533 b 0.0199 0.0512 a 0.0532 b 0.0170 0.0477 a
(2.232) (0.752) (1.792) (2.295) (0.622) (1.737)
Prior Return -0.0032
b
-0.0061
c
-0.0086
c
-0.0032
b
-0.0060
c
-0.0079
c
(-2.545) (-3.934) (-4.431) (-2.386) (-3.887) (-3.481)
σ(Equity Return) -0.0696 0.0873 0.6243 a -0.1183 0.0693 0.5944
(-0.239) (0.236) (1.707) (-0.404) (0.176) (1.527)
Ln(Total Assets) 0.0051 0.0080 0.0126
b
0.0053 0.0113
a
0.0175
c
(1.216) (1.427) (2.390) (1.138) (1.690) (2.700)
Ln(Sales) -0.0021 -0.0046 -0.0089
b
-0.0028 -0.0083 -0.0142
b
(-0.559) (-1.085) (-2.234) (-0.617) (-1.306) (-2.429)
Ln(1+Firm Age) -0.0020 -0.0036 -0.0074 0.0018 -0.0009 -0.0039
(-0.397) (-0.620) (-0.950) (0.315) (-0.136) (-0.467)
Leverage -0.0179 -0.0392
b
-0.0662
b
-0.0179 -0.0422
b
-0.0679
b
(-1.336) (-2.127) (-2.086) (-1.512) (-2.449) (-2.319)
Market-to-Book -0.0008 -0.0021 0.0034 -0.0016 -0.0027 0.0029
(-0.264) (-0.638) (0.941) (-0.534) (-0.878) (0.781)
ROS 0.0111 0.0100 -0.0132 0.0096 0.0137 -0.0096
(0.761) (0.475) (-0.494) (0.653) (0.723) (-0.371)
PPE/Assets 0.0017 -0.0079 -0.0053 0.0300
a
0.0153 0.0107
(0.144) (-0.533) (-0.263) (1.855) (0.665) (0.384)
R&D/Sales -0.0383 -0.0215 -0.0867 -0.0298 -0.0365 -0.1466
(-0.597) (-0.300) (-1.163) (-0.395) (-0.418) (-1.604)
Advertising/Sales -0.0452 -0.0330 -0.0298 -0.2968 -0.3314 -0.3382
(-0.144) (-0.091) (-0.050) (-0.827) (-0.792) (-0.547)
NYSE -0.0083 -0.0132 -0.0074 -0.0059 -0.0101 -0.0040
(-0.652) (-1.034) (-0.546) (-0.456) (-0.768) (-0.288)
Constant -0.0326
c
-0.0328
c
-0.0257
c
-0.0332 -0.0226 -0.0265 -0.0395 0.0023 -0.0043
(-4.969) (-3.915) (-2.944) (-0.995) (-0.631) (-0.705) (-0.909) (0.045) (-0.096)
Year Controls N   N   N   N   N   N   Y   Y   Y   
Industry Controls N   N   N   N   N   N   Y   Y   Y   
Observations
Adj. R
2
0.044
580 580 580 580 580
0.015 0.014 0.015 0.042
CAR[-3,3] CAR[-5,5] CAR[-10,10] CAR[-3,3] CAR[-5,5]
0.086 0.109
580 580
CAR[-10,10] CAR[-3,3] CAR[-5,5] CAR[-10,10]
0.097
580 580
0.065
(6) (7) (8) (9)(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
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Appendix A: Variable Definitions 
 
  
Variable Definition
Amihud Liquidity Calculated as the reciprocal of the absolute value of the firm's daily return scaled by the
firm's daily dollar volume and then averaged for a given period before and after the
event window. This variable is multiplied by 1x10
7
 for scaling purposes.
Volume The daily trading volume as reported by CRSP .
Ask-Bid Spread The difference between the end of day ask and bid price as reported by CRSP .
Rating A numerical representation of the S&P rating received by the rated firm. Higher
numbers represent increased credit worthiness.
Ln (Total Assets) The natural log of book total assets in the fiscal year end immediately preceding the
initiation of a credit rating.
Ln (1+Firm Age) The natural log of one plus the number of years a firm has existed in Compustat .
Ln (Sales) The natural log of total revenue in the fiscal year end immediately preceding the
initiation of a credit rating.
Leverage Total long-term debt plus the current portion of long-term debt divided by total
equity in the fiscal year end immediately preceding the initiation of a credit rating.
∆Leverage The difference in firm leverage from the quarter-ending immediately preceding the
SEO date less the leverage from the quarter-ending immediately preceding the
initiation date.
Market-to-Book Market value of common shares outstanding to book value of shares in the fiscal year
end immediately preceding the initiation of a credit rating.
ROS EBIT divided by total revenue in the fiscal year end immediately preceding the
initiation of a credit rating.
PPE/Assets Net property, plant, and equipment scaled by book total assets in the fiscal year end
immediately preceding the initiation of a credit rating.
R&D/Sales R&D expenses scaled by total revenue in the fiscal year end preceding the initiation of a
credit rating.
Advertising/Sales Advertising expenses scaled by total revenue in the fiscal year end preceding the
initiation of a credit rating.
Tax Rate Effective firm tax rate is calculated as reported tax expense scaled by EBIT in the fiscal
year end preceding the initiation of a credit rating.
σ(Equity Return) The standard deviation of firm's daily returns over a 252 trading-day period starting
282 days before the event and ending 30 days before the event.
SEO Flag An indicator variable which takes a value of one if the firm issues a seasoned equity
offering and zero otherwise.
Time to SEO The time in days from a credit rating initiation to the issue date of a seasoned equity
offering.
SEO Issue Size Seasoned equity offering proceeds scaled by the market capitalization of the issue firm
evaluated at the credit rating initiation.
NYSE An indicator which takes a value of one if the firm's equity trades on the NYSE and
zero otherwise.
CAR The cumulative abnormal return surrounding the SEO issue. Daily abnormal equity
returns in the issue windows are computed using a Carhart (1997) four-factor model
estimated over the period 282 to 30 days prior to issue date.
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Appendix B: Probit Estimation 
Table reports the results of the probit model used to calculate propensity scores. We then use 
these scores to uniquely match our credit rating initiation firms to the respective control firm. 
Variable definitions are provided in appendix A. The model includes year fixed effects. a, b, and c 
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
  
Ln (Total Assets) 0.6750 c
(154.60)
Ln (1+Age) 0.3943 c
(47.69)
Leverage 1.6635
c
(61.47)
Market-to-Book 0.0063
(1.40)
ROS -0.3627
c
(-10.93)
PPE/Assets 0.1030
c
(4.50)
R&D/Sales -1.0720
c
(-11.84)
Advertising/Sales 2.0997
c
(5.16)
Tax Rate -0.0029
(-0.11)
Intercept -6.5564
c
(-130.49)
Observations 121,134
Pseudo-R
2
0.523
Limited Dependent 
Rated = 1
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IV. Essay 3: Social Clustering, Informal Contracting, and Firm Governance30 
Garrett A. McBrayer 
A. Abstract 
Using an extensive database that covers the social networks of business executives, we 
identify “social clustering” of CEOs and directors of S&P 1500 firms, roughly defined as close 
knit communities within a network, and study its effects on corporate governance and firm value. 
Prior literature has shown that network clustering improves information transmission and 
strengthens informal contracting, but may also induce excessive loyalty, homogenization of 
ideas, or propagate the effects of shocks throughout the network.  We find that the degree to 
which a CEO and her directors overlap in social communities affects the governance of the firm 
and that these effects are conditional upon the potential for adverse reputation costs faced by the 
members of the board. For firms whose boards face relatively lower potential adverse reputation 
costs to bad behavior, clustering is associated with poorer governance and managerial self-
dealing. For firms whose boards face relatively higher potential adverse reputation costs to bad 
behavior, clustering acts as an implicit enforcement mechanism complementary to explicit firm 
governance. 
B. Introduction 
With the availability of data on the social networks of business professionals from data 
companies such as BoardEx, the study of social networks in finance is now able to examine the 
                                                     
30 The authors wish to thank Wayne Lee, Tomas Jandik, Alexey Malakhov, and seminar 
participants at the University of Arkansas, the 2015 EFA Annual Meetings, the 2014 FMA 
Annual Meetings, and the 2013 SFA Annual Meetings for their valuable comments and 
suggestions. Research is supported in part by the National Science Foundation through grants 
MRI #0722625 (Star of Arkansas), MRI-R2 #0959124 (Razor), ARI #0963249, #0918970 (CI-
TRAIN), and a grant from the Arkansas Science and Technology Authority, with resources 
managed by the Arkansas High Performance Computing Center. Previously circulated under the 
title, “Social Clustering and Firm Value.” All error remains our own.  
 97 
 
effects of social connections in the context of financial decision making. Although the study of 
social networks in finance is still relatively nascent, there is already evidence emerging of the 
importance of social networks in both investment and corporate finance settings. Roughly, there 
are two strands of research emerging which reach very different conclusions of the effects of 
social networks. The first is that social networks lead to lesser accountability, increased 
entrenchment, poorer decision making, reduced firm governance, and, consequently, reduced 
shareholder protections and lower firm value. These conclusions highlight the increased agency 
costs and entrenchment effects of networks. For example, Hwang and Kim (2009) and Nguyen 
(2011) find that monitoring weakens when CEOs and directors have social connections. Social 
connections between the board and the CEO compromise otherwise independent directors, 
resulting in higher CEO compensation and reduced pay-performance and turnover-performance 
sensitivity relative to less socially-connected boards. Chidambaran, Kedia, Prabhala (2012) find 
higher likelihood of committing fraud when a CEO forms social connections with her directors 
outside their professional career.  
The second line of research focuses on the beneficial aspects of social connections. This 
research focuses largely on the improvements in information flows between connected parties 
and the ability of networks to act as a mechanism for implicit contracting. The former acts to 
reduce information asymmetries between participants while the latter supplements more formal 
contractual and governance mechanisms.31 Given that our study is primarily concerned with the 
implicit contracting effects of social networks, we focus on the latter. Lippert and Spagnolo 
                                                     
31 Larcker, So, and Wang (2013) study the relation of the centrality of the board to both 
accounting performance and market returns. Their paper shows that firms with central boards 
earn superior risk-adjusted stock returns and experience higher future growth in return-on-assets. 
They attribute their findings to the influence, improved information flows, and conduit of 
support provided by the networks of board members. 
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(2011) develop a model with complex and incomplete contracting wherein network dynamics 
offer informal information channels and provide multilateral enforcement mechanisms. Through 
this framework, they argue that networks may be detrimental to welfare maximization, but, that 
networks offer mechanisms for reducing information asymmetries and improving governance. 
Central to our study, they show that direct connections do not necessarily matter most as the 
network structure itself may act to improve the flow of private information and induce reputation 
effects to enforce good behavior and punish deviance. Brass and Labianca (2006) construct the 
mechanisms by which negative relationships in a workplace setting can affect one’s financial 
livelihood and emotional well-being thus affecting the productive functioning of the organization 
as a whole. Essentially, their argument hinges on detrimental reputational effects of negative 
relationships that lead to ostracization by the group. In an empirical setting, Poppo and Zenger 
(2002) examine data on the contracts of information service providers of firms to examine the 
association between formal and implicit contracting. They document the interdependence of 
implicit contracting, or relational governance, and formal contracting. The authors conclude that 
informal contracting acts as a necessary complement to formal contracting. 
In sum, there is increasing evidence suggesting that the structure of the network itself 
affects the outcomes of the network participants. What is unclear, however, is our understanding 
about the circumstances under which the network will induce positive effects and when the 
network will induce negative effects. In certain instances, the network can act to the detriment of 
stakeholders, e.g., by imposing principal-agent costs stemming from entrenchment on the 
shareholders of a firm. While, at other times, the network can act as a means of implicit 
contracting or relational governance in which bad behavior is punished, i.e., the potential for 
negative relational consequences force participants to act in accordance with the norms of the 
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network. One limitation of the current literature, however, is that prior studies have examined the 
existence of a bilateral link or of individuals (groups of individuals) relative position within a 
network (i.e., centrality), but not the network itself. Many of these studies seek to examine the 
links or positions of individuals in the network alone in isolation, thus extending to the network 
structure us not essential. However, in other situations, it is essential to understand the dynamics 
of the network itself. For instance, some networks may be sparse, while others more closely knit. 
The differences in the dynamics between the two, may affect the way in which the network, or 
its participants, act. In this study, we focus on the structure of the network itself and ask the 
question, “Does the structure of the network affect network outcomes?” More specifically, we 
identify network clusters, groups of people that are densely connected with each other but 
relatively sparsely connected with individuals belonging to different communities, and study 
how these clusters affect network outcomes. For example, a CEO and her directors belonging to 
the same, very tightly knit communities may derive a set of benefits and costs different from 
simply having established a bilateral connection in the past, or by being centrally located in the 
network. 
In this paper, we develop a measure of the interconnectedness of the network itself. 
Specifically, we measure and examine the effects of director clustering in the social networks of 
business professionals. We hypothesize that a higher fraction of the board sharing the same 
social cluster impacts the corporate governance of the firm by affecting the implicit contracting 
between the members of the cluster and thus, the firm. More specifically in environments where 
the potential for external, negative reputational effects are high, the cluster acts, through implicit 
contracting, to enforce good behavior and punish bad. However, in environments where the 
potential for external, negative reputational effects are low, the cluster acts as an entrenchment 
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mechanism leading to weaker director governance and thus increased managerial self-dealing 
and higher agency costs consistent with traditional agency theory. 
Using data from BoardEx, a company that specializes in collecting bibliographic data 
from annual reports and proxy statements, we construct yearly networks that comprise over 
380,000 business professionals and approximately 12 million pairs of unique connections. We 
then apply a modularity optimization algorithm (Blondel, Guillaume, Lambiotte, and Lefebvre, 
2008) to detect clusters of individuals within the data.  
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
Figure 1 demonstrates a simplified example of social network clustering. Individuals inside the 
cluster form overlapping relationships to one another, and sparse connections to those outside of 
the cluster.  
We identify the clusters to which the board members of Standard and Poor’s 1500 firms 
(S&P 1500) belong. A firm level clustering variable is then constructed to measure the 
percentage of directors who belong to the same social cluster as the CEO. Our results suggest 
that clustering at S&P 1500 firms acts as an informal contracting mechanism affecting the 
governance of a firm. Specifically, we show that CEO-Director clustering has differential effects 
on the governance of the firm depending on the network environment in which the CEO-
Directors are located. In environments where the potential for external reputation costs are high 
(low), the effects of clustering on firm governance are positive (negative). When we examine the 
relation between clustering and measures of corporate governance, we observe higher managerial 
control and entrenchment in firms who are highly clustered and whose boards face relatively 
lower adverse reputation effects, but lower managerial control and better shareholder protections 
in firms who are highly clustered with relatively higher potential adverse reputation effects. We 
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conclude that clustering has differential effects conditional upon the potential for adverse 
reputation effects. 
This paper makes several important contributions. First, our results add to the literature 
on pairwise, or bilateral, connections (for example, Hwang and Kim, 2009, and Fracassi and 
Tate, 2012, among others) by suggesting that the bilateral connection alone does not capture the 
entirety of the social relationships within a network. The existence of a pairwise connection may 
simply indicate the presence of a relationship, either in the past or at present, but the strength of 
the relationship is unknown. On the other hand, belonging to the same cluster is more descriptive 
of the strength of the relationship, i.e., each cluster represents a social community in which one’s 
relationship to others within the cluster is much stronger than that toward anyone outside the 
cluster. Relationship within these tight-knit local neighborhoods imposes stronger informal, or 
implicit, contracts among members within the cluster. However, the benefits of stronger informal 
contracts are not without their costs. For example, network clustering may lead to the 
homogenization of ideas, leading to a scarcity of outside information, ideas, resources, and 
creativity (Janis, 1976). In the context of a firm, this may exacerbate directors’ excess loyalty 
and obedient to the CEO’s authority (Milgram, 1974; Fogel, Ma, Morck, 2012), stifle innovation, 
and worsen managerial entrenchment. 
Second, we extend the existing literature on network clustering to business executive 
social networks. Having identified social clustering within the network using the methodology in 
Blondel et al. (2008), we construct several new measures of CEO-Director clustering to assess 
the degree to which board members belong to the same social network cluster as their respective 
CEOs. Our measures differ from measures previously documented in that they capture the 
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structure of the network as opposed to the “connectedness” of individual within the network. The 
distinction allows us to evaluate the impacts of the network itself. 
We also contribute to the extant literature which examines the effects of network 
influences on firm outcomes. Collectively, Hwang and Kim (2009), Nguyen (2011), 
Chidambaran et al. (2012), and El-Khatib, Fogel, and Jandik (forthcoming) find that the 
shareholder protections are a decreasing function of the connectedness of the CEO. We 
complement this literature by examining how the interconnectedness of the board with their CEO 
affects firm outcomes. We show that the degree to which a CEO and her directors overlap in 
social communities affects the governance of the firm and that these effects are conditional upon 
the potential for adverse reputation costs faced by the members of the board. For firms whose 
boards face relatively lower potential adverse reputation costs to bad behavior, clustering is 
associated with poorer governance and greater managerial self-dealing. For firms whose boards 
face relatively higher potential adverse reputation costs to bad behavior, clustering acts as an 
implicit enforcement mechanism complementary to explicit firm governance. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a detailed literature 
review which builds our hypotheses on the relation between clustering, informal contracting, and 
firm governance. Section 3 describes the social connection data and the modularity optimization 
algorithm we use to detect whether a CEO and her directors belong to the same social cluster. 
Empirical results on the relation of clustering corporate governance are provided in section 4. 
Section 5 concludes and discusses possible extensions of this research, to further examine the 
financial impact of the size and density of the social communities CEO or director belongs, in 
order to deepen our understanding of how executive social network characteristics affect 
financial decision making and firm value. 
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C. Concept Development and Related Literature 
Financial economists have ventured into social network analysis with great success 
finding new insights on the behavior and predictability of corporate policies and investment 
performance. For example, Cohen, Malloy, Frazzini (2010) document superior performance for 
sell-side equity analysts when they share an educational connection to senior officers of firms 
from their alma mater. Fracassi (2012) shows that increases in the social connections among key 
executive and directors of two companies lead to higher synchronicity between the levels of 
investments of two companies. 
The depth of this literature extends beyond simply counting connections. Further 
examination of the social networks reveals properties beyond bilateral connections between 
individuals. The first is “homophily”, or in its more common idiom, “birds of a feather flock 
together”, whereby people with similar interests, personalities, upbringings, etc. are more likely 
to form relationships than those who do not share similar attributes (Lazarsfeld and Merton, 
1954). The next is “transitivity”, whereby a friend’s friend is also a friend. In other words, two 
individuals who each have a tie to a third person are more likely to be connected, compared to 
individuals who do not (White, Boorman, and Breiger, 1976). The transitive and homophilic 
properties of social connections contribute to the natural tendency to form “clusters” of 
relationships within the network, resulting in local neighborhoods, communities or sub-networks 
that include a collection of more densely connected individuals. These clusters, varying in size 
and composition, augment the benefits and costs of social relationships. Members in social 
clusters enjoy close proximity to each other, share common friends, and may, over time, conform 
to similar economic and social behaviors.32  
                                                     
32 See, for example, Irving Janis’ seminal work on “groupthink.” 
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A significant body of emerging literature examines the connections between the CEO and 
the board of directors of a firm. Although the scope of this literature is broad (e.g., ranging from 
studies on compensation, to mergers and acquisitions, to financial contracting), essentially, these 
studies are similar in that they all examine, at least to some degree, how the fiduciary 
responsibilities and incentives of the CEO and the board are affected by social or professional 
connections between the two. Depending on the specific question being asked, connections 
between a CEO and the board seem to affect the workings of a firm; sometimes to the 
shareholders’ benefit and sometimes to their detriment.33 
Our study builds upon prior literature that examines director independence, CEO-director 
social connections, and the effects of independence or connections on corporate governance and 
firm value. In the next section, we discuss the findings and limitations of prior studies using 
bilateral connections. A richer understanding of the architecture of the social network, 
particularly in terms of social clustering, is necessary to reveal a more nuanced picture of the 
inner workings of the board room, the innovation activities of a firm, the information 
environment in which a firm operates, and the board’s effectiveness. 
1. Reputation Effects 
In a framework where individuals are rational and seek to optimize their respective utility 
functions, seeking to maximize one’s personal or professional interests is a default condition. 
Individuals seek to maximize their personal welfare subject to a variety of budget constraints. In 
a corporate framework, this is what leads to the agency problems firm formalized by Jensen and 
Meckling (1976). Jensen and Meckling model the separation of ownership and control and 
develop, as a rational outcome of the subsequent optimization process, three costs to separation: 
                                                     
33 See, for example, Hwang and Kim (2009), Nguyen (2011), Chidambaran et al. (2012), and El-
Khatib, Fogel, and Jandik (forthcoming). 
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1) monitoring costs to the principal, 2) bonding expenditures of the agent, and, 3) residual loss. 
They show that managers rationally expropriate non-pecuniary benefits from the firm as a result 
of the fact that they, themselves, do not incur the full costs of doing so. Since the innovation of 
Jensen and Meckling, a significant body of literature has been developed which seeks to identify 
factors which mitigate this misappropriation. One subset of this literature examines how the 
reputation effects (career concerns) of CEOs and board members affect this suboptimal outcome. 
Managers seek to optimize their individual welfare conditional upon the budget 
constraints they face. One such constraint is the potential for adverse reputation effects that arise 
as a result of their behavior. Kreps and Wilson (1982) develop a model by which the effects of 
reputation in the presence of imperfect, or asymmetric, gives rise to a “reputation effect” in 
repeated games. They show that “small” amounts of informational uncertainty can lead to 
considerable reputation concerns in finite games. Gibbons and Murphy (1992) model CEO 
reputation (career) concerns in an optimal compensation setting and show that reputational 
concerns play a significant role in optimal contracting, i.e., explicit incentives from an optimal 
compensation structure should be stronger for CEOs closer to retirement than for CEOs further 
from retirement. Their result is naturally intuitive in that reputational concerns are diminishing 
with the time left for adverse actions to become costly to the individual. Milbourn (2003) 
supports this result by showing that optimal CEO contracting is a direct function of the 
reputation of the CEO. Milbourn uses various measures of CEO reputation and shows a positive 
and economically meaningful relationship between performance-pay sensitivities and CEO 
reputation. Collectively, prior literature seems to suggest that reputational considerations are of 
concern to welfare maximization of CEOs. What about members of the board? 
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The literature on reputational considerations, or career considerations, of the members of 
a firm’s board is much more scarce. This result is a logical outcome for at least two reasons: 
firstly, it is difficult to measure the career considerations of a given individual, much less 
aggregate to a group of individuals. Secondly, the function of the board is to protect the 
shareholders. In the event that underperformance or managerial self-dealing, it is often not the 
case that boards are replacement en mass. Given these reasons, the reputational concerns of 
board members is often overlooked in finance literature. The fact that a significant body of prior 
research does not exist on the reputational concerns of board members does not mean that 
reputational considerations are not of concern to board members. Zajac and Westphal (1996), for 
example, examine the selection process of members to corporate boards. They find that board 
members are selected based, in part, on the reputations they have developed in prior 
appointments. Fich and Shivdasani (2006) support this result. The authors investigate the impact 
of financial fraud on director appointments and show that: 1) directors who are associated with 
fraud experience a reduction in board seats held; 2) interlocked firms that share a director with 
the fraudulent firm experience a valuation decline; and, 3) the likelihood of a fraudulent director 
losing his directorship increases with stronger firm governance. It follows, since board 
appointments are a function of the reputation of the individual director, that directors who are 
better connected, i.e., more current or previous board appointments, face greater potential 
reputation costs to adverse actions, ceteris paribus. The outcome on firm governance is then that 
better connected boards, who face greater reputation costs, would have greater incentive to align 
the objectives of the firm with the shareholders interest. However, since the process of 
developing a reputation and board selections are endogenous to each other (i.e., more board 
appointments gives a better opportunity to develop a better reputation which leads to more board 
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appointments), this is only part of the story. Consider, for example, an individual with a 
relatively less-developed reputation. For this individual, the opportunity to increase their board 
appointments, and the career concerns that result, are significant pressures to act in accordance 
with shareholder interests. Together these conjectures lead to the following null hypothesis: 
H1: The potential for adverse reputation costs to the reputations of directors on a firm’s 
board are positively related to the governance of the firm. 
2. Informal Contracting 
Informal contracts arise when the marginal costs of formal contracting exceed the 
marginal benefits. In these cases, informal contracts serve to outline the behaviors/actions of the 
contractees in order to achieve some pre-defined outcome. Roughly defined, informal 
contracts are non-contractual, relationship-based agreements between parties (Azariadas and 
Stiglitz, 1983; Azariadis, 1975; Baily, 1974; among others). For example, Boot, Greenbaum, and 
Thakor (1993) develop a model that explains the use of legally unenforceable, discretionary 
contracts in circumstances where legally enforceable contracting is possible. The authors explain 
this seemingly paradoxical result by arguing that considerations of trust and reputation capital 
are sufficient to enforce the components of the informal contract. The better the reputation of a 
contracting party, the greater the flexibility permitted in contracting. If a trusted party upholds 
his commitments his reputation grows; if he breaks his commitments his reputation is damaged, 
possibly beyond repair (Tullock, 1985). In terms of informal contracts between members of 
boards, prior shared work experience and reputation effects lead to informal contracts among 
board members that reinforce the behaviors/norms of the group. 
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Taken together, the implications of informal contracting suggests that the contracts 
between the individual members of a firm’s board will affect the way in which the board 
operates, and thus the way the firm is managed leading to the following hypothesis: 
H2: The strength of the informal contracts between the members of a firm’s board will affect 
the governance of the firm. 
Lippert and Spagnolo (2011) model the influence of social networks in complex settings 
wherein contracting is necessarily incomplete and network dynamics create multilateral 
enforcement mechanisms. The authors argue that network influence may be detrimental to 
welfare maximization by, for example, enabling corruption. They note, however, that dynamics 
also allow for decreased information asymmetry and improvements in network governance (i.e., 
parties acting in accordance with the agreed upon objectives of the network). It is unclear, a 
priori, whether the informal contracting mechanisms created by the network serve to the benefit, 
or detriment, of a given firm. As previously mentioned, prior literature has discussed the 
negative consequences of CEO-director social connections (Hwang and Kim, 2009; Nguyen, 
2011; Barnea and Guedj, 2009; El-Khatib, Fogel, and Jandik, 2012; among others). CEO-
director clustering may exacerbate the problem if members of the closely knit community 
conform to unity and demonstrate loyalty. If markets recognize this possibility and demand a 
clustering premium or adjustment, then we would expect a positive relation between network 
clustering and explicit corporate governance, i.e., as directors become more clustered we would 
expect to see increases in explicit governance as a signal to markets of boardroom stability and 
transparency. What is clear is that the influence of informal contracting is conditional upon the 
objectives of the contractees. More specifically, in environments where external influences on 
contractees are high and where the costs of adverse reputation impacts of are high, then the 
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amplification effects of informal contracting should act to reinforce positive behavior thus 
encouraging good governance. However, in environments where external influences are low and 
where the costs of adverse reputation impacts of are low, then the amplification effects of 
informal contracting should act to reinforce negative behaviors thus engendering poorer 
governance. This dichotomous result leads to the following hypotheses: 
H3: In environments where adverse reputation costs are high, stronger informal contracting 
(clustering) will serve to engender good firm governance. 
H4: In environments where adverse reputation costs are low, stronger informal contracting 
(clustering) will serve to engender poor firm governance. 
D. Data and Variable Construction 
1. Data and Variable Construction 
We construct our social network of business professionals using data from BoardEx. For 
each year from 1999 to 2009, we include all connections formed up to that year in the network, 
assuming that once a connection forms, it continues to exist34. Consequently, there are a total of 
11 networks, each corresponds to a year with the number of edges in the network increases 
monotonically as the time progresses. The types of connections is mostly professional in nature, 
formed through common work experience, but some can be formed through common education 
experience or serving as board members of non-profit organization or social clubs. For our 
primary analysis, we study the social networks of executives for publically traded firms. The data 
are systematically collected from annual reports and proxy statements to ensure reliability and 
                                                     
34 Alternative methods to determine inclusion of a past connection, either by restricting the 
minimum length of time the connection actually existed (3 years or 5 years), or by restricting 
how recent the connection existed (within the past three years or five years) do not alter the 
empirical results.  
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consistency in the collection process. We include other types of connections in our robustness 
checks.  
We represent each yearly network as an undirected, unweighted graph, 𝐺 = (𝑉, 𝐸), 
where 𝑉 is the set of vertices with each vertex corresponding to a node, or person, in the 
network, and 𝐸 is the set of edges, or connections between individuals. There is an edge between 
two vertices if and only if the two nodes are connected in the social network. The undirected 
graph can be represented by an adjacency matrix of size 𝑁, where 𝑁 is the number of nodes or 
vertices in the yearly network. The element on the 𝑖th row and 𝑗th column of the adjacency 
matrix is 𝐴𝑖𝑗 = 1 if there is an edge between nodes 𝑖 and 𝑗, and 0 otherwise. In the network, two 
nodes can be connected either directly if there is an edge between them, or indirectly if the 
information can flow from one node to the other by using other nodes in the network as 
intermediate relays. There might be more than one paths connecting nodes. The connection 
between two nodes is stronger if the number of paths between them is larger. Two nodes are 
disconnected if there is no path connecting them. The clustering operation will group nodes that 
are densely connected into the same cluster, so that, there are a relatively large number of paths 
between any node pairs inside a cluster and a relatively few (if any) paths between nodes of 
different clusters.  
The next section provides technical details of how we detect social clustering in the 
network. The method utilized here is computational in nature, only basing on their set of social 
connections, without any labeling of their actual board positions. Such “blind” classification 
therefore provides a subjective measurement of one’s network position in its own social 
structure, un-contaminated by one’s exact (superior or subordinate) position in each firm.  
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2.  Detection of Social Clustering  
The N nodes in the network will be divided into different clusters based on their social 
connections defined by the adjacency matrix. Nodes inside a cluster should be densely connected 
to each other with a large number of mutual connections, such that the information can easily 
flow from one node to its peers in the same cluster through a wealth of direct or indirect 
connections. On the other hand, there should be no or minimum amount of connections between 
two nodes in two different clusters.  
Since the amount of information flow between two nodes can be measured by counting 
the number of paths between them, one possible way of clustering is to maximize the number of 
edges used for intra-cluster connections, or minimize the number of edges for inter-cluster 
connections. This objective can be achieved by maximizing the modularity metric (Newman, 
2004)  
𝑄 = 
1
2𝑚
∑(𝐴𝑖𝑗 −
𝑘𝑖𝑘𝑗
2𝑚
)
𝑖𝑗
𝛿(𝑐𝑖, 𝑐𝑗)   
where 𝐴𝑖𝑗 = 1 if nodes i and j are direct neighbors and 0 otherwise, 𝑘𝑖 = ∑ 𝐴𝑖𝑗𝑗  is the degree (or, 
the number of direct neighbors) of node i, 𝑚 =
1
2
∑ 𝐴𝑖𝑗𝑖𝑗  is the total number of edges in the 
network, 𝑐𝑖 is the cluster that node i belongs to, and 𝛿(𝑢, 𝑣) = 1 if 𝑢 = 𝑣 and 0 otherwise. The 
modularity metric measures the difference between two quantities: 𝑄1 = 
1
2𝑚
∑ 𝐴𝑖𝑗𝛿(𝑐𝑖, 𝑐𝑗)𝑖𝑗  and 
𝑄2 =
1
2𝑚
∑
𝑘𝑖𝑘𝑗
2𝑚
𝛿(𝑐𝑖, 𝑐𝑗)𝑖𝑗 . The first quantity, 𝑄1, is the percentage of the edges that are used for 
intra-cluster connections. A good clustering should have a large value of 𝑄1 such that the number 
of edges used for intra-cluster connections is large, or equivalently, the percentage of edges used 
for inter-cluster connections is small. This means that there are only weak connections between 
clusters. The second quantity, 𝑄2, is a similar percentage, but calculated for a random network 
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that has the same node degrees as the original network. In the random network, the probability 
that nodes i and j are connected is 
𝑘𝑖𝑘𝑗
2𝑚
. The difference between 𝑄1 and 𝑄2 measures how good 
the clustering is for a particular network. If 𝑄1 is close to 𝑄2, then the clustering is not a good 
one because the same clustering applied to a random network results in a similar intra-cluster 
edge percentage as the original network.  
The exact optimization with respect to the modularity metric has a prohibitively high 
complexity for networks with large number of nodes. Thus sub-optimum algorithms are required. 
In this paper, we adopt a two-step clustering method. The first step divides the original network 
into a collection of disconnected sub-networks, such that there is no connection between any 
node in one sub-network and nodes in all other sub-networks. The second step performs 
clustering inside of each sub-network with the iterative clustering algorithm proposed by Blondel 
et al. (2008). Since there is no connection between any pair of sub-networks, performing 
clustering inside of each sub-network separately yields the same performance as clustering over 
the entire network, but with a much lower complexity.  
The sub-network division in the first step is performed by identifying the direct and 
indirect neighbors of a given node. Two nodes are direct neighbors if there is an edge between 
them, and they are indirect neighbors if they are connected through other nodes. The direct 
neighbors of a node can be directly obtained by using the adjacency matrix. For example, if 
𝐴𝑖𝑗 = 1, then node j is a direct neighbor of node i and vice versa. Once the direct neighbors of a 
node are identified, we can locate its indirect neighbors by checking the neighbors of its direct 
neighbors. For instance, node i has a direct neighbor j, which in turn has a direct neighbor k, then 
nodes i and k are indirect neighbors if there is no direct connection between them. We can repeat 
this procedure until the neighboring relationship among all the nodes is identified. If two nodes 
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are neighbors (either direct or indirect), then they are in the same sub-network. If two nodes are 
neither direct nor indirect neighbors, they will be placed at different sub-networks. With such a 
procedure, we can divide the original network with N nodes into K sub-networks, each with 𝑁𝑘 
nodes, and ∑ 𝑁𝑘 = 𝑁
𝐾
𝑘=1 .  
After the division of the original network into K disconnected sub-networks, the second 
step performs clustering for each sub-network separately. Clustering inside a sub-network is 
performed by using the iterative algorithm proposed by Blondel et al. (2008). The clustering 
algorithm is summarized as follows.  
The clustering operation comprises multiple iterations. Each iteration consists of two 
phases. In the first phase, each node forms its own cluster of size 1. For a given node i, we can 
calculate the change in modularity if it is moved from its current cluster 𝑐𝑖 to a new cluster 𝑐𝑗, 
where node j is a direct neighbor of node i. Denote the modularity change caused by moving 
node i from cluster 𝑐𝑖 to cluster 𝑐𝑗  as Δ𝑄𝑖→𝑗. The modularity change is calculated for all the direct 
neighbors of node i. If all the modularity changes are negative, then node i will remain at its 
current cluster, because moving node i from its current cluster any of the cluster of its direct 
neighbors will result in a loss of modularity. If any least one of the modularity change is positive, 
then node i will be moved to the cluster that results in the largest modularity change. This 
procedure is repeated for all the nodes in the sub-network. In the second phase, all the nodes 
belonging to the same cluster are grouped into a new node, and this yields a new network with 
the number of nodes equal to the number of clusters in the original network. The weight of the 
edge between two new nodes equals to the sum of the weights of the edges connecting the two 
original clusters. Each node also has a self-looping edge with weight equal to the sum weight of 
all the edges inside the original cluster. The newly formed network will be used as the starting 
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point in the next iteration. This procedure is repeated until no modularity gain can be achieved. 
At the end, each node i is associated with a cluster 𝑐𝑖. 
To summarize, the input of the clustering operation is the network adjacency matrix, 
which defined the connections between the nodes in the network. The output of the clustering 
operation is the clustering assignment 𝑐𝑖, for 𝑖 = 1,… ,𝑁. Figure 1 provides a graphical example 
of a stylized network with three clusters. Cluster 1 consists of 6 individual nodes and represents 
the least “complete” cluster of the three, in that, node 6 is not connected to node 4, 1, or 5, 
Cluster 3 consists of 4 nodes in a “complete” cluster, i.e., each node is connected to all of the 
others within the cluster. The clustering operation analyzes the network in order to produce a 
measure of clustering which ranges from -0.5, no clustering, to 1, complete clustering. For 
example, when the clustering operation is applied to the network in figure 1, a value for 𝑄 of 
.516 is obtained. The clustering assignment will be used to measure the CEO-Director clustering 
as described in the next subsection.  
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
For example, Figure 2 attempts to depict the social network of over 210,000 business 
professionals in 2000. The graph includes three distinct sets of clusters: (a) a dense core where 
each cluster is densely connected to almost all other core clusters, (b) "petals" - smaller clusters 
that are connected to one or two core clusters, and (c) complete isolates very small in size but 
large by count representing 19,910 individuals unconnected to the giant component, forming the 
outer ring. Like many complex networks, Figure 2 shows that our empirical network is locally 
dense and globally sparse. The network is also highly clustered, forming pockets of densely 
connected individuals within the community most of whom have relatively few links to the 
outside.  
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[Insert Table 1 about here] 
Table 1 presents summary statistics on the sizes and numbers of clusters in each yearly 
network. On average, our algorithm detects roughly 4,500 clusters per year, with the average 
cluster comprising 25 individuals, and the median cluster, 11 individuals. The mean (median) 
cluster size increases monotonically over the sample period as a result of the assumption that 
connections are not severed. 
3. CEO-Director Clustering at Firm Level 
We obtain a list of incumbent CEOs in S&P 1500 firms from ExecuComp, and a matched 
list of directors for each CEO from RiskMetrics. Based on the results from clustering, each CEO 
or director is assigned to a cluster. Note that any particular individual can belong to only one 
cluster in a given year. For each CEO, we can count how many directors in her firm are in the 
same cluster as the CEO’s. We define a metric, Clustering Ratio, 𝐶𝑟𝑡, as the number of directors 
that are in the same cluster as the CEO’s divided by the total number of board seats (excluding 
the CEO should she also serve on the board). The Clustering Ratio is used to measure the degree 
to which directors of a board belongs to the same social network cluster as the CEO.  
We create several indicator variables to categorize the extent of clustering at each firm. 
𝐶50 is set to 1 if a majority of directors belong to the same cluster as the CEO and 0 otherwise. 
𝐶67 is set to 1 when over two thirds of director (satisfying supermajority requirements) resides in 
the CEO’s cluster. Finally, 𝐶90, as a measure of extremely clustered board, indicates that over 
90% of board members are clustered together with the CEO. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
A first look at the data reveals significant CEO-board clustering at firm level. Extremely 
clustered board represents 8% of the sample, supermajority clustering represents nearly 30%, and 
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by simply majority count, 40%. In a typical firm, 40% of directors belong to the same cluster as 
the CEO. 70% of a board resides in the same social cluster as the CEO in a quarter of the sample. 
Further investigation shows that clustering patterns vary with the average centrality of the 
board. Across all four measures of clustering, firms whose boards are characterized by higher 
average director centrality, have lower CEO-Director clustering. For firms whose board 
members have high average centrality, i.e., central boards, about 27% of directors share the same 
cluster as the CEO. In contrast, for firms whose board members have low average centrality, i.e., 
peripheral boards about 54% of directors share the same cluster as the CEO. Across all firms in 
the sample, the rate of clustering for peripheral firms is about 1.97 times that of central firms. 
When we analyze the binary measures of clustering, we see that the prevalence of majority, 
supermajority, and extremely clustered boards increases monotonically. For 𝐶50, 𝐶67, 𝐶90, the 
rate of clustering for peripheral firms is 2.7, 3.36, and 6.76 times the rate of clustering for central 
firms, respectively. 
4. Proxy for Reputation Costs 
Figure 2 aids to graphically represent our proxy for the degree of potential reputation 
effects for the members of various boards. In order to capture external influences of the network 
on network participants, we examine the centrality of the individuals in the network. Ceteris 
paribus, the actions of highly central individuals are more apparent to other members of the 
network than members who are not central. Thus, in environments with greater external 
oversight (i.e., high centrality), the potential for the negative reputation effects of bad behavior 
are higher than for areas with lower external oversight (i.e., low centrality). To capture this 
effect, we create a variable, Periph, which takes a value of 1 if the average centrality of the board 
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is less than the median centrality of all boards in a given year.35 Our variable, Periph, captures 
the “core,” “petals,” and “isolates” in figure 2 discussed previously. 
5.  Other Key Variables  
The purpose of our analysis is to investigate how CEO-board social clustering affects 
corporate governance. In our primary analysis, the key variable of corporate governance we use 
is Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell’s (2009), E-Index. E-index is a composite measure based on six 
Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) provisions of shareholder protections.36 The 
measure takes a value between zero and six, with zero (six) being representative of the best 
(worst) shareholder protections. In addition to using the index itself, we also examine two of the 
individual components of the index for which data are made available, i.e., the presence of a 
staggered board and/or poison pill provision. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
We define a list of commonly used control variables in predicting average E-Index: log of 
total assets as the natural log of total book assets, book leverage as the sum of long-term and 
short-term liabilities over total book assets, return on assets as the net income over total book 
assets, and capital investments as capital expenditures over total book assets. We include the log 
of CEO age as an additional control following Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988).   
                                                     
35 As robustness, we also used terciles, quantiles, deciles, and average centrality of the board as a 
continuous measure; the results were qualitatively similar in all cases. We used above/below the 
median as our primary measure simply because the interpretation is straightforward. 
36 We thank Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen, and Allen Ferrell for making their data publically 
available: http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/bebchuk/data.shtml. Bebchuk et al. (2009) 
construct their measure as the summation of six indicator variables which take a value of 1 if a 
firm has any of the following: 1) staggered board; 2) poison pill provision; 3) golden parachute 
policy for executives; 4) limits to amend bylaws; 5) limits to amend charter; and, 6) 
supermajority for mergers. 
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In additional testing, we examine the relation between the inner workings of the board 
and clustering. Specifically, we study the relation between clustering and board independence, 
board business, and board monitoring. Our measure of board independence is constructed as an 
indicator which takes on a value of 1 for boards that have a majority of independent directors and 
0 otherwise (Fogel, Ma, and Morck, 2012). Additionally, we look at CEO’s total compensation 
and incentive pay as taken from ExecuComp. Total CEO compensation, CEO compensation, is 
the sum of salary, bonuses, the value of stock and options granted, the value of long-term 
incentive payouts, and any other compensation grated. Data on executive compensation are from 
ExecuComp. In regression testing, we take the natural log of total compensation to reduce the 
non-linearity inherent in CEO compensation. For performance pay, we scale the equity-
dependent portion of the CEO’s total compensation by the total compensation paid to the CEO in 
that year. The equity component includes long-term incentive payouts, restricted stock grants 
(fair value stock awards), and the value of options granted. 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
Table 4 presents the description and the summary statistics of these variables across 
relative clustering. Across measures of firm characteristics, differences emerge for both 
performance and financial characteristics. The average Tobin’s Q for firms who are 
characterized as being relatively less clustered is higher for all three measure of clustering. Firm 
size, as measured by the natural log of total assets, is higher for less clustered firms for all but the 
most clustered firms. Book leverage is higher for firms who are less clustered. Capital 
investments are lower for less clustered firms R&D investments make up an average of 2.5% to 
2.9% of a firm’s book assets for less clustered firms, but only 1.2% to 1.6% for firms who are 
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relatively more clustered. Summary statistics on ROA suggest that less clustered firms are 
relatively more profitable, but the difference is not economically significant.  
Across measures of governance and board and CEO characteristics/compensation, we 
find similar differences in firms based on their relative clustering. On average, based on E-Index, 
less clustered boards have worse shareholder protections. However, they have more independent 
boards. CEO age and tenure are both higher for firms with a relatively higher degree of 
clustering. Perhaps most striking are the differences in CEO compensation across relative 
clustering. CEOs of highly clustered firms have lower total compensation, but have higher cash 
compensation and lower performance based compensation (both is absolute terms and as a 
percentage of their total compensation). Taken together, measures of governance and board and 
CEO characteristics/compensation suggests clustering as a potential factor in the heterogeneity 
of the governance of firms. 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
We repeat the analysis of Table 4 and examine the same firm, board, and CEO 
characteristics, now splitting the sample by the location of the firm in the network, i.e., Periph. 
Periphery located firms have lower Q, are smaller, are less levered, have higher capital 
investments, are less R&D intensive, and are less profitable than their centrally located 
counterparts on average. Across all measures of the financial characteristics of the firm, the 
differences are statistically different at greater than the 5% level. The differences are only 
economically meaningful, however, for size and R&D. Across measures of governance and 
board and CEO characteristics/compensation, we find differences in firms based on their relative 
location. Firms who are relative more centrally located have worse shareholder protections than 
those who are more peripherally located. However, similar to the differences identified by 
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clustering, they have more independent boards. CEOs of peripherally located firms are older and 
have longer tenure in their position than their centrally located counterparts. Finally, differences 
in CEO compensation across Periph show a similar pattern to differences across centrality. 
CEOs of peripherally related firms have lower total compensation, but lower performance based 
compensation (both in absolute dollars and as a percentage of their total compensation). Finally, 
CEOs of Periph firms are paid a lower percentage of the total compensation paid to the top-five 
executive of their respective firms (Bebchuk, Cremers, Peyer, 2011). 
E. CEO-Board Clustering and Governance 
In this section, we provide empirical evidence from OLS panel regressions on the 
association between CEO-director clustering, firm governance, and board effectiveness. We 
show that clustering benefits one type of firm while hurting another. We find evidence that firms 
in environments where the potential for adverse reputation costs to its board of directors are high 
(low), benefit (suffer) from CEO-director clustering. We confirm the results of our panel 
regression by examining CEO-turnover following value destroying acquisitions at the end of this 
section.   
1. Clustering and Governance 
We first investigate whether a board dominated by directors who cluster in the CEO’s 
social network affect firm governance and CEO entrenchment. Given the difficulty in capturing a 
firm’s governance with one-simple variable, our methodological approach is to examine 
commonly used proxies for governance, both composite measures and individual measures, in 
our tests. Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009) provide one such measure. Bebchuk et al. examine 
the findings of Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) to examine which, of the 24 provisions 
identified by Gompers et al., are the drivers of the inverse relation between poor shareholder 
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protections and firm value. Bebchuk et al. find that six individual provisions are driving the 
results of Gompers et al. and develop an entrenchment index, i.e., E-Index, accordingly. For 
robustness, we examine the individual components of the E-Index for which we have data to see 
which components, if any, are associated with CEO-director clustering. In this section, we are 
asking the question, “Is having a majority of directors in a CEO’s social cluster associated with 
poorer shareholder protections?”  
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
We first examine the effects of network clustering on the firm governance (E-Index) of 
firms using a panel ordinary least squares framework with heteroskedasticity-robust standard 
errors clustered at firm level.  For this test, all control variables and the measures of clustering 
are lagged on time-period to better capture the dynamics of the process.  Column (1) of Table 6 
uses our continuous measure of clustering, Crt, whereas columns (2)-(4) use C50, C67, and C90, 
respectively. Across all four specifications, the coefficient estimates on the clustering and Periph 
variables are negative and statistically significant. These results suggest that, on average, having 
a relatively highly clustered board and having a periphery located board are associated with 
better shareholder protections. The negative coefficient estimates on the clustering variables are 
consistent with the conjecture that firms who are relatively highly clustered, in environments 
where the potential for adverse reputation costs to board members is high, benefit from CEO-
director clustering. The negative coefficient estimate on periphery is also consistent with the 
conjecture that reputation effects mitigate agency problems. The coefficient estimates on the 
interaction terms between our clustering variables and periphery tell the other side of the story.  
Across all four specifications, the coefficient on the interaction term is positive and 
statistically significant at better than the 1% level. Further, the coefficient estimate increase 
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monotonically as firms become relatively more clustered. The positive coefficient estimates 
supports the conjecture that clustering acts to engender agency problems for firms whose board 
faces relatively lower costs to engaging in self-dealing. Taken together, these results support the 
notion that informal contracts between network participants affect the behavior of clusters within 
the network, i.e., for firms whose boards are (are not) centrally located clustering acts to mitigate 
(intensify) agency costs. 
The E-Index is a composite measure of firm governance. As such, analyses which rely 
solely on it to capture firm governance overlook the differential effects of the various 
components. In this section, we look at the two components for which data were readily 
available: 1) whether or not the firm has a poison pill provision; and, 2) whether or not the firms 
has a staggered board provision. A significant body of extant literature has documented an 
inverse relationship between the presence/adoption of a poison pill provisions and firm value.37 
As for staggered boards, Bebchuk and Cohen (2005) find that staggered boards are associated 
with an economically significant reduction in firm value. They show that this effect is strongest 
for firms whose staggered board provision is in the firm’s charter and therefore out of the reach 
of shareholders to amend. For our analysis, we use data from GMI Ratings to construct indicator 
variables which take a value of one if a firm has either a poison pill provision or a staggered 
board provision. Table 7 provides the results of this testing. 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
Panel A provides the results of probit regressions testing for the presence of poison pill. 
Across all four specifications, only the coefficient estimates on Periph are statistically 
significant. These negative coefficient estimates are consistent with the conjecture that reputation 
                                                     
37 Ryngaert (1988), Brickley, Lease, and Smith (1988), Davis (1991), and Agrawal and Knoeber 
(1996), among others. 
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effects mitigate agency problems. Despite the lack of statistical significance [excluding the 
results in column (2)], the coefficient estimates on the interaction terms are positive; this is weak 
evidence in support of the entrenchment effects of being highly clustered and isolated from 
network effects. The results of our staggered board regressions are much more pronounced. 
Across the four specifications which use our staggered board indicator as the dependent 
variable, the coefficient estimates on the interaction term between the various clustering 
variables and periph are positive and statistically significant at better than the 5% level. 
Additionally, the main effects for the clustering variables and the periph variable are negative in 
all specifications and are statistically significant in two of the four specification for clustering 
and in all specifications for periph. Taken together, these results provide evidence supporting the 
hypothesis that clustering is beneficial for firms whose directors face high potential adverse 
reputation costs to bad behavior and is harmful for firms whose directors are isolated in the 
network. 
2. Clustering, CEO Compensation, and CEO Entrenchment 
The E-Index and its components capture one facet of the overall governance of a firm. In 
this section, we examine the relation between clustering and various proxies for CEO power and 
control. More specifically, we investigate the relation between clustering and various CEO 
compensation metrics and proxies for CEO power. Jiraporn, Kim, and Davidson (2005) study the 
link between poor shareholder protections and CEO compensation. They show that firms with 
relatively weaker shareholder rights have CEOs with higher pay and lower performance-pay 
sensitivity. In addition, they document that CEOs of firms with stronger anti-takeover provisions 
enjoy even more generous pay. When Jiraporn et al. examine performance pay, they document 
an asymmetric response of CEO to shareholder wealth. When shareholder wealth rises, CEO 
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rises in step. However, when shareholder wealth falls, CEO compensation does not decline when 
shareholder rights are weak. Building on the results of Jiraporn et al., we examine the relation 
between clustering and CEO total compensation and performance pay. The results of this testing 
is presented in Table 8. 
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
Panel A of Table 8 presents the results from panel tests using ordinary least squares 
framework with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at firm level. Other controls 
include ln(CEO Age), ln(Total Assets), Book Leverage, ROA, and Investments. As with prior 
tests, all independent variables are lagged one time period. Across all four specifications, we find 
that periphery firms pay less on average and that this difference is statistically significant at 
better than the 1% level. Further, we find no relation between clustering, nor clustering 
interacted with periph, and total CEO compensation; the coefficient estimates on clustering and 
its interaction with periph hover around zero for all specifications. These results suggest that 
CEOs of peripheral-clustered firms are not, or do not, extract rents in the form of excess 
compensation from the firm they manage. However, examining total compensation only tells one 
aspect of the compensation story. In Panel B, we examine the fraction of CEO pay that is 
sensitive to fluctuations in equity value. The dependent variable in these tests, CEO Performance 
Pay, is the ratio of equity-based compensation to total compensation. Across all four 
specifications, the coefficient estimates on clustering, periph, and their interaction are negative 
and statistically significant. Further, the coefficient estimates on the interaction decrease 
monotonically with the relative clustering of the firm, i.e., for majority clustered firm the 
coefficient estimate is -.9% whereas it decreases to -2.2% for extremely clustered firms. The fact 
that the estimates are negative and that they increase with clustering is consistent with the 
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entrenchment effects of highly-clustered firms in environments with low potential reputation 
costs. 
Another way to examine the CEO compensation story is to look at the relative power or 
control garnered by the CEO using compensation as a proxy. Bebchuk, Cremers, and Peyer 
(2011) investigate the relation between CEO Pay Slice, the ratio of CEO total compensation to 
the total compensation paid to the top-5 executives of the firm, and firm value, performance, and 
behavior. They find that CEO Pay Slice is inversely related to firm value, profitability, and 
performance sensitivity of CEO turnover. Bebchuk et al. (2011) conclude that CEO Pay Slice 
serves as a good indicator of agency problems. We use their measure to examine the relation 
between it and clustering. 
[Insert Table 9 about here] 
Table 9 presents the results from panel tests using ordinary least squares framework with 
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at firm level. Other controls are the same as 
our prior tests on compensation. For all four measures of clustering, the coefficient estimates are 
negative and statistically significant suggesting clustering is, on average, associated with a 
reduced CEO Pay Slice. The estimates on Periph are negative, but are only marginally 
significant. The interesting result from Table 9 is the fact that the estimates on the interaction 
term between clustering and Periph are positive and statistically significant for all four 
specifications. This results suggests that CEOs of periphery related firms who are also relatively 
highly clustered are able to garner a greater fraction of the total compensation paid to the top-five 
executives. To the extent that this variable captures dynamics related to firm governance, the 
positive coefficient estimates are consistent with the conjecture that clustering is associated with 
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poor governance in environments where the potential for adverse reputation costs to board 
members are low. 
3. Clustering and Board Effectiveness 
We now turn to testing on the effectiveness of the boards themselves. Are clustered board 
members effective monitors of CEO actions?  Or, are boards complicit in the agency problems 
that result from the separation of ownership and control? One way to assess board effectiveness 
is to investigate some of the board characteristics identified in prior literature to affect 
governance. We address the association between social network clustering and board 
effectiveness and the impact on firm value in the following section. 
First, we investigate the relation between CEO-director clustering and board 
independence. The literature on board independence and firm valuation is somewhat mixed.38 
Despite the lack of findings of a relation, prior literature documented a somewhat stronger 
positive association between director independence and governance. For example, Beasley 
(1996) examines the relation between board composition and financial statement fraud and finds 
that firms without instances of financial fraud have significantly higher percentages of 
independent directors than firms with instances of fraud. Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) model 
the board selection process and provide a model in which board effectiveness is a function of its 
independence. A second dynamic of boards to consider is their size. Jensen (1993), Yermack 
(1996), Eisenberg, Sundgren, and Wells (1998), and Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2008), among 
others, find that board size is related to valuation. The first three argue that this relationship is 
negative, i.e., firms with larger boards have lower valuation. Coles et al. (2008) argue that this 
relationship is a function of firm complexity. Jensen (1993) sums up the problem of a large board 
                                                     
38 See Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand, and Johnson (1998) for a survey of this literature. 
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stating that ‘…they are less likely to function effectively and are easier for the CEO to control.’ 
We examine the relation between clustering, board independence, and board size. The results of 
these tests are presented in Table 10. 
[Insert Table 10 about here] 
Panel A of Table 10 provides the results of probit regressions with robust standard errors 
clustered at the firm level. All independent variables are lagged on time period. Across all four 
specifications, the coefficient estimates on both Periph and its interaction with clustering are 
negative and significant suggesting that periphery firms have less independent boards and that 
the effect if stronger for clustered-periphery firms. To the extent that independent boards are 
better monitors, this result is consistent with entrenchment story presented in prior tables. Panel 
B of Table 10 provides the results of ordinary least squares regression with robust standard errors 
clustered at the firm level. In all four specifications, clustering and its interaction with Periph are 
positive and statistically significant. The fact that the interaction term is positive and significant 
indicates the marginal effect of being clustered on the periphery is positively associated with 
increases in board size. 
4. Clustering and CEO Turnover 
Our prior analyses rely, largely on panel regressions to identify the relation between 
clustering and firm governance. In this section, we analyze the association in an event 
framework. The labor market for managers operates as a restraint on the managers of firms 
acting to incentive with both ‘carrots’ and ‘sticks’. In an optimal setting, the labor market will 
restrain managers through the threat of being fired and the negative reputation effects that result 
and, at the same time, reward managers who perform well through the promise of higher wages 
or a better position (Weisbach, 1988; Jensen and Murphy, 1990). This outcome, however, 
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assumes that the board of directors is optimally acting in the best interests of the shareholders. 
For example, if the threat of forced turnover is ameliorated by the fact that the board acts to 
insulate top managers from the labor market, then the threat of being fired and the negative 
reputation costs that result will be ineffective mechanisms in restraining agency costs. 
In this section, we examine the extent to which social clustering and reputation costs 
insulate/expose CEOs from disciplinary turnover following value-destroying acquisitions. 
Specifically, we follow the methodology of Lehn and Zhao (2006) and El-Khatib et al. 
(forthcoming) in modeling the likelihood that a CEO faces a disciplinary turnover in a five year 
window following the first acquisition announcement by the firm’s CEO during our sample 
period. Collectively, Lehn and Zhao (2006) and El-Khatib et al. (forthcoming) find that the 
announcement window cumulative abnormal return is a significant determinant in models 
predicting disciplinary CEO turnover. In other words, CEOs of poorly performing acquisitions 
are more likely to face disciplinary action. Additionally, El-Khatib et al. (forthcoming) show that 
the likelihood that a CEO of a poorly performing acquisition will face disciplinary turnover is 
negatively related to the CEO’s centrality. We follow the framework Lehn and Zhao (2006) and 
El-Khatib et al. (forthcoming) adding social clustering and the average centrality of the board 
(i.e., Periph) to their analysis to examine their interplay. 
Given that we examine the five year window following the announcement for instances 
of CEO turnover, our sample period of CEO disciplinary turnovers covers acquisitions that take 
place from January 2000 through December 2005. Following prior studies, we make three 
additional restrictions to our turnover sample. Firstly, we require that our acquisitions involve 
publically traded firms, both acquirer and target, with data on CRSP and Compustat. Secondly, if 
there is more than one acquisition in the sample for a given CEO-firm combination, we keep 
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only the first acquisition. Finally, we restrict the sample to include only those acquisitions where 
the target firm’s market value is at least 10% of the market value of the acquiring firm. Data on 
CEO turnover come from Execucomp. To identify whether or not a CEO remains with the firm 
five years after the acquisition announcement, we compare the CEO in the year prior to the 
acquisition to the CEO five years following the acquisition. Our methodology dies generate a list 
of CEO turnovers, however, it does not indicate whether or not the turnover was forced. To get 
this information, we follow Lehn and Zhao (2006) in defining turnovers which are due to 
disciplinary action, i.e., turnovers which are due to internal governance, takeovers, or 
bankruptcy. Data on internal governance turnovers, turnovers due to takeovers, and turnovers 
due to bankruptcy in compiled in two distinct ways. Firstly, data on internal governance 
turnovers comes from Execucomp’s “Reason” variable which captures the reason for a 
departure. In the event that the data is missing, we use the CEO’s age as a proxy, i.e., if the CEO 
is less than 65 when she is replaced, we classify this as a disciplinary turnover.39 Secondly, to 
ascertain whether or not a CEO turnover is due to a takeover or bankruptcy, we examine whether 
or not a CEO retains her job following the takeover (bankruptcy). The final sample consists of 
186 acquisitions. 
We run the following probit model on the turnover sample: 
𝑃(𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 = 1) = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝐶𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑝ℎ + 𝛽3(𝐶𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑝ℎ) + 𝜹 + 𝑒𝑖 
where the dependent variable takes a value of one if there is a disciplinary CEO turnover in the 
five-year window following the acquisition, Clust is one of our four measures of clustering 
depending on the specification, Periph is an indicator variables that equals one if the average 
board centrality is below the median, (𝐶𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑝ℎ) is their interaction, and δ is a matrix of 
                                                     
39 Our results are robust if we exclude this assumption. 
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control variables including the average percentile centrality of the CEO, the ROA of the firm in 
the three years before (after) the acquisition, the age of the CEO in the year of the 
announcement, and the CEO’s tenure in her current position at the time of the announcement. 40 
The results of this analysis are presented in Table 11. 
[Insert Table 11 about here] 
Coefficient estimates on our control variables are consistent with prior literature. 
Consistent with the findings of Lehn and Zhao (2006) and El-Khatib et al. (forthcoming) the 
coefficient estimates on CAR[-3,+3] are negative and significant in all four specifications. 
Further, our estimates on CEO centrality are positive and significant consistent with El-Khatib et 
al. who find that higher CEO centrality, ceteris paribus, insulates managers from the labor 
market. The diagonal in the top half of Table 11 provides the main results of our testing. Across 
all four specifications, the coefficient estimates on our clustering variables are positive while the 
estimates on Periph are negative. However, they are all statistically indistinguishable from zero. 
In contrast, the interaction between clustering and Periph is negative and statistically significant 
in all four specifications. The negative and statistically significant estimate on the interaction 
suggests that CEOs of clustered firms whose boards have low average centrality, are less subject 
to the labor market. 
Most central to our story, however, is the triple interaction of clustering, Periph, and 
CAR. The coefficient estimate on the triple interaction is positive and significant across the four 
specifications. This result suggests that, although a reduced car increases the likelihood that a 
                                                     
40 We follow El-Khatib et al. (forthcoming) and Fogel, Jandik, McCumber (working paper) in 
calculating CEO centrality. We first calculate four measures of CEO centrality, degree-centrality, 
betweeness-centrality, closeness-centrality, and eigenvector-centrality. We then calculate the 
percentile rankings for each measure and average across the four for a given CEO in a given 
year. 
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CEO faces disciplinary action, this result is ameliorated in the cases where the CEO is managing 
a clustered firm whose boards has a low potential for adverse reputation costs. Taken as a whole, 
these results suggest CEOs of clustered firms on the periphery are insulated from the managerial 
labor market and tend to retain their jobs following a poorly performing acquisition.  
F. Conclusion 
Using data from BoardEx on over 380,000 business professionals and approximately 12 
million pairs of unique social connections, we use a novel approach to detect the community 
structures, or “clusters”, of the network. Inclusion within these tight-knit local communities acts 
as an informal contracting mechanism amongst the members of the group wherein behavior 
consistent with the group’s ideals is rewarded while behavior contrary is punished. This, we 
argue, acts as complement to traditional governance affecting agency costs and producing 
asymmetric consequences for the shareholders of the firm, i.e., in some instances clustering leads 
to desirable outcomes for shareholders while in others it leads negative outcomes. We separate 
these dichotomous outcomes by conditioning the board of directors on their relative, network-
imposed adverse reputation costs and find that clustering is beneficial when the potential for 
adverse network effects is high and harmful when the potential for adverse networks effects is 
low.   
We construct several variables of CEO-director clustering to measure the degree to which 
board members belong to the same cluster as their respective CEOs. Our evidence shows that the 
architecture of the network itself matters. Controlling for CEO and directors’ bilateral 
connections, we show that the degree to which a CEO and her directors overlap in social 
communities affects the governance of the firm and that these effects are conditional upon the 
potential for adverse reputation costs faced by the members of the board. For firms whose boards 
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face relatively lower potential adverse reputation costs to bad behavior, clustering is associated 
with poorer governance and greater rent-extraction by managers. For firms whose boards face 
relatively higher potential adverse reputation costs to bad behavior, clustering acts as an implicit 
enforcement mechanism complementary to explicit firm governance. Specifically, when we 
examine the relation between clustering and various measures of corporate governance, we 
observe higher managerial entrenchment, in the forms of reductions in shareholder protections, 
lower CEO performance-pay sensitivity, lower board independence, greater board size, and a 
reduction in functionality of the executive labor market. 
We contribute to the corporate finance literature in several ways. First, our results add to 
the literature on pairwise, or bilateral, connections by suggesting that the bilateral connection 
alone does not capture the entirety of the social relationships within a network. The existence of 
a pairwise connection may simply indicate the presence of a relationship, either in the past or at 
present, but the strength of the relationship is unknown. On the other hand, belonging to the 
same cluster is more descriptive of the strength of the relationship, i.e., each cluster represents a 
social community in which one’s relationship to others within the cluster is much stronger than 
that toward anyone outside the cluster. Relationship within these tight-knit local neighborhoods 
imposes stronger informal, or implicit, contracts among members within the cluster 
Second, we extend the existing literature on network clustering to business executive 
social networks. The detection of social clusters allows us to analyze the structure or robustness 
of the CEO’s social relationships to the directors. By grouping CEOs and directors into closely 
knit social neighborhoods in which they share more than just common work experience, but also 
mutual friends, information, and maintain closer relationships, we can examine the benefits of 
the network itself. 
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We also contribute to the extant literature which examines the effects of network 
influences on firm outcomes. We show that the degree to which a CEO and her directors overlap 
in social communities affects the governance of the firm and that these effects are conditional 
upon the potential for adverse reputation costs faced by the members of the board. For firms 
whose boards face relatively lower potential adverse reputation costs to bad behavior, clustering 
is associated with poorer governance and greater rent-extraction by managers. For firms whose 
boards face relatively higher potential adverse reputation costs to bad behavior, clustering acts as 
an implicit enforcement mechanism complementary to explicit firm governance. 
We welcome additional work in this area to further our understanding of how social 
relationship modifies the behaviors of connected parties, and affects financial decision making. 
The research in this field has just begun, with ample room to find new insights. 
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Figure 1: Clusters in the Network 
This figure provides an example of clustering in a network with 15 nodes and 60 links. The 
numbered nodes represent individuals, and the links between individuals are their social 
connections. Individuals within the clusters are densely connected, and those belonging to 
different clusters are only sparsely connected. As a result, the majority of the links are 
connecting nodes in the same cluster. Clusters are identified following a procedure that is similar 
to the one outlined in Blondel, Guillaume, Lambiotte, and Lefebvre (2008), with details given in 
Section 3. 
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Figure 2: Graphical representation of CEO and director network 
Figure 2 attempts to depict the social network of over 210,000 business professionals in 2000, 
shown in clusters that minimize the number of inter-cluster connections and maximize the 
number of intra-cluster connections, using the Louvain algorithm for community detection in 
large networks (Blondel, et al., 2008). The graph includes three distinct sets of clusters: (a) a 
dense core where each cluster is densely connected to almost all other core clusters, (b) "petals" - 
smaller clusters that are connected to one or two core clusters, and (c) complete isolates very 
small in size but large by count representing 19,910 individuals unconnected to the giant 
component, forming the outer ring. See also Fogel and Zinoviev (2014) for further details. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics of Clusters in the Network 
This table tallies the clusters in the social network of business professionals for each year from 
1999 to 2009. N is the number of clusters, and distribution statistics (mean, sd, min, max, p25, 
p50, p75) are describing the size of each cluster.  
 
 
 
  
Year N Mean SD Min Max p25 p50 p75
1999 4416 16.4 45.5 1 1189 3 8 15
2000 4438 18 56.7 1 2462 3 9 17
2001 4469 19.6 74.3 1 3658 3 9 18
2002 4491 21.1 69.3 1 1926 3 10 19
2003 4457 22.8 90.2 1 4207 3 11 20
2004 4391 24.8 95 1 3219 3 12 21
2005 4523 25.9 84.6 1 2236 3 12 23
2006 4474 28 101.6 1 3748 3 13 25
2007 4580 29.3 124 1 6413 3 14 26
2008 4627 31.8 98.3 1 2404 3 15 28
2009 4693 33.3 122.8 1 5454 3 16 30
Total 49559 24.7 91.1 1 6413 3 11 22
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Table 2: Summary Statistics on CEO-Director Clustering  
This table presents summary statistics of Clustering Ratio (Crt), defined as the number of 
directors sharing the same social cluster as the CEO as a percentage of total director count, and 
Clustering indicators (C50, C67, C90) taking the value of 1 if more than 50%, 67%, or 90% of 
directors share the same social cluster as the CEO and 0 otherwise. “Total” represents the full 
sample whereas “Central” and “Peripheral” represent boards with high and low average 
centrality of firms for each year from 1999 to 2010, respectively. 
 
 
  
Crt C50 C67 C90
Total N 13933 13933 13933 13933
Mean 0.401 0.398 0.299 0.080
Median 0.4 0 0 0
Std. Dev. 0.342 0.490 0.458 0.272
p5 0 0 0 0
p25 0 0 0 0
p75 0.7 1 1 0
p95 1 1 1 1
Central N 7117 7117 7117 7117
Mean 0.272 0.217 0.131 0.021
Median 0.182 0 0 0
Std. Dev. 0.281 0.412 0.337 0.143
p5 0 0 0 0
p25 0 0 0 0
p75 0.5 0 0 0
p95 0.8 1 1 0
PeripheralN 6816 6816 6816 6816
Mean 0.535 0.587 0.475 0.142
Median 0.625 1 0 0
Std. Dev. 0.347 0.492 0.499 0.350
p5 0 0 0 0
p25 0.2 0 0 0
p75 0.833 1 1 0
p95 1 1 1 1
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Table 3: Summary Statistics on Financial and Corporate Governance Variables 
Table 3 presents key financial measures and corporate governance variables used in the analysis. 
The variables are defined in the second column, before summary statistics are presented.  
 
 
  
Variable Definition N Mean S.D. P25 P50 P75
Tobin’s Q
(Market equity + book assets –
book equity)/total book assets
15889 1.543 1.192 0.848 1.193 1.827
ln(Total Assets)
Natural log of total assets in
Compustat
15889 7.846 1.675 6.626 7.659 8.905
Book Leverage
Total book liabilities over total
book assets
15889 0.225 0.181 0.066 0.212 0.339
Investments Capex over total book assets 15889 0.049 0.062 0.013 0.032 0.064
R&D
R&D expenses over total book
assets
15889 0.024 0.044 0.000 0.000 0.028
ROA Net income over total book assets 15889 0.126 0.101 0.070 0.121 0.176
E-Index
Entrenchment Index (Bebchuk, et
al., 2009)
15889 2.725 1.395 2 3 4
Indep Board
Indicator valued at 1 for having a
majority of independent directors
and 0 otherwise
13969 0.906 0.292 1.000 1.000 1
CEO Age Age of the CEO 15889 55.696 7.326 51 56 60
CEO Tenure Number of years as CEO 15520 7.051 7.379 2 5 10
CEO Centrality
Average of percentile rakings of 4
centrality measures for the CEO
15889 77.296 19.229 65.333 82.333 93
Total Comp. CEO’s total compensation, in thou. 15889 5646.555 10298.250 1498.564 3150.886 6442.850
Equity Comp. CEO’s incentive pay, in thou. 15889 4227.087 9642.213 615.072 1981.311 4880.367
Cash Comp. CEO’s salary plus bonus, in thou. 15889 1419.469 2146.251 635.000 950.769 1501.900
CEO Perf. Pay
Ratio of CEO equity comp. to total 
comp.
15889 0.582 0.279 0.414 0.651 0.807
CEO Pay Slice CEO’s salary plus bonus, in thou. 14649 0.375 0.126 0.301 0.377 0.446
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Table 4: Pairwise Comparisons of Financial and Corporate Governance Variables by 
Degrees of CEO-Director Clustering 
This table presents t-test statistics of firms categorized by the clustering indicators C50, C67, or 
C90, which take a value of 1 if 50%, 67%, or 90% of the directors belongs to the same social 
cluster as the CEO, respectively, and 0 otherwise. The variables are defined in Table 3. 
Statistical significance indicating different group means are indicated by ***, **, * for 1%, 5%, 
and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
  
C50 C67 C90
0 1 0 1 0 1
Variable Mean Mean t-test Mean Mean t-test Mean Mean t-test
Tobin's Q 1.581 1.484 5.029 *** 1.567 1.486 3.786 *** 1.558 1.370 4.801 ***
ln(Total Assets) 7.879 7.794 3.067 *** 7.885 7.750 4.470 *** 7.836 7.957 -2.199 **
Book Leverage 0.227 0.220 2.342 ** 0.228 0.216 3.788 *** 0.225 0.219 1.199
Investments 0.048 0.051 -2.724 *** 0.048 0.052 -3.705 *** 0.049 0.047 0.847
R&D 0.029 0.016 18.543 *** 0.027 0.016 15.734 *** 0.025 0.012 13.665 ***
ROA 0.127 0.123 2.364 ** 0.127 0.123 2.246 ** 0.127 0.113 4.520 ***
E-Index 2.797 2.613 8.065 *** 2.787 2.574 8.661 *** 2.739 2.556 4.190 ***
Indep. Board 0.834 0.744 31.401 *** 0.826 0.732 29.717 *** 0.808 0.688 20.277 ***
CEO Age 55.218 56.442 -9.993 *** 55.262 56.753 -11.006 *** 55.552 57.417 -7.584 ***
CEO Tenure 6.249 8.330 -16.041 *** 6.296 8.933 -17.590 *** 6.796 10.261 -11.583 ***
CEO Centrality 84.088 66.700 58.030 *** 82.458 64.754 51.870 *** 78.794 59.406 28.258 ***
Total Comp 6063.996 4995.237 6.610 *** 6021.659 4734.953 7.845 *** 5745.293 4466.688 4.648 ***
Equity Comp 4694.795 3497.338 8.079 *** 4634.315 3237.413 9.531 *** 4332.205 2970.980 5.547 ***
Cash Comp 1369.201 1497.899 -3.374 *** 1387.344 1497.540 -2.534 ** 1413.088 1495.708 -1.143
CEO Perf. Pay 0.623 0.518 23.051 *** 0.615 0.501 22.816 *** 0.592 0.462 15.092 ***
CEO Pay Slice 0.383 0.362 9.634 *** 0.380 0.362 7.589 *** 0.376 0.361 3.413 ***
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Table 5: Pairwise Comparisons of Financial and Corporate Governance Variables by 
Periphery 
This table presents t-test statistics of firms categorized by the periph indicator (average centrality 
of the board members of the firm), which take a value of 1 if the average board centrality of a 
given firm is lower than the median board centrality across all firms. The variables are defined in 
Table 3. Statistical significance indicating different group means are indicated by ***, **, * for 
1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
  
Peripheral
0 1
Variable Mean Mean t-test
Tobin's Q 1.631 1.455 5.029 ***
ln(Total Assets) 8.415 7.276 3.067 ***
Book Leverage 0.236 0.213 2.342 **
Investments 0.045 0.053 -2.724 ***
R&D 0.033 0.015 18.543 ***
ROA 0.127 0.124 2.364 **
E-Index 2.756 2.694 8.065 ***
Indep. Board 0.847 0.749 31.401 ***
CEO Age 55.000 56.393 -9.993 ***
CEO Tenure 5.563 8.588 -16.041 ***
CEO Centrality 88.157 66.423 58.030 ***
Total Comp 7938.980 3351.532 6.610 ***
Equity Comp 6242.164 2209.726 8.079 ***
Cash Comp 1696.816 1141.807 -3.374 ***
CEO Perf. Pay 0.664 0.500 23.051 ***
CEO Pay Slice 0.383 0.366 9.634 ***
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Table 6: CEO-Director Clustering and E-Index 
This table reports OLS regressions of E-Index on clustering ratio or indicators for the degree to 
which directors belong to the same social cluster as the CEO of the firm, periph, and the 
interaction between clustering and periph. Clustering Ratio (Crt) is defined as the number of 
directors sharing the same social cluster as the CEO as a percentage of total director count, and 
Clustering indicators (C50, C67, C90) taking the value of 1 if more than 50%, 67%, or 90% of 
directors share the same social cluster as the CEO and 0 otherwise. Periph is an indicator which 
take a value of 1 if the average board centrality of a given firm is lower than the median board 
centrality across all firms. Other Controls include ln(CEO Age), ln(Total Assets), Book 
Leverage, ROA, and Investments as defined in Table 3. Independent variables are lagged one-
time period. All regressions control for Fama-French 17 industry classification and year. Robust 
standard errors are clustered at firm level. t-statistics are reported in the parentheses below the 
coefficients. Statistical significance is indicated by ***, **, * for 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. 
 
 
Crt -0.486 ***
(-8.41)
Crt x Periph 0.497 ***
(6.64)
C50 -0.291 ***
(-7.41)
C50 x Periph 0.334 ***
(6.49)
C67 -0.438 ***
(-9.24)
C67 x Periph 0.437 ***
(7.59)
C90 -0.755 ***
(-6.57)
C90 x Periph 0.831 ***
(6.71)
Periph -0.284 *** -0.222 *** -0.194 *** -0.155 ***
(-7.46) (-6.66) (-6.19) (-5.32)
CEO Centrality 0.003 *** 0.004 *** 0.003 *** 0.004 ***
(3.28) (4.43) (4.13) (5.03)
Intercept 3.296 *** 3.177 *** 3.141 *** 3.150 ***
(9.29) (8.97) (8.88) (8.89)
Other Controls
Industry/Year Controls
N
Adj - R
2
13933 13933 13933 13933
0.114 0.113 0.115 0.1126
Dependent Variable = E-Index
Y
Y Y Y Y
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Y Y Y
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Table 7: CEO-Director Clustering, Poison Pills, and Staggered Boards 
This table reports OLS regressions of Poison Pills (Panel A) and Staggered Board (Panel B) on 
clustering ratio or indicators for the degree to which directors belonging to the same social 
cluster as the CEO of the firm, periph, and the interaction between clustering and periph. The 
dependent variables are binary and take a value of 1 if a firm has a poison pill provision or a 
staggered board. Clustering Ratio (Crt) is defined as the number of directors sharing the same 
social cluster as the CEO as a percentage of total director count, and Clustering indicators (C50, 
C67, C90) taking the value of 1 if more than 50%, 67%, or 90% of directors share the same social 
cluster as the CEO and 0 otherwise. Periph is an indicator which take a value of 1 if the average 
board centrality of a given firm is lower than the median board centrality across all firms. Other 
Controls include ln(CEO Age), ln(Total Assets), Book Leverage, ROA, and Investments as 
defined in Table 3. Independent variables are lagged one-time period. All regressions control for 
Fama-French 17 industry classification and year. Robust standard errors are clustered at firm 
level. z-statistics are reported in the brackets below the coefficients. Statistical significance is 
indicated by ***, **, * for 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
  
Crt -0.031 -0.104
[-.38] [-1.55]
Crt x Periph 0.132 0.216 **
[1.25] [2.50]
C50 -0.042 -0.063
[-.76] [-1.40]
C50 x Periph 0.129 * 0.139 **
[1.79] [2.35]
C67 -0.043 -0.210 ***
[-.61] [-3.76]
C67 x Periph 0.071 0.236 ***
[.83] [3.50]
C90 -0.122 -0.282 **
[-.62] [-2.02]
C90 x Periph 0.063 0.462 ***
[.30] [3.08]
Periph -0.146 *** -0.142 *** -0.111 *** -0.097 ** -0.174 *** -0.147 *** -0.133 *** -0.117 ***
[-2.84] [-3.18] [-2.65] [-2.46] [-4.01] [-3.88] [-3.72] [-3.52]
CEO Centrality 0.005 *** 0.005 *** 0.004 *** 0.004 *** -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 ** -0.001
[3.99] [4.24] [3.85] [3.63] [-1.38] [-1.60] [-2.16] [-1.61]
Intercept -0.371 -0.375 -0.376 -0.390 1.408 *** 1.382 *** 1.358 *** 1.404 ***
[-.76] [-.76] [-.76] [-.79] [3.40] [3.33] [3.28] [3.39]
Other Controls
Industry/Year Controls
N
Pseudo - R
2
9922 9922 9922
0.093 0.093 0.093 0.093 0.027 0.027 0.028 0.028
7678 7678 7678 7678 9922
Panel A: Dep. Var. = Poison Pill (Yes=1) Panel B: Dep. Var. = Staggered Board (Yes=1)
Y Y YY Y Y Y Y
(6) (7) (8)
Y Y Y
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Y Y Y Y Y
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Table 8: CEO-Director Clustering and CEO Compensation 
This table reports OLS regressions of Total CEO Compensation (Panel A) and CEO 
Performance Pay (Panel B) on clustering ratio or indicators for the degree to which directors 
belonging to the same social cluster as the CEO of the firm, periph, and the interaction between 
clustering and periph. Total CEO Compensation is total compensation paid to the CEO in a 
given year. CEO Performance Pay is the equity-based compensation divided by the total 
compensation. Clustering Ratio (Crt) is defined as the number of directors sharing the same 
social cluster as the CEO as a percentage of total director count, and Clustering indicators (C50, 
C67, C90) taking the value of 1 if more than 50%, 67%, or 90% of directors share the same social 
cluster as the CEO and 0 otherwise. Periph is an indicator which take a value of 1 if the average 
board centrality of a given firm is lower than the median board centrality across all firms. Other 
Controls include ln(CEO Age), ln(Total Assets), Book Leverage, ROA, and Investments as 
defined in Table 3. Independent variables are lagged one-time period. All regressions control for 
Fama-French 17 industry classification and year. Robust standard errors are clustered at firm 
level. t-statistics are reported in the parentheses below the coefficients. Statistical significance is 
indicated by ***, **, * for 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
  
Crt 0.030 -0.046 ***
(.43) (-4.46)
Crt x Periph 0.046 -0.028 **
(.46) (-2.04)
C50 0.024 -0.035 ***
(.50) (-4.91)
C50 x Periph 0.008 -0.009 **
(.12) (-1.99)
C67 0.003 -0.032 ***
(.04) (-3.54)
C67 x Periph -0.005 -0.016 **
(-.08) (-2.44)
C90 -0.019 -0.083 ***
(-.12) (-3.25)
C90 x Periph -0.111 -0.022 *
(-.66) (-1.82)
Periph -0.313 *** -0.301 *** -0.291 *** -0.283 *** -0.075 *** -0.083 *** -0.083 *** -0.094 ***
(-4.57) (-5.19) (-5.50) (-5.98) (-10.69) (-13.54) (-14.65) (-18.37)
CEO Centrality 0.009 *** 0.009 *** 0.008 *** 0.008 *** 0.0022 *** 0.0022 *** 0.0022 *** 0.0022 ***
(6.85) (7.07) (6.47) (6.12) (8.23) (8.71) (8.58) (9.03)
Intercept 5.224 *** 5.236 *** 5.242 *** 5.228 0.914 *** 0.915 *** 0.905 *** 0.911 ***
(9.92) (9.88) (9.83) (9.80) (13.14) (13.15) (13.00) (13.07)
Other Controls
Industry/Year Controls
N
Adj - R
2
0.281 0.280 0.280 0.280
Y Y Y Y
13933 13933 13933 13933
Y Y Y Y
13933
Panel B: Dep. Var. = CEO Perf. Pay
0.243 0.244 0.244 0.240
13933 13933 13933
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Y Y Y Y
Panel A: Dep. Var. = ln(CEO Total Comp)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Y Y Y Y
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Table 9: CEO-Director Clustering and CEO Pay Slice 
This table reports OLS regressions of CEO Pay Slice (Bebchuk, Cremers, and Peyer, 2011) on 
clustering ratio or indicators for the degree to which directors belonging to the same social 
cluster as the CEO of the firm, periph, and the interaction between clustering and periph. CEO 
Pay Slice is the CEO’s total compensation divided by the total compensation paid to the top-five 
executives of the firm. Clustering Ratio (Crt) is defined as the number of directors sharing the 
same social cluster as the CEO as a percentage of total director count, and Clustering indicators 
(C50, C67, C90) taking the value of 1 if more than 50%, 67%, or 90% of directors share the same 
social cluster as the CEO and 0 otherwise. Periph is an indicator which take a value of 1 if the 
average board centrality of a given firm is lower than the median board centrality across all 
firms. Other Controls include ln(CEO Age), ln(Total Assets), Book Leverage, ROA, and 
Investments as defined in Table 3. Independent variables are lagged one-time period. All 
regressions control for Fama-French 17 industry classification and year. Robust standard errors 
are clustered at firm level. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance is 
indicated by ***, **, * for 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
  
Crt -0.028 ***
(-3.20)
Crt x Periph 0.031 ***
(2.70)
C50 -0.016 ***
(-2.74)
C50 x Periph 0.014 *
(1.94)
C67 -0.020 ***
(-2.88)
C67 x Periph 0.021 **
(2.52)
C90 -0.042 **
(-2.11)
C90 x Periph 0.050 **
(2.34)
Periph -0.014 ** -0.008 -0.008 -0.006
(-2.39) (-1.51) (-1.61) (-1.28)
CEO Centrality 0.0006 *** 0.0006 *** 0.0006 ** 0.0006 ***
(3.74) (4.06) (4.25) (4.66)
Intercept 0.466 ** 0.460 *** 0.458 *** 0.459 ***
(7.63) (7.54) (7.50) (7.54)
Other Controls
Industry/Year Controls
N
Adj - R
2
Dep. Var. = CEO Pay Slice
Y Y Y Y
13933 13933 13933 13933
Y Y Y Y
0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033
(1) (2) (3) (4)
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Table 10: CEO-Director Clustering, Board Independence, and Board Size 
This table reports OLS regressions of director independence on clustering ratio or indicators for 
the degree to which directors belonging to the same social cluster as the CEO of the firm, periph, 
and the interaction between clustering and periph. Independent Board is an indicator which takes 
a value of 1 if a majority of the board is comprised of independent directors. Clustering Ratio 
(Crt) is defined as the number of directors sharing the same social cluster as the CEO as a 
percentage of total director count, and Clustering indicators (C50, C67, C90) taking the value of 1 
if more than 50%, 67%, or 90% of directors share the same social cluster as the CEO and 0 
otherwise. Periph is an indicator which take a value of 1 if the average board centrality of a 
given firm is lower than the median board centrality across all firms. Other Controls include 
ln(CEO Age), ln(Total Assets), Book Leverage, ROA, and Investments as defined in Table 3. 
Independent variables are lagged one-time period. All regressions control for Fama-French 17 
industry classification and year. Robust standard errors are clustered at firm level. z-statistics (t-
statistics) are reported in the brackets (parentheses) below the coefficients. Statistical 
significance is indicated by ***, **, * for 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
  
Crt -0.003 0.392 ***
[-.32] (4.06)
Crt x Periph -0.074 *** 0.213 *
[-4.53] (1.74)
C50 0.000 0.286 ***
[-.04] (4.30)
C50 x Periph -0.037 *** 0.119 *
[-3.45] (1.82)
C67 -0.013 0.147 *
[-1.37] (1.66)
C67 x Periph -0.041 *** 0.127 *
[-3.22] (1.74)
C90 -0.012 0.360 *
[-.50] (1.75)
C90 x Periph -0.098 *** 0.868 ***
[-3.43] (3.87)
Periph -0.062 *** -0.075 *** -0.075 *** -0.083 *** -0.035 -0.025 0.017 0.051
[-7.90] [-11.16] [-11.93] [-14.06] (-.63) (-.51) (.38) (1.15)
CEO Centrality 0.001 *** 0.001 *** 0.001 *** -0.042 * 0.012 *** 0.011 *** 0.009 *** 0.009 ***
[4.07] [5.84] [5.36] [-1.68] (9.76) (9.27) (7.98) (7.74)
Intercept 0.843 *** 0.838 *** 0.829 *** 0.820 *** -0.736 -0.630 -0.536 -0.519
[9.67] [9.61] [9.49] [9.43] (-1.31) (-1.12) (-.95) (-.92)
Other Controls
Industry/Year Controls
N
Pseudo - R
2
/Adj - R
2
0.394 0.394 0.392 0.393
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Y Y Y Y
13933 13933 13933 13933
Dep. Var. = Board Size
Y Y Y Y
Dep. Var. = Indep. Board (Yes=1)
Y Y Y Y
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Y Y Y Y
0.112 0.111 0.113 0.117
13933 13933 13933 13933
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Table 11: CEO-Director Clustering and CEO Turnover 
This table reports the results of Probit estimation on the likelihood that a firm experiences a CEO 
turnover (dependent variable equals 1 if there was a turnover) in the five years following an 
acquisition. The sample is restricted to acquisitions in which both the acquirer and the target are 
U.S publically traded firms, that took place between January 2000 and December 2005, and for 
which the target comprised at least 10% of the acquirer’s pre-acquisition market value. 
Dependent variables of clustering are Clustrtl, clustering ratio, and indicators for the degree to 
which directors belonging to the same social cluster as the CEO of the firm. Periph, whether the 
average board centrality if above the median. And, the interaction between clustering and periph. 
CAR[-3,+3] is the cumulative abnormal return to the acquiring firm over the window three days 
before the announcement to three days after. CEO Centrality is the average percentile centrality 
of the CEO across four measures of centrality. Pre-ROA (Post-ROA) is the return on assets in the 
three years before (after) the announcement. CEO Age is the age of the CEO in the year of the 
announcement. CEO Tenure is the number of years for which the CEO has been in his current 
position. Clustering and Periph variables are lagged one-time period. All regressions control for 
Fama-French 17 industry classification and year. z-statistics are reported in the brackets below 
the coefficients. Statistical significance is indicated by ***, **, * for 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. 
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Table 11: CEO-Director Clustering and CEO Turnover (Cont.) 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Crt 0.051
[.14]
Crt x Periph -0.553 *
[-1.76]
Crt x Periph x CAR 1.9403 *
[1.67]
C50 0.228
[.82]
C50 x Periph -0.670 **
[-2.22]
C50 x Periph x CAR 3.2376 *
[1.71]
C67 0.288
[.89]
C67 x Periph -0.660 **
[-2.30]
C67 x Periph x CAR 4.0645 **
[2.12]
C90 0.743
[.88]
C90 x Periph -0.667 ***
[-2.58]
C90 x Periph x CAR 5.3914 **
[2.54]
Periph -0.439 -0.092 -0.225 -0.280
[-.82] [-.21] [-.48] [-.30]
CAR[-3,+3] -0.954 * -0.940 ** -0.911 ** -0.894 **
[-1.90] [-2.05] [-2.14] [-2.01]
CEO Centrality 0.012 ** 0.007 ** 0.008 ** 0.011 **
[2.15] [2.06] [2.52] [2.37]
Intercept -1.855 -2.401 ** -2.301 ** -1.945 *
[-1.55] [-2.07] [-2.02] [-1.77]
Other Controls
Industry/Year Controls
N
Pseudo - R
2
0.129 0.133 0.136 0.138
Y Y Y Y
186 186 186 186
Dep. Var. = CEO Turnover (Yes=1)
Y Y Y Y
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V. Conclusion 
In the first essay I show that credit rating changes induce market revaluations of peer 
firms. The information revelation of the credit downgrade of an intra-industry peer firms leads to 
price contagion in similar firms. Further, markets overreact at the news of the credit rating 
downgrade announcement. At the announcement, the valuation of peer firms suffer regardless of 
their relative transparency. Post-announcement, in contrast, markets correct the indiscriminate 
price updating exhibited at announcement. The valuations of transparent firms exhibit reversal in 
the post-announcement period while the valuations of opaque peer firms exhibit momentum, 
continuing their decline. 
The second essay illustrates the uncertainty resolution effects firms exhibit when 
becoming credit rated for the first time. The revisions in investor beliefs about the adverse 
selection risks to transacting in the firm’s equity that ensue from the credit rating initiation bring 
about significant changes in the trading behavior of the firm’s secondary market equity. By 
examining the liquidity costs paid by firms at seasoned equity offerings (SEO), we identify the 
reduction effects that being credit rated has on the costs to SEOs. Firms who are credit rated face 
lower SEO costs both in terms of investment bank fees as well as market valuations. 
The third essay examines the effects of information propagation and fidelity in the 
context of firm management. Using a database which covers the social networks of business 
executives, I investigate the effects that networks impart upon firm governance. The degree to 
which a CEO and her directors overlap in social communities and the adverse reputation costs 
they face affects the governance of the firm. For firms whose boards face relatively lower 
(higher) potential adverse reputation costs to bad behavior, clustering is associated with poorer 
(better) governance and greater (lesser) expropriation by firm managers. 
